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Moving Money: International Financial
Flows, Taxes, and Money Laundering
By RICHARD GORDON AND ANDREW P. MORRISS**
Money "moves" internationally through electrons and
physically among financial institutions and non-financial
institutions as part of global trade in legitimate goods and services
and as part of legitimate transnational capital investment, and,
regrettably, as part of criminal enterprise. Some analysts argue that
the movement of a large amount of these funds' through offshore
financial centers (OFCs) suggests a problem with the financial
system that puts "global financial capital. .. beyond the control of
any one national government, able effectively to cast judgment on
the fiscal and monetary policies of nation states themselves through
the disciplinary fear of capital flight." 2 Many of these analyses
purport to distinguish between "onshore" transactions that are
"fully regulated and taxed" and "offshore" transactions "where
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1. See, e.g., Mark P. Hampton & Jason P. Abbott, The Rise (and Fall?) of Offshore
Finance in the Global Economy: Editors' Introduction, in OFFSHORE FINANCE CENTERS
AND TAX HAVENS: THE RISE OF GLOBAL CAPITAL (Mark P. Hampton & Jason P.
Abbott, eds., 1999) (noting claim that "as much as half the world's stock of money
either resides in or is flowing through tax havens").
2. Id. at 2; see also KERN ALEXANDER ET AL., GLOBAL GOVERNANCE OF FINANCIAL
SYSTEMS: THE INTERNATIONAL REGULATION OF SYSTEMIC RISK 67 (2006) (asserting that
OFCs "pose a major regulatory concern because they often lack adequate regulation
and present numerous obstacles to customer identification").
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some regulations and taxation are withheld." 3 Most recently, the Tax
Justice Network caught public attention by arguing that, "[a]
significant fraction of global private financial wealth ... has been
invested virtually tax-free through the world's still-expanding black
hole of more than 80 'offshore' secrecy jurisdictions"4 though they
also ranked the United States in the top five in terms of financial
secrecy.5 Similarly, the popular press often portrays "offshore"
transactions as sources of criminal activity. To illustrate, following
the revelation that Jean-Jaques Augier, the former campaign
treasurer for President Hollande held bank accounts in the Cayman
Islands, the French newspaper Le Monde printed a front page
editorial entitled "The offshore system, this patent enemy of
democracy." The piece attacked "fiscal paradises," generally
interpreted as offshore centers, as a source for money laundering.6
Much of the discussion of international financial transactions
revolves around arguments about "unfair competition" and
"distortions" introduced into financial and legal arrangements by
jurisdictions with tax structures that differ from developed world
norms. For example, offshore critic Ronen Palan argues that what
sets offshore finance apart is that "it drives economic activities into
jurisdictions they should not have been in the first place." 7 As a
3. Ronen Palan, Offshore and the Structural Enablement of Sovereignty in
OFFSHORE FINANCE CENTERS AND TAX HAVENS: THE RISE OF GLOBAL CAPITAL 18, 21
(Mark Hampton & Jason Abbott, eds., 1999).
4. James S. Henry, The Price of Offshore Revisited: New Estimates for "Missing"
Global Private Wealth, Income, Inequality, and Lost Taxes 5, TAX JUSTICE NETWORK (July
2012), available at http://www.taxjustice.net/cms/upload/pdf/PriceofOffshore
_Revisited_120722.pdf.
5. Financial Secrecy Index, 2011 Results TAX JUSTICE NETWORK
http://www.financialsecrecyindex.com /2011results.html (last visited Oct. 29,
2013). See also ROBERT KEATS, A CANADIAN'S BEST TAX HAVEN: THE US 7 (2012)
(arguing that "The US meets virtually all the requirements of a good tax haven for
Canadians.").
6. Editorial, Le systime offshore, cet ennemi patenti de la ddmocratie, LE MONDE,
Apr. 4, 2013, at 1 (translation by the authors).
7. Palan, supra note 3, at 35. Places that economic activities "should not" be
include the Cayman Islands, about which Palan says "[s]trictly speaking, it does not
make economic sense for the Cayman Islands to serve as the world's fifth largest
financial centre." Id. Thus, Palan argues:
[Ilt does not make sense for the Marshall Islands, Vanuatu or Liberia to be
the world's giant shipping nations. There is no obvious economic reason
why small Pacific islands are at the forefront of the telecommunications
revolution, nor why Guyana and Niue are the central routing areas for
Internet porn. In direct contradiction to the theory of comparative
2 [Vol. 37:1
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result, critics contend that the existence of these jurisdictions
"distort[s] the relocation policies of international capital."8
These arguments rest on a profound misunderstanding of how
financial transactions occur.9 We argue below that much of this "tax
justice" literature is driven by its incorrect assumptions about
money, business, finance, and government. The assumptions are
disguised by often overheated rhetoric and pseudoscientific, or
completely unscientific calculations. Like a three card monte dealer
rapidly shifting cards on a box while distracting his victims with
rapid chatter, some proponents of "tax justice" divert debates over
tax policy, global finance, and international business away from the
economic underpinnings of financial transactions and the
fundamental substantive policy differences that should be the focus
of discussion. Although they seek to persuade policymakers that
adopting their proposed policies will not limit the beneficial aspects
of the existing financial system, what they are advocating is a
advantage which assumes that economic activities tend to gravitate
towards geographically relevant areas, offshore has the opposite effect.
Id. In a similar vein, another critic, Sol Picciotto, argues that "[b]y providing a
haven for routing global flows through the use of artificial persons and
transactions, 'offshore' has helped to dislocate the international state system and
induce its substantial reconstruction." Sol Picciotto, Offshore: The State as Legal
Fiction, in OFFSHORE FINANCE CENTRES AND TAx HAVENS: THE RISE OF GLOBAL
CAPITAL, supra note 1, at 43, 43. To some extent, all taxes have such impacts.
Corporate taxes "cause capital to flow to unincorporated productive sector" and
"distort investment and financing decisions, and may discourage the distribution of
dividends." Emilio Albi, The challenges of corporate income taxes in a globalized world,
in THE ELGAR GUIDE TO TAx SYSTEMS 131, 162 (Emilio Albi & Jorge Martinez-
Vasquez, eds., 2011).
8. Palan, supra note 3, at 35. Palan's analysis ignores a key element of such
jurisdictions' appeal to businesses: their legal and regulatory systems. See, e.g.,
Tony Freyer & Andrew P. Morriss, Creating Cayman as an Offshore Financial Center:
Structure and Strategy Since 1960, ARIZ. ST. L.J. (forthcoming 2014); Andrew P.
Morriss, The Role of Offshore Financial Centers in Regulatory Competition, in OFFSHORE
FINANCIAL CENTERS AND REGULATORY COMPETITION (Andrew P. Morriss, ed., 2010).
To ignore comparative advantage in providing a legal and regulatory environment
is a significant error in analysis. See ERIN A. O'HARA & LARRY E. RIBSTEIN, THE LAW
MARKET (2009).
9. They are often made by "repentant sinners," such as former employees of
consulting firms engaged in global finance who purport to offer an insider's
knowledge of how greedy individuals deprive their governments of their share of
those individuals' incomes. See, e.g., Henry, supra note 4; JAMES S. HENRY, THE
BLOOD BANKERS: TALES FROM THE GLOBAL UNDERGROUND ECONOMY (2005); JOHN
PERKINS, CONFESSIONS OF AN ECONOMIC HIT MAN (2005). As far as we can tell from
their writings, none of these repentant sinners has offered to make reparations for
their own shares of the ill-gotten gains they claim their former employers secured.
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fundamental reordering of global finance in ways that we contend
would reduce social welfare.
We believe that a continuum exists as to how those who
formulate public policy view international money movements. At
one end are those who believe that such movements are illegitimate
unless subject to strict public control. At the other end are those
who believe that such movements are the legitimate workings of the
market and need no public controls. Most probably have a view
somewhere in between these extremes - that while most
international money movements consist of legitimate market
activities, some public controls are needed to prevent abuse. The
real question is: where along the continuum is the best public policy
choice, and based on what criteria?
We believe that much current commentary (and actual public
policy) is hewing too close to the "illegitimate without strict control"
end. We refer to this as the "control first" view. "Control first"
advocates often begin by neglecting the benefits of free markets, and
then overstate the benefits of control while ignoring the costs of
those controls.
We, on the other hand, believe that one should begin with the
view that voluntary transactions among people and firms that wish
to trade and invest with one another is a positive good, and
therefore that keeping transactions costs of "moving" money from
one place to another is also a positive good. We also believe that
some public controls are needed to prevent the costs of abuse, and
that any controls must be judged by their costs to market efficiency
and their real, demonstrated benefits. At no time should policy
makers assume that controls have no costs, or that because controls
are well intentioned they have good results. Because we believe in
including both benefits and costs of free markets, market abuse, and
controls of market abuse, we call this the "Efficient Enterprises"
view. To be clear, we are not anti-regulation; we are against
inefficient and wasteful regulation.
Those of us that hold this view believe that we should start by
looking at the benefits of international markets in goods and
services, which cannot take place without the international
movement of money. For example, the Peterson Institute for
International Economics calculates that Americans alone benefitted
4 [Vol. 37:1
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from trade liberalization by nearly $1.4 trillion in 2012.10 It is not just
rich countries that benefit. By the 1970s, "[e]conomic growth in the
open world market economy ha[d] been so great that few
governments are now in strong enough control over their civil
societies to be able to deny them the chance to participate in this
wealth-creating system."" In 1998, the head of the World Trade
Organization (WTO) cited the growth in trade as a cause of the
doubling of income in ten developing countries with a combined
population of 1.5 billion and overall annual growth in the world
economy of 1.9% per year since World War II, a historically high
figure.12 This was the dominant vision in international private law
until the 1990s and underlies how international financial institutions
were constructed.
On the other hand, "Control First" begins by seeing the
"movement" of money as a problem unless subject to control.
Control can only be implemented if information on the money has
been reported to governments (or occasionally quasi-governmental
organizations), which will then be able to use the information to
prevent transactions that represent the proceeds of crime, including
the evasion (and, increasingly, the legal avoidance) of taxes. In this
vision, transfers of money, international finance, and globalization
are seen first as the means by which the powerful exploit others,
depriving the victims of their livelihoods and resources. For
example, the Tax Justice Network argues in its widely cited report
The Price of Offshore Revisited that $21 trillion to $32 trillion in
"financial" wealth in 2010 was "hidden" in OFCs and so is
"virtually tax free."13 Similarly, analyst Raymond Baker contended
10. , Economy & Trade, OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE
http://www.ustr.gov/trade-topics/economy-trade (last visited Oct. 29, 2013).
11. See JOHN STOPPORD, SUSAN STRANGE & JOHN S. HENLEY, RIVAL STATES, RIVAL
FIRMS: COMPETITION FOR WORLD MARKET SHARES 55 (1991). Note that, as Stopford et
al. argue, this does not mean that governments must adopt laissez faire policies, but
rather that governments have different options and different effective powers in an
open economy world than they did when autarky was a more realistic option. Id.
12. Press Release, WTO News, Renato Ruggiero, From vision to reality: the
multilateral trading system at fifty, (Mar. 4, 1998), available at http://www.wto.org
/english/news-e/pres98_e/pr94_e.htm.
13. Henry, supra note 4, at 5. The difference between $21 trillion and $32 trillion
is substantial - with the upper bound over 50% higher than the lower bound - but
TJN's argument is essentially that the amount is large, regardless of the precise
figure.) The report has been frequently cited in news accounts. See, e.g., Heather
Stewart, E13bn hoard hidden from taxman by global elite, GUARDIAN (July 21, 2012),
http://www.theguardian.com/business/2012/jul/21/global-elite-tax-offshore-
2014]1 5
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in the early 2000s that $1 trillion in "dirty money" crosses borders
annually, and that there was $5 trillion in accumulated hidden
assets (as of the early 2000s).14 Proponents of the Control First
framework argue that the most important impact of financial
openness is to allow the looting of developing country economies by
a coalition of local elites, multinational businesses, and
multinational financial institutions.15
The disagreement between these frameworks is partly
philosophical. Regardless of the size of "undertaxed" money flows,
who gets the money, or benefits of financial freedom, one might
believe that taxing every dollar of wealth trumps any benefit. One
might believe that a poorer but more equal world is preferable to a
richer but less equal one, or, alternatively, that ensuring that
investors are free to shift assets wherever they prefer is worth any
reduction in tax revenues anywhere, or that eradicating absolute
poverty trumps concerns over inequality. The Tax Justice Network,
for example, rarely concedes that there is any benefit to the
movement of money in the international financial system.16 As its
name suggests, it is focused on applying its definition of "justice" to
the tax system, largely to the exclusion of any benefits of financial
freedom. However, the disagreement is also empirical - there are
important disagreements about the facts: does making international
financial flows cheaper help or hurt the global economy, particular
economies, or particular individuals?
The relative influence of these visions over future measures
governing the international financial architecture in particular
countries, in treaties among countries, and in multilateral governance
structures will profoundly shape the future of the world economy. In
part, the choice between them reflects a disagreement about the mix
of different kinds of transactions in the world economy. For example,
the more criminal transactions that occur, the greater is the
economy.
14. RAYMOND W. BAKER, CAPITALISM'S ACHILLES HEEL: DIRTY MONEY AND How
To RENEW THE FREE-MARKET SYSTEM 165, 191, 237-38, 258 (2005).
15. See, e.g., HENRY, BLOOD BANKERS, supra note 9, at xxiv ("the conventional
portrait of the global development crisis is an economist's fairy tale. It leaves out
all of the blood and guts of what really happened-all the payoffs, corrupt
privatizations, fraudulent loans, intentionally wasteful projects, black market
'round trip' transfers, arms deals, insider information, and the behind-the-scenes
operation of the global haven banking network that facilitated this behavior.").
16. Henry, supra note 4, at 25.
6 [Vol. 37:1
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justification to implement preventive measures. At the same time,
however, Control First measures necessarily add transactions costs,
which by definition will reduce legitimate, value-maximizing
transactions, while perhaps blocking some criminal ones. How to
balance the costs and benefits of such measures will depend in part
on views about the relative importance of reducing crime, including
fiscal crime, (as well as the effectiveness of these measures in actually
reducing crime) and of increasing the volume of private, wealth-
maximizing transactions. That, in turn, rests not only on
disagreements within and across societies over the appropriate size
and scope of governments, but also over the costs and effectiveness of
different financial infrastructures.
As the global financial crisis provided the opportunity for
substantial changes in the world's financial infrastructure,
understanding this clash of visions is important. In this Article, we
make several contributions. In Part I, we contrast the Efficient
Enterprises and Control First frameworks, examining their different
assumptions about how the world economy functions. In Part II, we
set out the financial "plumbing" through which money "moves"
and show why this infrastructure is important and how it affects the
two frameworks' policy prescriptions. In Part III, we analyze the
evidence provided by the Tax Justice Network, among the primary
proponents of the more extreme Control First framework measures,
and show that it fails to support their claims. Part IV concludes by
setting out some criteria for evaluating policy trade-offs in decisions
about financial architectures.
I. Alternative Frameworks for International Finance
Before we can discuss international financial flows and the
regulatory frameworks that can be used to shape them, we need to
understand what it is that financial transactions do. Not surprisingly,
views differ about why money "moves" across borders and the
impacts of its movements. Moreover, the Control First attack on
"offshore" jurisdictions makes it important to consider the role of
these jurisdictions in the global economy and to recognize that these
"offshore" locations do not exist in isolation.'7  Their
interconnectedness with the rest of the global financial network
17. Even an OFC critic like Ronan Palan "'offshore' financial transactions are
very much 'onshore', conceived, organized and handled in the traditional financial
centers of London, New York, Tokyo, and so on." Palan, supra note 3, at 21.
2014] 7
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makes it necessary to understand how they function-how money
"moves" through them-to evaluate these competing visions.
Having a clear view of the alternative conceptual frameworks is
necessary to understand the legal and policy choices international
capital flows present.
A. Efficient Enterprises
The standard economic view of global capital flows is that
reducing the obstacles to the flow of money across borders
maximizes total global welfare by shifting resources from less
efficient to more efficient uses.18 Crucially, firms are willing to
engage in international operations only when the "greater
complexity and risk" involved in creating and maintaining "costly
systems of command and control that can work effectively over
large distances and deal with the hazards of markets that differ from
their own" if they believe the gains outweigh these costs.19 This
view sees virtues flowing from the movement of financial resources
of individuals and firms across borders, allowing them to reduce
concentration risk by engaging in portfolio diversification. It also
permits investors to avoid or hedge against risks due to poor quality
regulatory frameworks or other causes.20
This view can be summarized as follows: obstacles to financial
flows constitute transactions costs. In pursuit of wealth
maximization, the transactions costs of financial flows should be
reduced and financial innovations that promote lower transactions
costs should be welcomed.21 Increasing financial flows creates a
range of benefits, from generally facilitating trade and investment,
to specifically allowing both the reduction of overall risk and the
18. For example, Peter Cohen and U. Srinivasa Rangan argue that capital's
movement toward higher returns creates pressure to upgrade countries'
"Entrepreneurial Ecosystems," which involves "enhancing corporate transparency,
stream-lining capital markets, and building more globally competitive human
capital networks." PETER COHEN & U. SRINIVASA RANGAN, CAPITAL RISING: How
CAPITAL FLOWS ARE CHANGING BUSINESS SYSTEMS ALL OVER THE WORLD 4 (2010).
19. STOPFORD, STRANGE & HENLEY, supra note 11, at 69.
20. See, e.g., Michael E. Porter & Martin R. Kramer, Creating Shared Value, HARV.
Bus. REV. 76 (January / February 2011) ("the ways in which regulations are
designed and implemented determine whether they benefit society or work against
it.").
21. This includes regulatory measures that promote "the efficient pricing of
capital and financial products" as this helps control systemic risk. ALEXANDER ET
AL., supra note 2, at 77.
[Vol. 37:18
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efficient allocation of remaining risks among voluntary parties. The
more these are reduced or eliminated, the more efficiently resources
are allocated. As resources move about the world, states compete for
resources by providing attractive environments for labor and capital
in pursuit of wealth-creating activities that can then fund the
provision of public goods. 22 Since "a successful capitalist economy
depends not only on a successful capitalist class, but also on that
class's willingness to use and invest their money in the domestic
economy,"23 this exerts pressure on states to adopt policies that
attract resources, and so generate wealth. Among those policies are
limits on tax rates.24
In this view, regulatory measures should primarily aim at
facilitating markets, not obstructing transactions in pursuit of other
policies. This view is embedded in modem international financial
institutions such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF), and
later, the World Trade Organization (WTO).25 Promoting it has been
an important part of the work of the Organization for Economic
Cooperation and Development (OECD).26 It is also embedded in the
European Union's financial architecture, which emphasizes the free
movement of capital,27 and the creation of the euro.28 Indeed, so
22. See STOPFORD, STRANGE & HENLEY, supra note 11, at 209 ("Without wealth or
the prospect of future sources of wealth, even if there is no external security threat,
the state begins to fall apart."); Morriss, Role, supra note 8, at 105-109.
23. SVEN STEINMO, TAXATION & DEMOCRACY: SWEDISH, BRITISH, AND AMERICAN
APPROACHES TO FINANCING THE MODERN STATE 158 (1993).
24. Albi, supra note 7, at 142 (low tax jurisdictions "have established limits and
lowered CIT [corporate income tax] rates."). Research into distortions caused by
high rates may also push rates down. See Richard M. Bird, Tax system change and the
impact of tax research, in ELGAR GUIDE, supra note 7, at 413, 430 ("The downward
pressure on personal and corporate income tax rates has certainly been supported,
if not initiated, by the increasing research measuring the distortions caused by high
marginal tax rates.").
25. RAWI ABDELAL, CAPITAL RULES: THE CONSTRUCTION OF GLOBAL FINANCE 7
(2007) ("Policymakers then wrote the [liberal] consensus into the institutional
architecture of the international monetary system. The rules were codified in three
international organizations: the IMF, the European Community (EC), and the
OECD.").
26. Andrew P. Morriss & Lotta Moberg, Cartelizing Taxes: Understanding the
OECD's Campaign Against "Harmful Tax Competition", 4 COLUM. J. TAx L. 1, 21-22,
27-32, 2012) (describing and explaining transformation of OECD tax program).
Since the 1990s, however, the OECD's efforts on tax harmonization (but not its
work in other areas) have switched to a Control First perspective. See id. at 39-48.
ABDELAL, supra note 25, at 7.
27. See id. at 3 ("European policymakers conceived and promoted the liberal
20141 9
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pervasive is this view that one can reject it only by rejecting the
intellectual framework underlying the post-World War II system of
international trade law and finance adopted by virtually every
nation. This is not to say that problems like corruption should be
ignored. Rather, an Efficient Enterprises approach sees increasing
financial openness as reducing such problems, not increasing
them.29
The Efficient Enterprises framework has four central
implications for international financial flows. First, financial flows
are a necessary component of facilitating trade. One can argue-as
antiglobalization activists do-against efforts to lower barriers to
trade, but if one accepts that comparative advantage makes trade
welfare increasing for both parties, one must also accept the virtue
of reducing the transactions costs of trade. Second, global financial
flows reduce the costs of jurisdictional arbitrage, encouraging
jurisdictions to compete for wealth-creating activity by reducing
transactions costs. Third, globalized finance inevitably allows tax
planning to occur, which reduces the transactions costs of doing
business across borders as well as limits tax revenue. Fourth,
globalized finance provides financial privacy, which is a good in its
own right as well as a means to encouraging additional wealth
creation.
1. Facilitating Trade
One important reason why Efficient Enterprises proponents
favor removing obstacles to financial flows is to facilitate trade.
Increased financial flows facilitate trade in important ways.30 Even
rules that compose the international financial architecture. The most liberal rules in
international finance are those of the EU, and the United States was irrelevant to
their construction.").
28. See DAVID MARSH, THE EURO: THE POLITICS OF THE NEw GLOBAL CURRENCY 10
("the liberalism of an integrated European financial market is one of the essential
conditions within the Euro area required to provide the economic flexibility and
financial lubrication to offset the rigidity of permanently fixed exchange rates.").
29. Johann Graf Lambsdorff, Causes and consequences of corruption: What do we
know from a cross-section of countries, in INTERNATIONAL HANDBOOK ON THE
ECONOMICS OF CORRUPTION 3, 8-9 (Susan Rose-Ackerman ed., 2006) (summarizing
evidence that increased openness is correlated with reduced corruption). Note that
political openness may be less effective than financial openness, since corruption
can subvert political selection methods. Id. at 12-13. Further, firms may be able to
adapt to corruption through business structures. Id. at 30.
30. The relationship between financial integration and trade can be seen in
historical patterns of trade. Just before World War I, financial integration in the
[Vol. 37:110
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in relatively simple exchanges of cash and goods, financial flows
facilitate trade by allowing trading parties to shift activities to the
location with the comparative advantage in each activity. Reducing
the costs of even simple transactions is important. For example,
London owes its historical position as a financial and insurance
center to the lower cost of handling trade conducted in sterling
there;31 Hong Kong's entrep6t activities led to the development of its
role as an Asian financial center;32 and New York City developed its
role as a financial center out of its role as a domestic capital market
developed world's economies was quite high. Moritz Schularick & Thomas M.
Steger, Financial Integration, Investment, and Economic Growth: Evidence from Two Eras
of Financial Globalization, (CESifo Working Paper No. 1691) (rev.) (2007) at 4 available
at http://www.jfki.fu-berlin.de/faculty/economics/team/EhemaligeMitarbeit
ernnen
/schularick/FinancialIntegration Investment_andEconomicGrowth_.pdf?1376
087674 ("The degree of international financial integration reached before 1914 was
truly impressive."). A number of firms managed "their overseas assets as part of an
integrated unit rather than as passive investments in a portfolio." STOPFORD,
STRANGE & HENLEY, supra note 11, at 13 (noting that Colt began such operations in
Britain in 1852). The war disrupted the financial integration and the belligerents
raised barriers to trade; these persisted after the war ended and trade volume did
not recover until recently. By the end of the twentieth century, cross-border
financial flows had returned to their pre-World War I level as transactions costs and
regulatory barriers fell. Id. From 1980 to the early 1990s, cross-border financial
transactions in industrial economies grew from less than 10% of GDP to more than
100%. HENRI L. BEENHAKKER, THE GLOBAL ECONOMY AND INTERNATIONAL FINANCING
50 (2001). See also STOPFORD, STRANGE & HENLEY, supra note 11, at 41 ("Instead of a
series of national financial systems linked by a few operators buying and selling
credit across the exchanges, we now have a global system, in which national
markets, physically separate, function as if they were all in the same place.").
31. Ranald Michie, A Financial Phoenix: The City of London in the Twentieth
Century, LONDON AND PARIS AS INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL CENTRES IN THE TWENTIETH
CENTURY 15, 17 (Youssef Cassis & Eric Bussiere eds., 2005) (London was "the
payments center of the world economy, for through these connections it was
possible to settle almost any international transaction there. Hence the fact that the
'bill on London' was the near universal currency of international trade and finance,
whether it involved transactions between China and the United States or France
and Australia.").
32. Catherine R. Schenk, The Rise of Hong Kong and Tokyo as International
Financial Centres after 1950, in CENTRES AND PERIPHERIES IN BANKING: THE HISTORICAL
DEVELOPMENT OF FINANCIAL MARKETS 2, 6 (Philip L. Cottrell et al. eds., 2007) ("Hong
Kong's role as a regional and international financial center arose from the strong
commercial heritage of banking and financial services, which continued to
dominate activity in the colony throughout the 1950s and 1960s, and positioned
Hong Kong as the regional center for the exchange of information and expertise on
Asian and Western market opportunities. In this sense, Hong Kong clearly fits into
the model of an IFC emerging from an international commercial entrepot.").
2014] 11
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for the United States.33
The competitive advantage of a multinational firm will depend
on where it locates its activities (either the activities it does directly
or those it contracts for in the marketplace).34 Structuring a
multinational business involves more than one-off exchanges of
goods and services for cash, it also requires more complex
transactions that reduce the transactions costs of cross-border
activity. Among the important risks for cross-border investments
are principal-agent conflicts. Building longer term relationships can
reduce principal-agent conflicts and so reduce the risks involved in
cross-border transactions.35 Similarly, sophisticated financial
arrangements enable parties to reduce the costs of transacting by
allocating or hedging risks (e.g., currency risk) among the parties.36
33. YOUSSEF CASSIS, CAPITALS OF CAPITAL: A HISTORY OF INTERNATIONAL
FINANCIAL CENTRES 1780-2005 115 (2006) (New York's importance due to "three
reasons: the total amount of foreign capital investment in the United States, the
dynamism of the American economy, and the city's position as the country's
financial centre" in period before World War I.).
34. MICHAEL E. PORTER, THE COMPETITIVE ADVANTAGE OF NATIONS 60 (1998)
("Over time, however, successful global firms usually combine advantages drawn
from their home base with those resulting from locating particular activities in
other nations and those emerging from the overall world-wide network.... The
combination of home base advantages, the benefits of locating selected activities in
foreign locations, and advantages growing out of the worldwide system, not each
alone, underpins international success."); BEENHAKKER, supra note 30, at 31 ("If the
global competitor locates its different activities in different countries according to
each country's comparative advantage, it will then, at the same time, achieve
competitive advantage. For instance, components can be made in South Korea,
software written in India and basic R&D performed in Silicon Valley.").
35. For example, accounting serves as a crucial means of facilitating cross-
border investment. Indeed, the development of the accounting profession in the
United States is at least partly due to the need to persuade European (and
particularly British) investors to invest in American railroads. See PAUL J. MIRANTI,
JR., ACCOUNTANCY COMES OF AGE: THE DEVELOPMENT OF AN AMERICAN PROFESSION,
1886-1940 34 (1990) ("The certificate of a well-known accounting firm was thought
to improve the marketability of American securities among European investors.");
THOMAS A. KING, MORE THAN A NUMBERS GAME: A BRIEF HISTORY OF ACCOUNTING
14-17 (2006) (describing issues involved in railroad and other securities); GEOFFREY
P. MILLER & FABRIZIO CAFAGGI, THE GOVERNANCE AND REGULATION OF
INTERNATIONAL FINANCE 142 (2013) ("Accounting is about reducing information
asymmetry. The rise of trans-national companies and cross-border investments
exposed the deficiency of the old local accounting framework to deal with these
transactions, and the world is today moving towards a more globalized accounting
practice, with regulations trying to follow.").
36. See, e.g., Bjorn Dohring, Hedging and invoicing strategies to reduce exchange rate
exposure: a euro-area perspective 1 (EU Econ. & Fin. Affairs Directorate, Econ. Papers
No. 299, 2008), available at http://ec.europa.eu/economyjinance/ publicatio
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Making such arrangements requires both financial service providers
(e.g., banks, accountants, insurance companies, lawyers) and well-
developed legal and regulatory systems. Because these are often not
available or too costly in some jurisdictions, structuring transactions
through jurisdictions where such services are available or are less
expensive facilitates trade.37
Consider a relatively simple trade arrangement between a
manufacturer in one country and a retailer in another. The parties to
the trade deal face a number of risks, including currency risks, legal
risks, and political risks. For example, a U.S. retailer contracting
with a Chinese supplier to send it goods to be sold in the United
States would need, at a minimum, to address risks due to
differences in the U.S. and Chinese legal systems, currency risks for
dollar-renminbi conversions, and political risks that U.S.-China
relations could be disrupted in a fashion that would affect the
transactions. If the relationship were even slightly more complex, as
it would be if the U.S. retailer and Chinese manufacturer wanted to
enter into a joint venture that required the U.S. partner to invest in
China and transfer intellectual property rights to the joint venture,
these risks would be greatly increased. Relationships between a U.S.
ns/publicationll475_en.pdf ("Exchange rate risk can also be neutralized
("hedged") through financial instruments, such as exchange rate derivatives or
foreign currency debt (financial hedges), as well as through the operational setup of
the exporting firm (operational hedges). Financial derivatives have today become
standard tools for hedging risks related to exchange rates, interest rates or
commodities prices."); Ron Box, Reducing Pricing Risks with Effective Hedge Strategies,
CORPORATE FIN. INSIDER (Feb. 3, 2011),
http://www.cpa2biz.com/Content/media/PRODUCER CON TENT/
Newsletters/Articles2011/ CorpFin/ReducePricingRisks.jsp ("Mitigating financial
risk with hedge transactions can be very helpful to businesses of all sizes,
particularly as those risks become more pronounced. Many circumstances beyond
the control of financial executives can affect the commodities critical to business
operations or the interest rates required for capital."); GORDON DE BROUWER, HEDGE
FUNDS IN EMERGING MARKETS 1-2 (2001) (noting usefulness of currency trades to
"[a]n exporter who wants to eliminate the risk that the currency will appreciate
before he receives his foreign-exchange receipts" and who is able to "sell that
foreign exchange now for delivery at some time in the future" which leads to a
"process of intermediation ... whereby banks trade the foreign-exchange risk until
someone who wants the exposure - typically a speculator -can get it.").
37. STOPFORD, STRANGE & HENLEY, supra note 11, at 222 (In many developing
countries, legal systems are antiquated, contradictory and impenetrably obscure.
Firms need to know the extent of their legal obligations and of their legal rights.
Although it is reasonable for a government to reserve the right to change the rules,
the changes should be consistent, pointed in the same direction, and transparently
clear. Arbitrary decisions provide one of the biggest disincentives to investors.").
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firm and a French firm, a Chinese firm and a South African firm, or
a British firm and a Chilean firm would face a similar array of risks,
although the details of the particular risks might differ. Because any
contract defining the rights of the parties would necessarily be
incomplete,38 the parties would need confidence that any future
disputes would be resolved fairly and efficiently. One way to
provide such confidence is through sophisticated financial
transactions. For example, valuable assets of the joint venture might
be owned by a legal entity that was bankruptcy-remote from either
of the joint ventures. More sophisticated financial instruments
promote liquidity and allow better management of risks.39 Another
means of coping with incomplete contracts is to choose the law and
legal institutions of a jurisdiction other than the home jurisdictions
of the contracting parties (to avoid potential bias).40
Currency risks are a simple example of a problem parties face
in international trade. Changes in exchange rates, including changes
in the value of outstanding financial obligations incurred prior to a
change in exchange rates, changes in the present value of firms due
to changes in the net present value of future operating cash flows,
and accounting-derived changes in owners' equity from the
translation of foreign-currency denominated assets and liabilities
into the currency in which accounts are reported. 41 The risk of
inflation differs dramatically across jurisdictions -and inflation is
itself a form of a tax. 42 An important means of managing these risks
38. See, e.g., Eric Maskin & Jean Tirole, Unforeseen Contingencies & Incomplete
Contracts. 66 REv. EcoN. STUD. 83, 83 (1999) ("Most real contracts are vague or silent
on a number of significant matters."); Eric A. Posner, Economic Analysis of Contract
Law After Three Decades: Success or Failure?, 112 YALE L.J. 829, 833 (2003) ("A
theoretically complete contract would describe all the possible contingencies, but
transactions costs -including the cost of negotiating and writing down the terms -
and foreseeing low-probability events, render all contracts incomplete.").
39. See, e.g., MILLER & CAFAGGI, supra note 35, at 43-44 (discussing role of CDS
instruments).
40. See, e.g., The Report on the First Five Years of the Hong Kong Special
Administrative Region of the People's Republic of China 25 (2002), available at
http://www.info.gov.hk/info/sar5/contente.htm ("The most important
[advantage over the Mainland] is Hong Kong's legal system, which is trusted, tried
and tested by international business.").
41. BEENHAKKER, supra note 30, at 149.
42. Patrick Honohan, Avoiding the Pitfalls in Taxing Financial Intermediation, in
TAXATION OF FINANCIAL INTERMEDIATION: THEORY AND PRACTICE FOR EMERGING
ECONOMIEs 1, 19-20 (2003).
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is by hedging currency exposures.43 Another is through contractual
provisions, shifting the risk to the party most willing or able to bear
it at the lowest cost.
The foundation for the case for trade is comparative advantage,
the idea that productivity differentials across jurisdictions
(differences in the cost ratios for producing different goods and
services) translate into opportunities for gains from trade.44
However, global competition does more than just promote trade
based on existing comparative advantages, it also spurs innovation.
Cohen and Rangan describe how the evolution of the personal
computer industry over the last thirty years illustrates this:
Far from being a vertically integrated, few-firms-dominated
industry as its predecessor main-frame industry used to be, the
new industry has from its beginning been highly decentralized.
The splintering of the vertical chain was facilitated by the
standardization of various parts, components, operating systems,
and microprocessors. In turn, this led to the springing up of a
large number of new manufacturers specializing in key parts of
the value chain in many parts of the world and especially in Asia,
a classic case of global spur to entrepreneurship. . .45
As a result, they argue that the growth in international trade was
facilitated by a combination of micro developments ("such as
advances in product design and process technology") and macro
developments ("such as the acceptance of a liberal international
trading order").46
Trade thus expanded the number of firms and diversified their
locations, producing a greater demand for cross-border financial
transactions above and beyond the increase that would result from
firms diversifying their own operations across borders. The benefits
of such expansion go well beyond the immediate benefits from
trade: opening economies brings in both new physical technology
and knowledge embedded "in the brains of people, in
organizational structures and in behavioral patterns, which in turn
are conditioned by the strategies of different social factors and their
patterns in conflict and co-operation."47 This growth makes taxation
43. Id. at 149-50.
44. Id. at 29.
45. COHEN & RANGAN, supra note 18, at 13.
46. Id. at 14.
47. STOPFORD, STRANGE & HENLEY, supra note 11, at 72 (quoting Ernst &
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of capital more difficult, however, since the growth of multinational
business deals and organizations combined with "the common
propensity of national government[s] to offer tax incentives,
deductions, exemptions, credits, and so on" makes it easier to shift
income to the lowest tax jurisdiction and avoid or evade taxes.48
Finally, expanding trade increases the need for access to deep
capital markets and, crucially, to legal systems capable of handling
complex business organization and contractual matters. The
common practice of raising capital on the New York and London
financial markets by non-American and non-British companies,
respectively, illustrates this.49 To accommodate such needs, a legal
system needs both a group of sophisticated decision makers and
regulators capable of adding value without imposing excessive costs
and a body of law that allows transaction engineering to structure
transactions to predictably accomplish clients' goals.50 Financial
transactions may thus be structured to take advantage of such
jurisdictions by legally locating crucial steps (e.g., issuing bonds) in
them (discussed below).
2. Facilitating Jurisdictional Arbitrage
While traditional trade theory focuses on differences in factor
endowments (e.g., natural resources), skill levels, or costs in the
workforce,1 differences in legal and regulatory regimes also play an
important role in structuring cross-border transactions. In particular,
O'Connor).
48. STEINMO, supra note 23, at 29. U.S. taxation of capital income relative to
earned income is particularly heavy relative to most other nations. Id. at 36.
49. See Ethiopis Tafara & Robert J. Peterson, A Blueprint for Cross-Border Access
to U.S. Investors: A New International Framework, 48 HARV. INT'L L.J. 31, 34 (2007)
(describing growth of foreign investor use of NYSE stock exchanges); Darius P.
Miller & John Puthenpurackal, The Costs, Wealth Effects, and Determinants of
International Capital Raising: Evidence from Public Yankee Bonds (Apr. 2001), available
at http://www.bus.umich.edu/jfi/WDIMiller.pdf (describing use of U.S. bond
markets by foreign firms). See also Richard Benzie, The Development of the
International Bond Market, (BIS Econ. Papers, No. 32, Jan. 1992), available at
http://www.bis.org /publ/econ32.pdf (describing growth of international bond
market in 1980s); Juan Carlos Gozzi et al., How Firms Use Domestic and International
Corporate Bond Markets (NBER Working Paper No. 17763, Jan. 2012).
50. DAVID HOWARTH, LAW AS ENGINEERING: THINKING ABouT WHAT LAW- YERS
Do 3 (2013) ("Clients come to lawyers, as they come to engineers, with problems
that they cannot solve themselves. The service both engineers and lawyers provide
is the solving of those problems.").
51. BEENHAKKER, supra note 30, at 29.
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jurisdictions may compete to provide services, regulatory regimes, or
dispute resolution services that facilitate business across borders. 52
Businesses make use of these differences across jurisdictions; within
jurisdictions, policy entrepreneurs respond to such opportunities by
pursuing strategies to provide services in the marketplace. Erin
O'Hara and Larry Ribstein describe how this market for law
functions within the U.S. federal system; the same process encourages
competition among jurisdictions internationally.53 This is particularly
important in finance, where innovation is centered on "the creation of
new instruments by repackaging the cash flows generated by
others."5
The Netherlands Antilles developed a significant business after
World War II in facilitating U.S. businesses issuing bonds in the
Eurocurrency market as the result of a combination of a fortuitous
extension of the U.S.-Netherlands tax treaty to non-European Dutch
territories, the growth of a huge pool of dollars outside the United
States, and an entrepreneurial notary's efforts.55 Similarly, the
Cayman Islands created a legal framework for company formation,
banking, trusts, and insurance through the collaborative efforts of
local political leaders, lawyers and other professionals, and British
officials. 56 Guernsey and Jersey developed financial services
businesses through their proximity to the City of London financial
district, the high costs of post-World War II British exchange control
regulations for multinational businesses, and their jurisdictional
distinctiveness relative to the United Kingdom, which includes laws
making it easier and less expensive to form companies than in the
United Kingdom as well as low or no taxation of income.57 Once the
legal and regulatory environments are recognized as factors of
52. See O'HARA & RIBSTEIN, supra note 8.
53. Morriss, Role, supra note 8, at 112-117. See also STOPFORD, STRANGE &
HENLEY, supra note 11, at 1 ("states are now competing more for the means to create
wealth within their territory than for power over more territory. . . . [While] the
emergence of new forms of global competition among firms also affects how states
compete for wealth.")
54. Honohan, supra note 42, at 18.
55. See Craig M. Boise & Andrew P. Morriss, Change, Dependency, and Regime
Flexibility in Offshore Financial Intermediation: The Creation, Collapse, and Return of
Curacao and the Netherlands Antilles, 45 Tx. INT'L L.J. 377, 404-410 (2009).
56. Freyer & Morriss, supra note 8, at 21-24.
57. R.A. JOHNS & C.M. LE MARCHANT, FINANCE CENTRES: BRITISH ISLE OFFSHORE
DEVELOPMENT SINCE 1979 18, 55 (1993) (discussing advantages of location near
London and U.K. exchange controls, and distinctive jurisdictional status).
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production, developing a sophisticated regulatory environment
conducive to financial transactions becomes a development strategy.
In particular, a jurisdiction's legal and regulatory environment
may provide it with a significant comparative advantage because of
the quality of its legal system. For example, courts in the Hong Kong
SAR, Delaware, and Britain are all widely recognized as capable of
addressing sophisticated business transactions competently and
fairly.58 Jurisdictions whose legal systems have ties to the United
Kingdom similarly have an advantage in this regard because of the
availability of appeals to the Privy Council.59 Because many legal
systems recognize choice of law and choice of forum clauses in
business agreements, parties to international business transactions can
exploit the comparative advantage of a jurisdiction in law by electing
to have a contract governed by, and disputes addressed in, that
jurisdiction.60 The existence of jurisdictions that specialize in providing
legal and regulatory systems that efficiently structure transactions is
thus not a mystery to be explained but the logical outcome of a system
of relatively free trade, legal systems' enforcement of choice of law and
choice of forum provisions, and the operation of comparative
advantage. As demand for legal and regulatory services to support a
global economy grows, the opportunity for jurisdictions to earn
revenue by providing those services increase as well. The wider
market for such services, including for specialized products like
protected cell companies and international investment funds, also
58. See, e.g. International businesses to be encouraged to use British courts for
economic growth, DAILY RECORD (Mar. 14, 2013), http://www.dailyrecord.co.uk
/news/ uk-world-news/ international-businesses-encouraged-use-british-1764194
(U.K. Justice Secretary toting "unrivalled reputation" of U.K. courts in business
cases); Donald F. Parsons, Jr. & Joseph R. Slights III, The History of Delaware's
Business Courts, BUSINESS LAW TODAY (Mar./Apr. 2008) available at
http://apps.americanb ar.org/buslaw/blt/2008-03-04/slights.shtml (discussing
Delaware Chancery Court's worldwide reputation for fairness, experience, and
expertise in presiding over corporate disputes."); Hong Kong has best judicial system
in Asia: business survey, AFP (Sept. 18, 2008),
http://www.google.com/hostednews/ afp/article/ALeqM5glkK vk-
YnNQ1HVb2n_HUUMhncDLA (reporting survey of business executives finding
Hong Kong rated best).
59. See Stefan Voight et al., Improving Credibility by Delegating Judicial Comp-
etence - The Case of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council, (December 2004)
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=652682
(discussing enhancement of credibility from using Privy Council as final court of
appeal).
60. O'HARA & RIBSTEIN, supra note 8, at 6-7.
18 [Vol. 37:1
Moving Money
offers opportunities for jurisdictions to compete for niche products.61
Within the United States, Delaware is the leader in providing
business organizations' law and dispute resolution, with a well-
regarded statutory framework, court system, and network of service
providers.62 Delaware entered the market for corporate law as the
U.S. economy grew and transitioned from a primarily agricultural
and extractive industries-based economy into a diversified
manufacturing economy.63 It won the business away from New
Jersey by offering a better product and has maintained its
competitive edge by continually innovating and offering the best
corporate law court system in the United States.64 Similarly,
Vermont is widely recognized as a jurisdiction with laws and
regulators that facilitate captive insurance.65 Internationally,
jurisdictions such as Bermuda, the Cayman Islands, the British
Virgin Islands, Guernsey, Hong Kong, Ireland, and Jersey all
compete for business by offering a combination of cost-efficient
regulatory frameworks that facilitate particular businesses, low or
neutral direct taxation regimes, and high quality courts. 66 In exactly
the same way, New York City and London compete for
international business by offering access to well-organized, deep
capital markets with legal frameworks and agglomerations of
61. See Paul Scrivener & Thomas M. Jones, Incorporated Cells: The latest
development for Cayman Islands segregated portfolio insurers, CAYMAN FIN. REv. (July
12, 2013), http://www.compasscayman.com/cfr/2013/07/12/Incorporated-cells-/
(discussing introduction of new legislation to enhance market appeal of Cayman
entities); Freyer & Morriss, supra note 8, at 33-37 (discussing efforts to compete for
additional markets).
62. Parsons & Slights, supra note 58. See also Brian Broughman, Jesse M. Fried,
& Darian Ibrahim, Delaware Law as Lingua Franca: Evidence from VC-Backed Startups
(Working Paper, 2012), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm
?abstractid=2117967 (arguing Delaware has advantage because investors under-
stand its law).
63. Charles M. Yablon, The Historical Race: Competition for Corporate Charters and
the Rise and Decline of New Jersey: 1880-1910, J. Corp. L. 323, 379 (2007) (annual
incorporations rose from 421 in 1899 to 1,325 in 1910). See also, Roberta Romano,
Competition for Corporate Charters and the Lesson of Takeover Statutes, 61 FORDHAM L.
REV. 843, 845 (1993) (by 1920, Delaware was the leading state for incorporation).
64. Parsons & Slights, supra note 58.
65. Vermont Captive Insurance Leader Discusses Emerging Areas, Challenges,
INSURANCE JOURNAL (Sept. 26, 2012),
http://www.insurancejoumal.com/news/east/ 2012/09/26/264495.htm.
66. Even critics of OFCs like Ronen Palan concede that "[o]ffshore offers many
benefits and it is doubtful whether the modem international economy can function
as smoothly as it does without it." Palan, supra note 3, at 26.
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service providers that protect investors and facilitate financial
transactions. 67 The rapid rate of financial innovation in the major
financial markets after World War II has also tended to shift
transactions to those jurisdictions that compete for the business
most aggressively.
In addition to the benefits this competition provides directly to
parties structuring international business transactions, this
competition pushes other jurisdictions to innovate as well. Just as
Delaware competes for corporate charters in the United States, and
London and New York compete for financial services business
internationally, jurisdictions also compete for specific slices of the
financial business, and that spurs quality improvements even in large
jurisdictions. Thus Vermont created onshore captive insurance
legislation to compete for business with Bermuda and the Cayman
Islands,68 and the United States created International Banking
Facilities to compete with offshore centers.69
Moreover, this competition offers a significant advantage to
individuals and firms outside the major, developed economies.
Entrenched interests in governments may make it difficult to change
policies within poorer economies: "When change will create too many
local 'losers,' it will be resisted no matter how strong are the rational
arguments." 70 It levels the playing field between firms and
individuals in jurisdictions with advantageous legal systems and
those in jurisdictions that are not by allowing the latter to opt into a
higher quality legal system. For example, such competition allows
67. See CASSIs, supra note 33, at 263-68 (describing advantages of New York and
London).
68. Lindsay Kelly, Perception drives more captives to form onshore, THE ROYAL
GAZETTE ONLINE, (Apr. 18, 2012), http://www.royalgazette.com/article/201204
18/BUSINESSO4/704189968 (quoting Vermont insurance commissioner that "We're
not the first onshore domicile but we really pursued it and made a success out of
it," he said. "Because Vermont is a very small state with 600,000 people with a
tourist-based economy, it meshed really well for us."). See also Morriss, supra note
8, at 136-138.
69. Palan, supra note 3, at 33 (at end of 1970s "as the result of a prolonged and
complicated battle between the US Treasury, the Swiss government and a number
of Caribbean tax havens. With the active encouragement of the New York banking
community, particularly Citibank and Chase, the US Treasury came to the
conclusion that rather than fight the onset of offshore, the USA stood to gain by
encouraging its own offshore center .... A swift volte-face took place, culminating
in the establishment of the New York offshore market, the New York International
Banking Facilities (IBF), on 1 December 1980.").
70. STOPFORD, STRANGE & HENLEY, supra note 11, at 30.
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firms from outside the developed world to tap into First World
capital markets and other institutions. As a result, "[in nascent or
growing industries like nanotechnology or biopharmaceuticals, firms
from countries like India and China are now competing intensely
because they are able to tap into the global entrepreneurial ecosystem
through capital access," with the result that they are making "the
lives of managers and owners of firms in many industries less
comfortable."7' This is because "[t]he availability of capital" has
allowed firms from India to "acquire companies in other advanced
countries by tapping into the global capital market." 72
3. Tax Planning
In the Efficient Enterprises framework, tax planning is a rational
response to tax laws. Indeed, it is the only response possible for an
individual or firm faced with the need to comply with the conflicting
provisions, definitions, and exemptions of multiple jurisdictions' tax
laws.7 3 Under the Efficient Enterprises framework, tax law is
conceptualized as a multi-period interaction in which governments
create tax statutes and regulations, taxpayers react by reorganizing
their affairs to reduce their net payments of taxes (taking into account
the costs of tax planning services), governments respond by changing
tax laws to limit opportunities to make such reorganizations, and
taxpayers respond. As Patrick Honohan notes, financial sector tax
design "is confounded by arbitrage between functionally equivalent
contracts or institutional forms" and requires attention to the relative
elasticities of financial market activities. 74 However, it is important to
keep in mind that financial innovations are not necessarily tax
driven.75
71. COHEN & RANGAN, supra note 18, at 23.
72. Id.
73. See, e.g., Robin Boadway, Individual income taxation: income, consumption, or
dual?, in ELGAR GUIDE, supra note 7, at 93, 117 (treating different sources of income
differently virtually required by various considerations but creates system "that
invites tax planning opportunities and perhaps even tax evasion."); AlbI, supra note
7, at 131 ("In an international system, the CIT induces tax competition among
governments and income shifting between nations in the search for lower tax
liabilities by multinational firms. Compliance and enforcement costs, or avoidance
and anti-avoidance schemes, consume real resources and lead to reduced
welfare.").
74. Honohan, supra note 42, at 17.
75. Robin Boadway & Michael Keen, Theoretical Perspectives on the Taxation of
Capital Income and Financial Services, in TAXATION OF FINANCIAL INTERMEDIATION:
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The growing internationalization of economic activity makes
this more of a challenge for governments by limiting their ability to
collect corporate taxes.76 Through multiple cycles of such efforts,
governments strike a balance between tax revenue collection, tax
complexity, and the other policies that might be served by tax law
provisions (e.g., inducing investment). Such a balance need not be
reached by increasing severity of enforcement or tightening
regulations: in response to the liberalization of capital flows in the
EU in the 1980s, many countries eliminated wealth taxes?7
Both taxpayers and tax authorities must strike such balances.
The result is complexity, which, as Albi notes, "is the rule in tax
systems, steering discussions toward less distortionary and costly
solutions, within the established constraints, as opposed to more
perfect, albeit impracticable, alternatives."78 Developing countries in
particular may lack the resources to develop tax policies to address
financial innovations. 79 Even among OECD countries, rules often
differ on sophisticated transactions.80 Changes in levels of tax
avoidance and tax evasion can be partially explained by changes in
tax systems. For example, as even some OFC critics concede, tax
planning's growth is undoubtedly due, at least in part, to the shift
away from indirect taxation to direct taxation over the twentieth
century.8' (There is also evidence that direct taxation is more
THEORY AND PRACTICE FOR EMERGING ECONOMIES 31, 53 (2003) ("The massive
financial innovation of recent years has been driven much more by commercial
considerations -especially the better management of risk-than by the avoidance
of tax.").
76. STEVEN A. BANK, FROM SWORD TO SHIELD: THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE
CORPORATE INCOME TAX, 1861 TO PRESENT xi (2010) ("the advent of the multinational
corporation has surely placed competitive pressure on the structure of the purely
domestic corporate tax system.").
77. Mattias Levin & Peer Ritter, Taxation of Financial Intermediation in Industrial
Countries, in TAXATION OF FINANCIAL INTERMEDIATION: THEORY AND PRACTICE FOR
EMERGING ECONOMIEs 197, 220 (2003).
78. Albi, supra note 7, at 130. See also STEINMO, supra note 23, at 38 ("All
countries complicate their tax systems with equity considerations and through the
use of tax structures as instruments of economic and social policy. But no country
is nearly as detailed as the United States in its attempts to adjust tax burdens."); Id.
at 161 (noting that "every [U.S.] tax reform has been presented as a simplification of
the tax system, but each has in fact complicated the tax system.").
79. Boadway & Keen, supra note 75, at 55.
80. Id.
81. Picciotto, supra note 7, at 48.
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vulnerable to corruption than indirect taxation.)82 Together with
rising rates, this increases the incentive to avoid and evade taxes. It
is thus an endogenous response to tax provisions, including but not
limited to rates.
Moreover, despite critics' attempts to blur the lines, tax
avoidance is conceptually distinct from tax evasion: avoidance is
minimizing taxes within the rules of the law, while evasion is
breaking the law by not paying taxes due under the law.83 This
approach is well summarized by the response of a member of the
band U2 to a journalist's inquiry about the band's relocation of its
music publishing business to the Netherlands after a change in Irish
tax law that would have led to higher taxes on the band's royalties:
The Edge (David Evans) stated, "Of course we're trying to be tax-
efficient. Who doesn't want to be tax-efficient?"84 Who indeed? As
one guide to tax planning argued, Warren Buffett was able to pay an
average tax rate of just 11 percent on 2010 income of $69 million by
taking "the majority of his income in the form of dividends, tax-free
municipal bond interest, and capital gains."85
Moreover, trying to be tax-efficient by moving a company from
one jurisdiction to another is conceptually no different from a firm
issuing debt rather than equity to take advantage of the
deductibility of interest,86 an individual buying a house rather than
82. Lambsdorff, supra note 29, at 37.
83. One way to lump avoidance and evasion together does not necessarily favor
those critical of avoidance. As Steinmo describes the evolution of U.S. tax code, as
the Congressional system became more open during the 1970s, the result "made an
already porous system even more loophole-ridden." STEINMO, supra note 23, at 141.
The result was "disastrous." Id. at 142. "Tax expenditures" as a percentage of
income tax receipts grew from 40.7 percent in 1973 to 103 percent in 1986. Thus
avoidance required securing a favor from a member of Congress to create a
"loophole" in the tax code; evasion skipped the step of securing favors (and so
presumably the cost of the campaign contributions necessary to secure the
cooperation of the member) at the risk of possible prosecution if the evasion was
discovered. Does the legitimacy of a provision depend on whether or not its
existence was legally or illegally purchased from the legislature or executive? How
would one tell? If others illegally purchase loopholes, is evasion of the greater
burden created for the taxpayer who is unsuccessful at doing so illegitimate?
84. Timothy Noah, Bono, Tax Avoider, SLATE (Oct. 31, 2006), http://www.slate.
com/articles/news.and-politics/chatterbox/2006/10/bono taxavoider.html.
The move reportedly cut the band's tax bill on its royalties by half. Id.
85. KEATS, supra note 5, at 102.
86. John R. Graham, How Big Are the Tax Benefits of Debt?, 60 J. FINANCE 1901
(2000) (discussing tax benefits of debt over equity); Deen Kemsley & Doron Nissim,
Valuation of the Debt Tax Shield, 57 J. FINANCE 2045 (2002) (finding debt shield
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renting to take advantage of the mortgage interest deduction,87 an
investor buying a tax-exempt public bond instead of a taxable
private one,88 or a firm with unused nonrefundable tax credits
choosing to merge with a firm with net income that would allow the
use of the credits. 89 Stephen Bank terms the expanded use of pass-
through entities (LLCs, limited partnerships, S corporations, and
similar entities) likely "the most significant factor" in the decline in
corporate tax revenue in the United States. 90 It is impossible to find a
principled conceptual difference between changing a business from
a C-corporation to an LLC within the United States and changing it
from a U.S. based corporation to a Bermuda based one.91 Sijbren
Cnossen argues that, "in reality, most interest is not taxed at all [in
Europe] due to the symbiosis between interest deductibility at
company (and personal) level and the existence of capital-rich tax-
exempt investors, such as pension funds, life insurance companies
significant despite personal tax implications); BANK, supra note 76, at xiv (noting
that the U.S. Treasury estimates that "equity is taxed at an effective rate that is
approximately 40 percent, debt has a negative tax burden of minus 2 percent.");
Boadway & Keen, supra note 75, at 53-54 ("The tax preference for debt over equity
... has long figured centrally in the analysis of corporate financial decisions."). But
see Albi, supra note 7, at 161 (noting that innovations in finance are "making it
increasingly difficult to distinguish between debt and equity instruments").
87. The Center for Budget and Policy Priorities, a left-leaning group
sympathetic to expanding federal spending, called the mortgage interest deduction
"one of the largest federal tax expenditures" and estimated that it reduced federal
tax revenue by $70 billion per year. Will Fischer & Chye-Ching Huang, Mortgage
Interest Deduction is Ripe for Reform, Center on Budget and Policy Priorities (June 25,
2013), http://www.cbpp.org/cms/?fa=view&id=3948. Moreover, they concluded
that "the bulk of its benefits go to higher-income households." Id.
88. STEINMO, supra note 23, at 75-76 (noting that when Sixteenth Amendment
debated in United States, "[i]t was agreed that interest from state and local bonds,
which was becoming an indispensable source of revenue for these governments,
should be exempted from the new federal tax. It was understood not only that this
would provide an incentive for wealthy individuals to buy these bonds, but also
that these same individuals would be able to use the bonds to protect their income
from the federal taxation.").
89. This was the goal of the merger in question in the landmark Smith v. Van
Gorkom case. 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985). See also BANK, supra note 76, at xxvii-xxviii
(noting crucial role of carryforward provisions for newer firms relative to older
ones).
90. Id. at xviii.
91. Moreover, as Bank notes, business taxation originally focused on
corporations rather than partnerships because collecting at the source on dividends
was administratively convenient and out of a desire to avoid the "most inquisitorial
aspects of the income tax." Id. at 38-39.
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and social security funds." 92
This approach is reflected in many jurisdictions' laws. For
example, in the United Kingdom and many other Commonwealth
countries, following the literal statutory construction of the tax law
may be all that is needed to avoid tax, even if the form of the
transactions do not reflect the economic substance that was the
original object of the law. As explained in the House of Lords'
decision in the 1935 opinion of Lord Tomlin in IRC v. Duke of
Westminster,
Every man is entitled, if he can, to order his affairs so as that the
tax attaching under the appropriate Acts is less than it would
otherwise be. If he succeeds in ordering them so as to secure this
result, then, however unappreciative the Commissioners of Inland
Revenue or his fellow taxpayers may be of his ingenuity, he
cannot be compelled to pay an increased tax.93
In the United States, since the landmark case of Gregory v.
Helvering, the economic substance of transactions typically triumphs
over their form, at least when the clear purpose of the statutory
construction is to address the economic substance. 94 However, to
quote Judge Learned Hand, in his opinion in the Gregory case at the
Appeals Court level, even in America "anyone may so arrange his
affairs that his taxes shall be as low as possible; he is not bound to
choose that pattern which will best pay the Treasury; there is not
even a patriotic duty to increase one's taxes."95
92. Sijbren Cnossen, Company Taxes in the European Union: Issues and Options for
Reform, 17 FISCAL STUDIES 67 (1996).
93. IRC v. Duke of Westminster (1936) AC 1, 19-20 (U.K). The Duke reduced his
taxes by covenanting to pay some of his employees yearly sums as an annuity,
regardless of work done or whether they remained in his service; in practice this
substituted for their wages. As the wages were not deductible from the Duke's
income but the annuity payments were, this reduced his tax liability. The
circumstances are described in detail in Assaf Likhovski, Tax Law and Public
Opinion: Explaining IRC v Duke of Westminster, in 2 STUDIES IN THE HISTORY OF TAX
LAW 183 (John Tiley, ed., 2007).
94. Gregory v. Helvering, 239 U.S. 465 (1935). The taxpayer had followed the
technical rules for avoiding a tax on capital gains by selling shares as part of a tax-
free corporate reorganization, even though the result was not, in fact, a real
"reorganization" of the type the statute was attempting to address. The Court
upheld the conclusion of the Bureau of Internal Revenue, which had ruled that the
economic substance of the transactions should prevail over the legal form. The
substance over form view has been recently reaffirmed by the Supreme Court in
PPL Corp v. Commissioner, Sup. Ct. Dkt. No. 12-43 (2013).
95. Helvering v. Gregory, 69 F.2d at 810-11. Later, Hand extended this view.
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In short, under the Efficient Enterprises framework, governments
set rules for tax obligations, and individuals and firms then react by
structuring their affairs to minimize structuring costs and taxes. If a
particular set of tax laws produces too little tax revenue for a
government's purposes, the government then responds by altering
the tax laws (increasing rates, broadening the base, changing
definitions, limiting exemptions, and so forth) to increase its
revenues. The problems with such transactions are primarily the
result of poor statutory or regulatory drafting rather than bad
behavior by firms or individuals (except where they violate the law).
Typically, the solution to tax evasion is to focus on structuring taxes
to be collected at the source and requiring entities to report payments.
But the legislative system for repealing or enacting laws cannot and
should not be short-circuited through the exercise of political
pressure on selected taxpayers.
4. Financial Privacy
Individuals may view privacy as a good to seek in its own right,
either because it meets their preferences or because it reduces other
costs. Thus, an individual may not want his personal financial
affairs known because that is his personal preference, or a firm may
wish that rivals not know details of its business strategy. Of course,
criminals also seek to conceal their activities. Legal systems
regularly seek a balance between privacy interests and law
enforcement interests, permitting intrusion into private matters only
under limited circumstances.96 Privacy in financial affairs can thus
"Over and over again courts have said that there is nothing sinister in so arranging
one's affairs as to keep taxes as low as possible. Everybody does so, rich or poor;
and all do right, for nobody owes any public duty to pay more than the law
demands: taxes are enforced exactions, not voluntary contributions. To demand
more in the name of morals is mere cant." Commissioner v. Newman, 159 F.2d 848,
850-51 (2d Cir. 1947) (Hand, dissenting).
96. See AMITAI ETzIONI, THE NEw GOLDEN RULE: COMMUNITY AND MORALITY IN A
DEMOCRATIC SOCIETY 12 (1996) (arguing that steps to limit privacy should only be
taken in face of a "well-documented and macroscopic threat to the common good,
and not merely a hypothetical danger and that if the threat can be minimized by
less intrusive means than invasion of privacy, those means should be adopted
instead); Kenneth Einar Himrna, Privacy Versus Security: Why Privacy Isn't an
Absolute Right, 44 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 857, 876 (2007) (arguing that the two
dimensions to balancing privacy and security are: "(1) the importance of the
interest relative to the type of interest involved, and (2) the number of people
whose security are implicated compared to the number of people whose interest in
privacy are implicated." However, he has little to contribute to the means of
weighing these interests.); Fred H. Cate, The EU Data Protection Directive, Information
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be seen as an outgrowth of the general principle that a person's
privacy (including the privacy of an association of persons) should
be respected unless there are circumstances that suggest a crime has
been committed or there is some other significant social interest at
stake.97
Financial privacy is not a novel concept: Many jurisdictions' laws
recognize this interest. As Rose-Marie Antoine notes,
In my view, confidentiality has been used largely as a scapegoat,
blamed for encouraging money laundering and tax evasion. The
result of linking it so intimately to such criminal activity has been
that confidentiality in the offshore sector has acquired a negative
image. On examination of the jurisprudence, however,
confidentiality remains a viable and much respected principle in
areas of commercial endeavor not associated with offshore
investment. For example, the United States and Canada have
fought long and hard to protect the principle of financial
confidentiality in terms of trade secrets, arguing precisely that it is
essential for business.98
Indeed, the evolution of the U.S. federal income tax over its first
decades reveals a steady progression away from methods that even
today would appear abusive to many.99 Most importantly,
confidentiality in financial affairs has long been provided by
Privacy, and the Public Interests, 80 IOWA L. REV. 431 (1994-95) (European Parliament
overwhelmingly supported legislation that personal data can only be used for the
purpose collected, which can only be processed under consent, or to protect public
interests or the legitimate interest of a private party when that interest does not
exceed the fundamental rights and freedoms of the data subject.).
97. There are a wide range of reasons why an individual or firm might want
information kept confidential which do not involve illegal activities. Professor
Rose-Marie Antoine has described these in detail. See ROSE-MARIE ANTOINE,
CONFIDENTIALITY IN OFFSHORE FINANCIAL LAW 33-38 (2002).
98. Rose Marie Belle Antoine, The Legitimacy of the Offshore Financial Sector: A
Legal Perspective, in OFFSHORE FINANCIAL CENTERS AND REGULATORY COMPETITION,
supra note 8, at 30, 35.
99. See, e.g., BANK, supra note 76, at 44-45. Bank describes how nineteenth
century income tax authorities would publish lists of taxpayers and their income in
local newspapers, "in the hopes of securing more accurate returns" and would have
assessors "complete the taxpayer's return through a series of inquiries into all
aspects of the taxpayer's personal and financial affairs," methods which David
Wells, the Commissioner of Internal Revenue during the first federal income tax,
termed "arbitrary and inquisitorial methods and agencies ... entirely antagonistic to
and incompatible with the principles and maintenance of a free government." Id. at
45.
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attorneys advising their clients and by financial firms handling
client money and property. Such confidentiality has been
guaranteed by jurisdictions in which those persons work. Financial
privacy in the common law world has been well established since at
least the 1924 English Court of Appeal decision in Tournier v.
National Provincial and Union Bank of England.oo This decision has
been called "one of the most respected and celebrated instances of
judicial law making in the entire field of banking." 01 The decision
"has been approved, applied and reaffirmed by courts in every
common law jurisdiction, including Australia, Canada, Hong Kong,
Ireland and New Zealand." 02 Based in contract, Tournier held a
bank liable for disclosing to a customer's employer that the
customer had paid a bookmaker by check. In addition to this
contractual duty, a number of non-common law jurisdictions have
created statutory duties of confidentiality.' 0 For example, Swiss law
imposes criminal penalties on those who disclose banking
information without authorization.104
Moreover, the business reasons for privacy make businesses'
affairs worthy of protection. For example, firms need data that reflects
business plans, trade secrets, or strategic decisions to be kept
confidential.105 Similarly, a law firm's or financial institution's client
would not want its plan to purchase a company -a plan likely based
on a significant expenditure of resources in research -to be broadcast
to others, who could free-ride on that research and rob the client of a
legitimate competitive advantage. 0 6 This is particularly likely to be
true in the investment fund business, where fund managers closely
guard strategies. 07 Equally obviously, wealthy clients would want to
100. Tournier v. National Provincial and Union Bank of England, (1924) 1 KB 461
(U.K.).
101. 2 George Weaver & Charles Craigie, THE LAW RELATING TO BANKER AND
CUSTOMER IN AUSTRALIA 2.3400 (2009) (quoted in Chaikin).
102. David Chaikin, Adapting the Qualifications to the Banker's Common Law Duty
of Confidentiality to Fight Transnational Crime, 33 SYDNEY L. REv. 265, 271 (2011).
103. ANTOINE, supra note 97, at 23-33 (describing Swiss statutory model).
104. Swiss Federal Law on Banks and Savings Banks, SR 952.0-47 (1934).
105. See, e.g., David B. Jemison & Sim B. Sitkin, Corporate Acquisitions: A Process
Perspective, 11 ACADEMY OF MGT. REv. 145, 155 (1986) (discussing role of secrecy in
corporate takeovers); Elizabeth A. Rowe, Striking a Balance: When Should Trade-Secret
Law Shield Disclosures to the Government?, 96 IOWA L. REV. 791 (2010-11) (discussing
protection of trade secrets disclosed to regulators).
106. Jemison &. Sitkin, supra note 105.
107. See Mary Margaret Frank, James M. Poterba, Douglas A. Shackleford & John
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hide the size and location of their wealth from criminals. In countries
where crimes such as kidnapping for ransom are common, the desire
for confidentiality may be greatest.108 And while concerns about
confidentiality of financial information can be alleviated to some
extent by restricting access to law enforcement only, it should be
noted that in many countries in the developing world (as well as
some in the developed world) law enforcement officials may not keep
such information to themselves. Mandatory breaching of
confidentiality with respect to financial information relating to
transactions can significantly raise the costs of those transactions.
Malawi's former dictator, Hastings Banda, once declared:
"Everything is my business. Everything. The state of education, the
state of our economy, the state of our agriculture, the state of our
transport, everything is my business," and, "Anything I say is law.
Literally law." 109 Certainly confidentiality in financial matters is a
necessary protection for anyone living under such a regime.
Of course, confidentiality or privacy of any kind can also hinder
enforcement of criminal and tax laws. In such circumstances, and
others, disclosure may be appropriate. Indeed, the decision in
Tournier explicitly recognized that disclosure of otherwise private
financial information was appropriate "(a) where disclosure is
under compulsion by law; (b) where there is a duty to the public to
disclose; (c) where the interests of the bank require disclosure; [and]
(d) where the disclosure is made by the express or implied consent
of the customer."110 Thus there is no question that financial privacy
is an interest subject to qualification - the tricky question is when
B. Shoven, Copycat Funds: Information Disclosure Regulation and the Returns to Active
Management in the Mutual Fund Industry. 47 J.L. & EcoN. 515 (Feb. 2004) (disclosure
of positions allows other investors to free-ride on investment strategies undertaken
by a fund); Russ Wermers, The Potential Effects of More Frequent Portfolio Disclosure
on Mutual Fund Performance, 7 PERSPECTIVE 1, available at
http://www.icinet.net/pdf/per07-03.pdf (disclosure can reduce profits for fund
managers by allowing speculative investors to front-run, or trade ahead of the
fund).
108. See, e.g., Andrew Osborne, Russian tycoon 'pays ransom' to free kidnapped son,
THE TELEGRAPH (22 April 2011), available at http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/
worldnews/europe/russia/8468779/Russian-tycoon-pays-ransom-to-free-
kidnapped-son.html (quoting experts that up to 300 children a year are kidnapped
in Russia).
109. MARTIN MEREDITH, THE FATE OF AFRICA: FROM THE HOPES OF FREEDOM TO THE
HEART OF DESPAIR 165 (2005).
110. Tournier v. National Provincial and Union Bank of England, (1924) 1 KB 461, 473
(U.K.).
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such qualifications occur. How a society balances these competing
interests will depend on a variety of factors, including cultural
ones."' The key is that a balance must exist, even if striking that
balance is difficult.
Both because there are such good reasons to avoid exposing
confidential information and because reporting clients would reduce
those clients' willingness to do business with them, financial firms
have an incentive to err on the side of confidentiality. Consequently,
reporting requirements are generally enforced by sanctions for failure
to report.112 As a result, financial institutions are forced into weighing
the relative costs of effective compliance with the probability that
sanctions will be imposed, introducing more uncertainty and costs to
compliance.
Resolutions of that question can be arrayed along a spectrum
from "no disclosure without specific evidence of wrongdoing" to
"automatic exchange of all relevant information about all
transactions." Within the Efficient Enterprises framework, because of
the increased costs associated with disclosure, we would expect such
questions to be resolved more frequently close to the "no disclosure
without specific evidence of wrongdoing" end of the spectrum,
unless costs could be reasonably contained. Indeed, many
jurisdictions concerned with privacy generally tend toward
enhancing privacy rights outside of financial matters, and we observe
considerable concern among civil libertarians over intrusion into
citizens' nonfinancial affairs." 3 With a few exceptions (e.g., the quite
111. See Michael Littlewood, Tax Reform in Hong Kong in the 1970s: Sincere Failure
or Successful Charade?, in 1 STUDIES IN THE HISTORY OF TAx LAw 379, 384-85 (John
Tiley, ed., 2004) (describing cultural resistance by Chinese community to disclosing
information to Hong Kong tax collectors). These same issues have arisen in
connection with the disclosures about the U.S. National Security Agency's
collection of cell phone data. See Declan McCullagh, NSA spying flap extends to
contents of U.S. phone calls, CNET (June 15, 2013), http://news.cnet.com/8301-
13578_3-57589495-38/nsa-spying-flap-extends-to-contents-of-u.s-phone-calls/; Josh
Levs & Catherine E. Shoichet, Europe furious, 'shocked' by report of U.S. spying,
CNN.coM (July 1, 2013), http://www.cnn.com/2013/06/30/world/europe/eu-nsa
(describing European reaction to disclosures).
112. See, e.g., 31 U.S.C. § 5318g (2012).
113. Imagine the uproar if a government suggested automatic exchange of
information on whether individuals were HIV positive or if a jurisdiction like Saudi
Arabia where homosexual acts are criminal offenses insisted that European and
North American governments automatically provide it with information that could
reveal sexual acts by Saudi citizens in Europe or North America or the sexual
orientation of those countries' citizens applying for Saudi visas.
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strong privacy Switzerland traditionally provided for numbered bank
accounts), by the end of the 1980s, most jurisdictions had created at
least some mechanism for exchange of information where there was
evidence of wrongdoing.114 The degree of financial privacy would
thus be the subject of a combination of a rights-based inquiry (to the
extent that privacy concerns generally were protectable) and a cost-
benefit analysis of specific measures that eliminated contracted-for
privacy in particular instances.
Over the past decade, however, initiatives of the Financial Action
Task Force (FATF), the Organization for Economic Cooperation and
Development (OECD) and the European Union (and of their key
member states) have successfully moved international standards to
the "automatic exchange of all relevant information about all
transactions" end of the spectrum. This movement from "no
disclosure without specific evidence of wrongdoing," as well as its
significant accompanying costs, will be discussed below.
5. Summary
Viewed through the Efficient Enterprises framework, the key
issue with respect to regulating global movement of money is the
reduction of transaction costs to facilitate the creation of more
wealth. In Stopford et al.'s analogy of governments to gardeners, the
main concern is not maintaining a fence to keep out marauders, the
priority is husbandry: improving the water supply, enhancing the
fertility of the soil, and keeping a proper balance of sun and shade:
"Forward-looking gardeners are now learning about becoming good
husbandmen rather than effective fence-keepers."" 5
Jurisdictions that lubricate trade by facilitating international
financial transactions play an important role by offering transaction-
cost-reducing innovations and services. Examples of this include: a
tax treaty network that reduces double taxation, such as Barbados; 116
a high quality business court and arbitration system, as in Hong
Kong;" 7 efficiently created, inexpensive business entities to serve as
114. ANTOINE, supra note 98, at 38-39; Freyer & Morriss, supra note 8, at 48-50.
115. STOPFORD, STRANGE & HENLEY, supra note 11, at 210-11.
116. See Barbados Tax Treaties, BARBADOS OFFSHORE ADVISOR http://barbadosof
fshoreadvisor.com/barbados-tax-treaties/ (last visited on Oct. 27, 2013) (Barbados'
reputation as "well regulated, offshore jurisdiction" due to its "extensive tax treaty
network with other counties" with a focus on transparency.).
117. See Michael J. Burns et al., British Virgin Islands: Recent Regulatory Reforms in
the British Virgin Islands: Regulating Light, Regulating Right, MONDAQ (Mar. 26, 2013)
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asset protection vehicles for persons fearful of government
expropriation, as in the British Virgin Islands;"58 flexible business
entities like protected cell companies, as in Guernsey; 119 estate
planning entities unavailable in neighboring legal systems, such as
common-law-based trusts in the Channel Islands (which offer options
to Continental clients not available in the clients' own legal
systems);120 legal environments that make it inexpensive to repackage
assets, as with the Cayman Islands and asset securitization, where the
combination of a knowledgeable regulator, recognized exchange, and
experienced service providers facilitates creating packages acceptable
to wide markets;121 industry clusters, as with Bermuda and
reinsurance,122 or creating service agglomerations that serve the many
http://www.nondaq.com:80/x/229250/offshore+financial+centres/Recent
+Reguatory+Reforms+In+The+British+Virgin+Islands+Regulating+Light+Regulati
ng+Right&login=true ("The British Virgin Islands' ('BVI') remains the world's
leading offshore center for the incorporation of international business companies,
with approximately 450,000 active companies currently registered in the
Territory."); PRICE WATERHOUSE, DOING BUSINESS IN BARBADOS 5 (1994) ("There is a
broadly based offshore business industry that includes international business
companies, captive insurance companies, offshore banks, foreign sales
corporations, shipping companies, and trusts. Tax treaties with Canada and the
United States have been important to the development of this industry.").
118. See, e.g., Kun Fan, The New Arbitration Ordinance in Hong Kong, 29 J. INT'L
ARB. 715, 722 (2012) ("a leading arbitration center in the Asia-Pacific region. With
its strong legal infrastructure, abundance of professional expertise, world class
arbitration institutions (such as HKIAC), connection with Mainland China, and
New York Convention signatory status, Hong Kong is a natural option for dispute
settlement in Asia.").
119. See Bedell Cristin, Cell Companies in Guernsey, BEDELL GROUP (2010),
http://www.bedellgroup.com/siteFiles/resources/docs/insights/Breifings/Com
panv%20and%20Commercial %20-
%20Guernsey%20Briefings/cellcompaniesinguernsev.pdf (describing entity which
Guernsey was first to create in 1997).
120. GORDON DAWES, LAWS OF GUERNSEY 137 (2003) (describing court decisions
and legislation to enable trust use).
121. See Memorandum from Conyers Dill & Pearman on Securitization in the
Cayman Islands, (2013) (on file with the author) (describing advantages of
securitization using Cayman entities).
122. See Marianne Burge, Captives: Bermuda, Colorado, Taxes and Beyond, reprinted
from Business Insurance (Apr. 10, 1972) in FOREIGN TAx HAVENS: CHOOSING THE RIGHT
ONE_141, 145 (Marshall J. Langer & Roy Albert Povell, chairmen) Tax Law and
Practice Course Handbook No. 55 (PLI), J4-2482(1973) ("Bermuda has the
advantage of being able to offer more of the sophisticated business facilities than
most island jurisdictions. It has thriving banking and office facilities,
communications and hotels, and grants work permits to foreigners. Bermuda has
been an insurance center for many years and has legal and technical expertise
available. It is very much concerned to maintain its reputation as a business center
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needs of different types of businesses. 123 To the extent there are
undesirable impacts of these jurisdictions' provisions of such services
on other jurisdictions (e.g., by making it more difficult to track
proceeds of crime or through impacts on tax collections), these must
be weighed against the benefits provided by the increased financial
activity and resolved through international negotiations. 24
B. Control First
Like Efficient Enterprises proponents, Control First framework
proponents believe that globalization unleashes competitive forces
that constrain governments. 125 However, unlike Efficient Enterprises
proponents, Control First proponents find this problematic. Rather
than increasing welfare, they see these trends as the means for
powerful groups to extract resources from less powerful groups. For
example, James Henry argues, "the First World has bled the Third,
of the financial and human capital that it desperately needs for
growth."126 Similarly, Steven Hiatt argues that developing nations
were "lured by economic hit men... to take on debt to build
grandiose projects. . . [while] large sums flooding in could be useful
in winning the allegiance of new Third World elites, who were
under pressure to deliver prosperity to their political followers,
allies, and extended families."127 Thus they see globalization
primarily as an expansion of the arena in which bad actors can
for reputable enterprises and screens applicants for local incorporation carefully.")
123. See Michael E. Porter, Location, Competition, and Economic Development: Local
Clusters in a Global Economy, 14 EcoN. DEV. Q. 15 (2000) (discussing key role of
clusters across industries).
124. For example, the Cayman Islands signed a Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty
(MLAT) with the United States in 1986, providing a mechanism by which the
United States could request information from the Cayman government about
specific individuals and transactions the United States could demonstrate were
involved in criminal activities. Freyer & Morriss, supra note 8, at 42.
125. Both may be overestimating the impact. Levin and Ritter conclude that the
continued existence of capital taxation may indicate that "[t]ax competition is not as
strong as is usually thought." Levin & Ritter, supra note 77, at 234.
126. HENRY, BLOOD BANKERS, supra note 9, at 182. Henry argues that this is a
literal phenomenon, pointing to purchases of blood plasma from developing
countries, which he claims has led to massive HIV infections. Id. However, he
ignores the parallel blood scandals in France (which he cites for its ban on blood
sales). See Mark Hunter, Blood Money, DISCOVER (Aug. 1993),
http://discovermagazine.com/ 1993/aug/bloodmoney250#.UW89c7OtdQ.
127. Steven Hiatt, Global Empire: The Web of Control, in A GAME AS OLD AS EMPIRE:
THE SECRET WEB OF EcoNOMIc HIT MEN AND THE WEB OF GLOBAL CORRUPTION 13, 17
(Steven Hiatt ed., 2007).
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operate.
The primary remedy Control First proponents advocate is to
increase national governments' control of individuals' and firms'
actions in the expanded international arena outside of the
governments' own jurisdictions, rather than focusing national
regulation on bad actors in the jurisdiction where bad acts occur.
For example, with respect to recent reports that $750 million is
missing from the Angolan treasury in a corruption case, Corruption
Watch UK argues that the money was stolen from the Angolan and
Russian governments through the use of "an unnecessary
middleman, Abalone Investments" which "made hundreds of
millions of dollars in profit from the transaction despite offering no
discernible services or value, at the expense of the Russian and
Angolan treasuries." As a result, Corruption Watch U.K. alleges that
"[a] number of Russian and Angolan individuals, including ... the
richest member of Russia's Duma. .., benefited from the deal, and
Swiss Bank Corporation (SBS), which through merger later became
UBS, facilitated it."128 In short, Corruption Watch U.K. alleges that
individuals in the Angolan and Russian governments conspired to
steal money from their governments by routing a government-to-
government transaction through a firm with ties to Switzerland and
the Isle of Man.
Although critical of the Russian or Angolan portions of the
transaction, Corruption Watch U.K.'s report emphasizes the roles of
actors in Switzerland, Isle of Man (where Abalone was created), and
elsewhere.129 This suggests, at least implicitly, that something about
Swiss or Manx law makes corruption more likely than if the
transaction were limited to Angolan and Russian legal structures.
However, Corruption Watch U.K. provides no actual evidence that
either Angolan or Russian law is better at preventing corruption than
Swiss or Manx law. In fact, there is evidence that this is not true.
Angola ranked 157th on Transparency International's Corruption
128. Associacao Maos Livres & Corruption Watch U.K., Deception in High Places:
The Corrupt Angola-Russia Debt Deal 9 (2013) available at http://www.cw-
uk.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/04/The-Corrupt-Angolan-Russian-Debt-Deal-
Full-Report.pdf.
129. Of course, no firm or individual in either Switzerland or the Isle of Man
could have accomplished the allegedly corrupt transactions without the active
participation of individuals with positions of responsibility in both the Russian and
Angolan governments. It thus seems peculiar to focus primary attention on
governments other than Russia and Angola.
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Perceptions Index, Russia ranked 133rd, while Switzerland ranked
6th (the Isle of Man was not ranked but the United Kingdom was
ranked 17th)130 This assumption that the use of Swiss and Manx legal
persons is prima facie bad, rather than the normal workings of an
efficient market, suggests that Corruption Watch U.K. has a Control
First view. Moreover, it assumes, rather than demonstrating through
a cost-benefit analysis, that the appropriate remedy for the failure of
the Russian and Angolan legal and political systems to control
corruption is to impose controls in Switzerland and the Isle of Man.
This is an assumption of heroic proportions. An alternative account
for corruption stresses "bad regulation. Ill-designed policies create
corrupt incentives for policy makers, bureaucrats and the public in
general."' 3' ("Bad" regulations include those that are "vague and
lax."132)
Although they sometimes concede there are some positive
impacts of globalized financial markets and increased trade,133
Control First proponents focus almost exclusively on increasing
governments' control over financial transactions to control the bad
effects. They argue this is necessary for three reasons. First, they
contend that the global financial system makes it possible for bad
130. Corruption Perception Index 2012, TRANSPARENCY INTERNATIONAL (Oct. 27,
2013), http://cpi.transparency.org/cpi2012/results/#myAnchor1 (lower scores
reflect lower perception of corruption). Interestingly, among the 25 least corrupt
jurisdictions on this index, there are six (Singapore (5th), the Netherlands (9th),
Luxembourg (12th), Hong Kong (14th), Barbados (15th), and the Bahamas (22nd))
which have substantial offshore financial center roles. Id. Nor do Russia or Angola
appear to provide accountability for public officials. Miller and Cafaggi define
accountability as requiring that "the officials who adopt and implement the
arrangement: (a) follow transparent procedures that take account of the interests of
all affected parties (procedural accountability); (b) are appointed and supervised
under a governance structure that gives a substantive voice to all affected parties
(governance accountability); and (c) are rewarded or sanctioned for their
performance by the relevant public on the basis of accurate information
(substantive accountability)." MILLER & CAFAGGI, supra note 35, at 133. Placing the
burden for the lack of accountability in Russia and Angola on Switzerland and the
Isle of Man is not only unfair to those jurisdictions but has little hope of success
since those jurisdictions have little influence on the construction of domestic
political institutions elsewhere.
131. Lambsdorff, supra note 29, at 6.
132. Id. at 7. See also Daniel Kaufmann et al., Measuring Governance Using Cross-
Country Perceptions Data, in INTERNATIONAL HANDBOOK ON THE ECONOMICS OF
CORRUPTION 52, 52 (Susan Rose-Ackerman ed., 2006) ("in the past 10 years there has
been an explosion of careful empirical work that has documented a strong causal
link running from better institutions to better development outcomes.").
133. Henry, supra note 4, at 25.
2014] 35
Hastings Int'l & Comp. L. Rev.
actors to engage in more bad activity than they would be able to
accomplish in a less financially open environment. For example, The
Price of Offshore Revisited argues that private banks and law firms are
engaged in "pirate banking" by "hiding and managing offshore
assets for the world's elite."134 Second, they argue that greater
financial openness produces greater tax evasion and tax avoidance,
which deny governments revenues needed to provide public goods.
Thus The Price of Offshore Revisited contrasts the "hidden wealth"
going untaxed with "governments around the world [which] are
starved for resources." 35 Third, they argue financial openness
constrains the ability of governments to adopt policies that the
governments believe are beneficial. For example, Palan argues that
offshore finance is the space where 'states choose to withhold some
or all of their regulations and taxation." 3 6 The result is to "subvert"
public regulation of onshore jurisdictions, which "is supposed to be
the imposition of political control and norms of behavior for social
ends."137 In general, Control First proponents focus on illegitimate
ends that might be pursued within a global economy in which
transactions are not carefully regulated by competent and
benevolent governments. 38 Where particular governments are
incompetent or malevolent, other jurisdictions' governments must
act to control bad actors.139
134. Id at 43.
135. Id. at 40. Although Henry and TJN do not explicitly link to his views, this is
an argument that goes back to John Maynard Keynes' post-World War II argument
that capital flows could be disaggregated into cross-border investment capital that
was productive and speculative and refugee capital that was destabilizing.
ALEXANDER ET AL., supra note 2, at 85. If Keynes was ever correct, the increased
complexity of capital flows today makes this implausible in our view.
136. Palan, supra note 3, at 25.
137. Id. at 36. For an organization that supposedly loves transparency, TJN
provides remarkably little of it in the report.
138. Strangely, the Tax Justice Network believes that "many key 'source'
countries don't even have domestic income tax regimes in place, let alone the
power to enforce such taxes across borders." Henry, supra note 4, at 42. If these
countries have no income tax (or no functional income tax), the reasons their
wealthy citizens are moving money out of the country do not seem to be tied to
taxation.
139. Id. at 43 ("developed countries have a responsibility as well as the capacity
to help [developing countries] solve" the tax problems). In addition, "institutions
like the World Bank, the IMF, the U.S. Federal Reserve, the Bank of England, and
the Bank for International Settlements" must "live up to their promises, and work
with organizations like TJN on a research and policy agenda that finally gives this
offshore sector the attention it deserves." Id. at 45. That would certainly solve TJN's
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It follows that the limits on governments imposed by capital
markets are illegitimate. For example, Hampton and Abbott argue
that
since 1992 we have witnessed a catalogue of economies and
government policies wrecked by speculation and rapid capital
flight. Since the 1992 ERM crisis forced the UK government to
take sterling out of Europe's fixed exchange rate system at a cost
of over $10 billion in foreign currency reserves, the financial
markets appear to have taken one scalp after another, from
Mexico in 1994 to a whole series of economies across Asia
between 1997 and 1998 whose collective collapse threatens to have
global consequences. Even as this book was being completed
(August 1998) there was the spectacle of Boris Yeltsin being forced
to devalue the ruble only three days after he and his finance
minister had adamantly resisted calls from the most famous of
speculators, George Soros, to do so. In Indonesia the financial
crisis even brought down the country's ageing President, Suharto,
after 32 years in power.140
These examples are revealing, as each reflects a government's
inability to maintain fixed exchange rates in the face of market
pressures. One interpretation of these failures is that it is the
speculators (such as Soros, who profited significantly from the
U.K.'s failure to maintain the value of sterling) who are responsible
for the problems, rather than the governments that adopted
dysfunctional policies. Control First framework proponents often
suggest this is the appropriate way to view such events, rather than
seeing them as a failure of a government to make appropriate policy
decisions, which allows a clever or lucky individual like Soros to
profit by risking his capital in betting that the government cannot
sustain a dysfunctional policy against market pressures.141 Because
funding issues for the foreseeable future! Unmentioned by TJN are the many
conflicts over policy objectives that underlie particular choices of tax structures.
For example, a key role of multi-jurisdictional tax planning for individuals concerns
their estate plans, including who gets the estate. National tax systems differ in their
treatment of estates. See Helmuth Cremer & Pierre Pestieau, Wealth and Wealth
Transfer Taxation: A Survey, in ELGAR GUIDE, supra note 7, at 183,189 (describing how
inheritance tax systems and estate tax systems reflect "quite different" conceptions
of the family and state).
140. Hampton & Abbott, supra note 1, at 14.
141. For example, Britain's exit from the ERM, the Russian and Mexican
devaluations, and the various Asian currency collapses might be attributable to
failures of the governments in question to have sustainable fiscal and monetary
policies rather than malevolent action by speculators.
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Control First proponents appear to not recognize as legitimate any
limits to government actions other than the limits they themselves
propose (e.g., restrictions on tax competition), they see all market-
derived limits primarily as the result of illegitimate private actions.
In particular, they appear to believe that any government ought to
be able to dictate any exchange rate the government believes is
useful to it. Moreover, they do not appear to recognize that any
governments might be illegitimate. That a financial crisis brought
down former Indonesian dictator Suharto, whose rule the New York
Times' story on his death termed "one of the most brutal and
corrupt," might be a feature of globalized finance rather than a
bug. 42
Control First proponents also find efforts by attorneys and
accountants to structure transactions in ways beneficial to their
clients to be problematic. "[T]he scope of the state's power to
regulate private activities and transactions in world markets is
elastic," thus enabling the use of "creative lawyers" to
"accommodate formal legal requirements to the strategies of capital
accumulation." 43 Using "abstract legal concepts, or fictions," these
lawyers then can pursue strategies to minimize taxes.'" According
to these Control Firsters, such efforts are "distortions" or involve
something other than "real" economic activity. As a result, these
efforts are illegitimate.
Control Firsters argue that the answer to all of these problems is
to control the movement of money; the absence of such measures
evades what they see as legitimate social controls. In particular, if all
the beneficial owners and controllers of interests in all transactions
were identified, all transactions could be regulated, taxed, or simply
stopped by governments when a government determined that a
particular transaction was illegitimate. Thus, for example, the Tax
Justice Network contends "nation-states need to work together to
take steps now to [take] control over all this out-of-control global
142. Marilyn Berger, Suharto Dies at 86; Indonesian Dictator Brought Order and
Bloodshed, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 28, 2008),
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/01/28/world/as
ia/28suharto.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0
143. Picciotto, supra note 7, at 47. He also attributes the creation of tax haven
jurisdictions to "enterprising lawyers or accountants who could persuade
government officials or legislators to enact the necessary provisions." Id. at 53.
144. Id. at 4748.
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'financial pollution.'"145 Doing this requires "automatic information
exchange among tax authorities, country-by-country corporate
reporting, and the deployment of public registries for beneficial
ownership of companies, trusts, and foundations."146 In addition,
there need to be "stiffer sanctions" for "'pirate banking'
misbehavior" by banks and bank managers.147 A successful
approach will limit not just behavior of OFCs but also jurisdictions
within larger countries: Nevada and Delaware will have to be
"curb[ed]," 48 presumably in part because they register many
companies whose owners do not live in those jurisdictions.
Such expanded control measures are not merely hypothetical
proposals. Recent proposed regulations by the Financial Crimes
Enforcement Network (FinCEN), designed to improve anti-money
laundering controls (discussed in further detail below) would
require financial institutions to identify, on a current basis, the
ultimate human beings who are the beneficial owners and
controllers of all their clients (with some exemptions, e.g., for
publicly listed companies), without regard to whether there is any
suspicion that such persons might be engaged in illegal activities.149
While this proposal has resulted in significant push-back from
regulated financial institutions and others,1s0 the fact that FinCEN
seeks to implement a requirement of the Financial Action Task
145. Henry, supra note 4, at 44. One of the endearing features of The Price of
Offshore Revisited is that it appears to not have been proofread and so contains quite
a few typos, missing words, etc. This does not inspire confidence in the unreleased
details of the calculations.
146. Id.
147. Id. These are extraordinary steps, much harder and costlier than they
appear. Countries without direct taxation do not collect the same information as
countries that rely on direct taxation. Who funds the collection of information that
must be exchanged "automatically?"
148. Id.
149. 77 Fed. Reg. 13,046 (Mar. 5, 2012), available at
http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/ FR-2012-03-05/pdf/2012-5187.pdf. However,
recent FinCEN guidance does include a risk-based concept to beneficial owner
identification. Guidance on Obtaining and Retaining Beneficial Ownership
Information, FIN-2010-G001 (Mar. 5, 2013), available at
http://www.fincen.gov/statutes-regs/guidance/pdf/fin-2010-gOO1.pdf.
150. See, Customer Due Diligence Requirements for Financial Institutions,
REGULATIONs.GOV
http:/ /www.regulations.gov/#!docketDetail;dct=PS;rpp=25;po=0 ;D=FINCEN-
2012-0001 (Last visited Oct. 29, 2013). The requirement to identify beneficial owner
and controller of accounts is also central to the Foreign Account Tax Compliance
Act, discussed below at 3.
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Force's (FATF) global anti-money laundering standards suggest that
some version of it will ultimately be enacted.151 Such requirements
would be exceptionally difficult to implement in such a way as to
catch actual "bad guys" intent on avoiding detection. Moreover,
they would generate significant additional costs by requiring
financial institutions to identify ultimate beneficial owners and
controllers in the vast majority of clients who are not involved in
illegal activities. 152 (They are also highly unlikely to be capable of
being implemented in many developing countries.) 153 But for the
Control Firsters, adding significant costs to legitimate financial
activities is not a primary concern. (Nor, perhaps, is the
effectiveness of the controls demanded in accomplishing the stated
objective of reducing crime, as we discuss below). Adding
complexity to tax codes is also problematic: Vito Tanzi analogizes it
to "termites" which "weaken the structure, increase the complexity
of the systems and the cost of compliance, and reduce the efficiency
and the equity of the tax systems" and argues compliance costs are a
regressive tax.154
The Control First vision focuses on four key policy areas. First,
its proponents believe that controlling crime via efforts to limit the
ability of criminals to make use of the proceeds of crime is an
important law enforcement tool, a view also adopted by most
Efficient Enterprisers. This has been important in persuading
151. Recommendations 10, 24, and 25, Financial Action Task Force, International
Standards on Combating Money Laundering and the Financing of Terrorism &
Proliferation 15, 22 (2012) (hereinafter FAFT 40), available at http://www.fatf-
gafi.org/topics/fatfrecommendations/ documents/ internationalstandardsoncomba
tingmonevlaunderingandthefinancingofterrorismproliferation-
thefatfrecommendations html. One reason to believe that the FATF will continue
to be influential is that it has already had "an extraordinary impact on the
development of international norms to combat financial crime and money
laundering." ALEXANDER ET AL., supra note 2, at 150.
152. The easiest being to use a confederate or front person as the beneficial
owner/controller, and to lie about it.
153. If developing countries have trouble with institution-level regulation for
financial firms - as they do -we think it improbable that the more demanding
beneficial ownership regulation could be accomplished. On capital regulation in
developing economies, see Philip L. Brock, Corrective Taxes and Quasi-Taxes for
Financial Institutions and Their Interaction with Deposit Insurance, in TAXATION OF
FINANCIAL INTERMEDIATION: THEORY AND PRACTICE FOR EMERGING ECONOMIES 169,
178 (2003) (noting problems with enforcing capital requirements regulations in
developing countries because of regulatory issues).
154. Vito Tanzi, Tax Systems in the OECD: recent evolution, competition, and
convergence, in ELGAR GUIDE, supra note 7, at 32-34.
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jurisdictions to adopt Control First measures, since it is difficult to
resist pressures to control crime. Second, they contend that
corruption is best controlled by generally applicable controls on
most or all international financial transactions. This is where they
differ from Efficient Enterprisers, who believe that controls should
be applied only on a cost effective basis. Third, Control Firsters
believe that all governments should be unconstrained by
international tax competition in designing domestic tax systems and
every jurisdiction should have complete information on all
transactions by any taxpayers who operate in it to facilitate
collection of any tax any government wishes to impose. Fourth, they
similarly believe that jurisdictional competition should impose no
limits on any government's ability to redistribute resources among
entities and individuals under its jurisdiction and that all
governments must therefore have access to complete information on
all of their citizens' wealth and income.
1. Controlling Crime via Money
In the 1970s and 1980s, it became clear to most observers that
the global "war" against illegal drugs trafficking was not working.
Rather than rethink whether their strategies of prohibiting the use of
narcotics was itself fundamentally flawed, or spend the necessary
additional public resources to treat drug addiction, or take the
additional draconian policing steps required to force the significant
curtailing of domestic drug usage,155 the United States and a number
of other wealthy countries where drugs were imported to meet
domestic demand began to focus instead on measures to reduce the
profitability of the international drug trade by making it more
difficult for those involved to use or invest the proceeds of their
illegal activities.156 They did so primarily by enlisting banks, and
155. See Human Rights Watch, Singapore, in World Report 2011, available at
http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/related-material/singapore_2012.pdf
(noting use of death penalty for "some 20 drug-related offenses in the face of
repeated criticism by UN human rights bodies and experts."). Singapore recently
changed its laws to make the death penalty depend on the degree of cooperation
with police and the degree of culpability. See Drug courier escapes gallows after
Singapore reforms, AFP NEWS (Apr. 12, 2013), http://sg.news.yahoo.com/drug-
courier-escapes-gallows-singapore-reforms-161116337.htnl (describing first drug
defendant not to be sentenced to death).
156. Richard Gordon, Trysts or Terrorists? Financial Institutions and the Search for
Bad Guys, 43 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 699, 712-719 (2008). Jurisdictions also began to
implement provisions for civil forfeiture of property involved in drug crimes.
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later, other financial institutions, as unpaid adjuncts of law
enforcement agencies. In effect, financial institutions were required
to identify exactly who their customers were, and to determine if the
origin of their customers' funds or financial transactions might be
the proceeds of narcotics trafficking (and, later, of other serious
crimes such as corruption and tax evasion). If the institution
suspected that the funds or transactions involved criminal proceeds,
they were required to complete an internal investigation of those
customers, funds, and transactions and file a report with the
government. A key to this anti-money laundering program was the
elimination of client confidentiality in financial matters.157 In
addition, financial institutions had to develop expertise in
evaluating patterns of transactions and other indicia of illegal
activity.58 Over time, these anti-money laundering requirements
were regularly extended and made more onerous, raising the costs
to all customers.159 This marked the first major international
adoption of a Control First approach to financial transactions.
Efforts to control crime via financial institutions could not be
effectively implemented by a single jurisdiction because of the
interconnectedness of the global financial system. Those countries
that took the lead in developing such anti-money laundering
preventive measures founded an international task force, the FATF,
both to standardize such measures and to encourage all jurisdictions
to adopt them.160 These international standards, now known as the
FATF 40 Recommendations on Money Laundering and Terrorism
Finance also include provisions regarding the freezing and forfeit of
criminal proceeds and instrumentalities and international assistance
in investigating and prosecuting crime, including the sharing of
extensive and detailed client financial information. Over time, the
FATF membership expanded to 34 jurisdictions,161 including such
Where these gave the law enforcement agency involved a larger share of the
property, they tend to focus law enforcement attention on such crimes. See Bruce L.
Benson, David W. Rasmussen, & David L. Sollars, Police Bureaucracies, Their
Incentives, and the War on Drugs, 83 PUBLIC CHOICE 21 (1995).
157. Gordon, Trysts, supra note 156, at 712-719.
158. Id. at 726-27.
159. Id. at 712-19.
160. The G-7 Heads of State or Government and President of the European
Commission convened the FATF from the G-7 member States, the European
Commission and eight other countries. FATF, History of the FATF, available at
http://www.fatf-gafi.org/pages/aboutus/historyofthefatf/.
161. About Us, FATF http //www.fatf-gafi.org/pages/aboutus/ (last visited
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emerging market countries as India and China, while allied regional
organizations known as FATF-Style Regional Bodies or FSRBs have
brought the number of jurisdictions pledged to implement the
FATF's Recommendations to over 140.162 Assessments of compliance
with the Recommendations are undertaken by members based upon
a detailed methodology of compliance, and are published on the
websites of the FATF and FSRBs.163 In addition, following the
attacks of September 11th, 2001, the International Monetary Fund
(IMF) and the World Bank began to participate in the compliance
assessments. 64 The experience with the FATF Recommendations is
thus a good model for assessing how Control First measures work
in practice.
A key aspect of the Recommendations has long been that
financial institutions must determine if financial institutions with
which they do business in other jurisdictions comply with the
Recommendations. If not, financial institutions must raise their own
required due diligence or cease engaging in business with those
non-compliant institutions.165 Crucially, all of these measures rely
heavily on conscripting financial service providers to implement
control measures and on transnational bodies to evaluate
compliance, shifting control of jurisdictions' financial systems out of
their own hands and into bodies that may be controlled by others.166
Oct. 28, 2013).
162. Anti-Money Laundering and Combatting the Financing of Terrorism, IMF
http://www.imf.org/external/np/leg/amcft/eng/ (last visited Oct. 28, 2013).
163. Id.
164. Id.
165. Recommendations 13 and 19, FATF 40, supra note 151, at 16, 19.
166. While FATF preventive measures are a Control First unfunded mandate
that forces financial institutions to engage in law enforcement, the mandate does
not discriminate among those jurisdictions that are suffering the ill effects of crime
and those that bear the increase in costs that the mandate generates. Richard
Gordon, Losing the War against Dirty Money: Rethinking Global Standards on
Preventing Money Laundering and Terrorism Financing, 21 DUKE J. COMP. & INT'L L.
503, 52944 (2011). For example, while the vast majority of the users of illicit
narcotics (who are the source of illegal proceeds) tend to reside in large
jurisdictions like the United States, other jurisdictions with fewer such problems,
many of which are offshore centers, are required to bear the costs of the preventive
measures. The same can be said of other serious predicate offenses like grand
corruption and income tax evasion. (Grand corruption "consists of acts committed
at a high level of government that distort policies or the central functioning of the
state, enabling leaders to benefit at the expense of the public good." FAQs on
Corruption, TRANSPARENCY INTERNATIONAL (Oct. 28, 2013)
http://www.transparency.org/whoweare/organisation /faqsoncorrup tion. As
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A central activity of the FATF has been to determine which
jurisdictions pose significant money laundering and terrorism
financing risks and to encourage them to improve their systems. A
primary part of such encouragement has been the threat of
countermeasures, or requiring financial institutions from compliant
jurisdictions to increase due diligence in transactions with
institutions in non-compliant ones, or to stop engaging in business
entirely with those financial institutions.167 The first such initiative
was the Non-Cooperative Country and Territories initiative, which
began in the early part of the last decade.168 There were a number of
complaints about that initiative, focusing on what the IMF believed
was a degree of arbitrariness in both the selection of which
jurisdictions would be subject to special monitoring and the method
for assessing compliance in those jurisdictions. The most recent
version, the High Risk and Non-Cooperative Jurisdictions initiative,
relies on a far more evenhanded and transparent approach to
assessment and evaluation. It targets "jurisdictions that have
strategic AML/CFT deficiencies and to which countermeasures
apply, [and] jurisdictions with strategic AML/CFT deficiencies that
have not made sufficient progress in addressing the deficiencies or
have not committed to an action plan developed with the FATF to
address the deficiencies." 169
Even though there is often no obvious benefit to them, offshore
jurisdictions have become among the most compliant jurisdictions
with the FATF 40. The High Risk and Non-Cooperative Jurisdictions
noted earlier, the Control First approach is to impose control measures that raise
costs on all with little or no discussion of the actual benefits achieved by the
measures. Recently, however, the FATF has adopted new Recommendations that
allow jurisdictions to apply preventive measures on a risk-weighted basis, and to
assess compliance in part on effectiveness of implementation. While these changes
are only now being implemented, they do demonstrate a new and commendable
willingness on the part of the FATF to address some of the problems that arise
under the Control First impulse. Recommendation 1, FATF 40, at 11.
Recommendation 1, FATF 40, supra note 151, at 11.
167. About the Non-Cooperative Country and Territories Initiative, FATF (Oct. 28,
2013) http://www.fatf-gafi.org/topics/high-riskandnon-
cooperativejurisdictions/more /aboutthenon-
cooperativecountriesandterritoriesncctinitiative.html.
168. For a history of the FATF's Non-Cooperative Country and Territories
Initiative and the Offshore Financial Center assessment process, see Richard
Gordon, On the Use and Abuse of Standards for Law: Global Governance and Offshore
Financial Centers, 88 N.C.L. REv. 510, 572-584 (2010).
169. High Risk and Non-Cooperative Jurisdictions, FATF (Oct. 28, 2013) http://
www.fatf-gafi.org/topics/high-riskandnon-cooperativejurisdictions.
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initiative includes only one traditional offshore center, Antigua and
Barbuda, and that only on the "Improving Global AML/CFT
Compliance: on-going process" list.170 Indeed, Jersey and Guernsey
have been assessed as the jurisdictions that are most compliant with
the FATF standards.'7'
In effect, jurisdictions that do not themselves suffer the ill
effects of predicate crimes to money laundering have raised the
costs of financial transactions implemented through financial
institutions located within their jurisdictions for the purpose of
fighting crime that occurs elsewhere and which adversely affects the
citizens of other places rather than their own citizens. This has been
particularly true with respect to measures directed against the use of
offshore centers by corrupt foreign officials. Recent studies by the
World Bank and noted scholar Jason Sharman conclude that among
the most compliant jurisdictions with respect to the laundering of
proceeds of corruption are offshore centers, while among the least
are the United States and the United Kingdom.172
Broader costs can also be observed. Anti-money laundering
compliance costs on low value transactions may have significant
effects on the poor and minorities who have little money to spare. 73
There are three key lessons from the FATF 40 experience with
Control First measures. First, they are imposed by a small group of
powerful jurisdictions on the rest of the world, often without
effective broad participation. Second, they may shift costs from the
jurisdictions that benefit to other, generally smaller jurisdictions and
170. Id.
171. Onshore Financial Centers: Not a palm tree in sight, ECONOMIST, Special Report,
Feb. 16, 2013, at 8.
172. EMILE VAN DER DOES DE WILLEBOis, EMILY M. HALTER, ROBERT A. HARRISON, JI
WON PARK & J. C. SHARMAN, THE PUPPET MASTERS: HOW THE CORRUPT USE LEGAL
STRUCTURES TO HIDE STOLEN ASSETS AND WHAT TO Do ABOUT IT (2012); Shima
Baradaran, Michael Findley, Daniel Nielson & J. C. Sharman, Does International Law
Matter?, 97 MINN. L. REV. 734, 826-837 (2013). There is also "at least some support
for the argument that corruption and taxation are substitutes." Bird, supra note 24,
at 415. This would greatly complicate TJN's analysis.
173. See Nina J. Crimm, High Alert: The Government's War on the Financing of
Terrorism and Its Implications for Donors, Domestic Charitable Organizations, and Global
Philanthropy, 45 WM. & MARY L. REv. 1341 (2004) (discussing extensively the
liabilities imposed by the U.S. on charitable donations by antiterrorism financing
laws). The increasing attention of financial regulators to microfinance initiatives is
another example of how regulatory goals sometimes conflict with attempts to
improve the financial status of the world's poor. See MILLER & CAFAGGI, supra note
35, at 78-79.
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the private sector by requiring expensive compliance and
monitoring measures to benefit others; they may as well adversely
affect the poor more than the wealthy. Third, neither the standards'
efficacy nor their cost-effectiveness are regularly discussed once
they are promulgated. Fortunately, under the FATF's current
leadership, the third point at least is no longer the case, where
efficacy and cost-effectiveness are increasingly important in the
design and implementation of FATF standards (discussed below).
2. Deterring Corruption
Once the Control First approach was established in anti-drug
crime efforts, proponents soon sought to expand it to control other
problems. In particular, the widespread publicity surrounding a
number of banking scandals involving corrupt individuals in the
1970s and 1980s led to efforts to control corrupt politicians in one
country via banking controls in other countries.174 Proponents of the
Control First framework see transnational financial institutions as
playing a key role in the theft of assets from developing country
governments. For example, James Henry argues that there is a
"general phenomenon" of "the export of vast quantities of capital
and tax-free incomes by the elites of poor countries, even as their
countries were incurring vast de-bts and struggling to service them.
Individual kleptocratic regimes and evil dictators come and go, but
this sophisticated transnational system remains more vibrant than
ever."175 "Preeminent global financial institutions" facilitate a series
174. See JONATHAN BEATY & S.C. GWYNNE, THE OUTLAW BANK: A WILDE RIDE INTO
THE SECRET HEART OF BCCI (2004) (describing the BCCI scandal); James Adams &
Douglas Frantz, A FULL SERVICE BANK (1993) (same); Timothy L. O'Brien, At Riggs
Bank, A Tangled Path Led to Scandal, N.Y. TIMES (July 19, 2004)
http:/ /www.nytines.com/2004/07/19/us/at-riggs-bank-a-tangled-path-led-to-
scandal. html?pagewanted=all&src=pm (describing corruption scandal at Riggs
Bank involving accounts for foreign government officials); U.S. Congress, House of
Representatives, Risk Management and Regulatory Failures at Riggs Bank and UBS:
Lessons Learned (2010).
175. HENRY, BLOOD BANKERS supra note 9, at xxv. A problem for Control First
framework proponents is that some of the policies they object to are the result of
domestic politics in developing economies. For example, Henry notes that the
Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas (the Philippine Central Bank), "under pressure from
domestic interest groups to maintain a strong peso, low taxes and interest rates,"
borrowed money that financed the peso's appreciation from 1976 to 1982. The
result was a growth in imports and capital flight, including by business people,
lawyers, accountants, doctors and dentists. Id. at 68. The problem is that those
"squirreling" away money outside the Philippines were behaving rationally-faced
both with an overvalued domestic currency and the political risk that the Marcos
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of "perverse capital flows."176 This has led to a "global bleed-out" of
assets from developing economies.'7 This includes "wasteful
projects and arms purchases," the use of "[h]undreds of billions of
Third World loans" for "nonproductive projects and corruption,"
many of which had "harmful long-term consequences." 178 A
regime would end (a risk that was increasing over time). Similarly, Henry's
complaint that Venezuelans "decapitalized" their economy during the late 1970s
and early 1980s when the bolivar was "seriously overvalued" making dollars
cheap, mistakenly ignores the rationality of the behavior of those who sought to
escape a currency that would inevitably devalue for the safety of an alternative. Id.
at 104. To the extent that it was politicians "stashing away government revenues
and foreign aid funds in numbered accounts" and helping to precipitate financial
crises, the problem is as much an internal one as it is an external one. See STOPPORD,
STRANGE & HENLEY, supra note 11, at 105. Moreover, even in Henry's account, the
Philippines' problems stemmed in significant part from theft of gold from the
Central Bank-an illegal act that occurred in the Philippines. HENRY, BLOOD
BANKERS, supra note 9, at 71-72. The Philippine example is not the only one. Henry
also points to Venezuela's practice of borrowing money for development projects
from international banks while depositing oil revenues in those same banks under
President Carlos Andres Perez. Henry explains this as a mechanism to siphon off
funds to the bank accounts of Pres. Perez and other Venezuelan officials. Id. at 98-
99. Among other means of doing so, Henry argues that Venezuelan government
agencies circumvented legal restrictions on long term borrowing by switching to
short term loans. Id. at 102-103. Similarly, he argues that Argentine central bankers
facilitated looting the country. Id. at 244-245. More of the problems-as Henry
admits -come from "the highest rate of tax evasion in Asia" because "tax resistance
is deeply engrained in Filipino attitudes" after "twenty-one years of dictatorship
and a parade of corrupt administrations" and "an extraordinary number of tax
concessions" made to businesses and individuals. Id. at 84. Even when a
government complicit in this activity is toppled, Control First framework
proponents object to developed countries' legal obstacles to returning allegedly
stolen assets. See, e.g. id. at 48 ("Overall, it turns out that if the loot is large enough,
leading havens like Switzerland, Liechtenstein, and the US as well as the court
systems in developing countries, are much more scrupulous about returning stolen
property than about receiving, protecting, and concealing it in the first place.").
176. HENRY, BLOOD BANKERS, supra note 9, at xxvii.
177. Id.
178. Id. Opinions may differ on what constitutes a 'wasteful' project, of course.
Reviews of multinational companies' projects in developing countries have found
large numbers of "negative economic outcomes" associated with projects "where
government offered high rates of tariff protection for import-substituting projects."
STOPFORD, STRANGE & HENLEY, supra note 11, at 151-52. It is not clear that Henry
would count a project as "wasteful" simply because it had a negative economic
return. There is certainly no shortage of poorly conceived and/or poorly executed
development projects funded through international borrowing by developing
country governments. (Richer governments can fund such projects on their own.)
But it is also true that "greater capital mobility has permitted many governments ...
to initiate development projects that previously had been starved by capital
shortage and has helped raise the levels of ambition for future competitiveness and
importance on the world stage." Id. at 34. Not all of these projects were misguided
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"sophisticated transnational system of influential institutions," rather
than "random policy mistakes" or "purely indigenous corruption,"
contrived to produce similar mistakes over and over again, in every
region of the world."179 This is the result of "an interlocking global
system of institutions and interests," which is "self-organizing" and
"consists of an amazing array of mutually reinforcing interests" that
"takes no prisoners." 80 Control First proponents argue that to
overcome this problem requires ever tighter controls over the
financial institutions that make the looting possible.
A key component of this argument is that developing countries
misapply the proceeds of the loans they receive. For example, in
Blood Bankers Henry argues that the Philippines' problem was "not
so much over borrowing per se, but the question of what was done
with the money."18 In The Price of Offshore Revisited, he argues that
"private elites" in developing countries "accumulated $7.3 to $9.3
trillion of unrecorded offshore wealth" from the 1970s to 2010, even
as their governments borrowed $4.08 trillion, and their economies
proved to be the source of $10.1 to $13.1 trillion of capital exports.182
The private capital exports and public debts are "intimately
or poorly executed.
179. HENRY, BLOOD BANKERS, supra note 9, at xxviii. Henry repeatedly excuses
foreign governments. Nicaragua's Sandinista regime is referred to as "courageous,
well-meaning, and rather naive young Marxists and social democrats" who "had
almost no experience managing a small developing country." Id. at 183. Later, he
concedes that the Sandinista-controlled central bank "printed cordobas like crazy"
when the Sandinista's lost power in*1996 and admits the lame duck Sandinista
legislature "rushed through several new laws that granted title for all this
expropriated property to its current possessor -in most cases, FSLN party leaders
and their supporters." Id. at 201-202.
180. Id. at 223. It should be mentioned that prior to the end of the cold war
geopolitics most likely had a significant influence over the waste of assets by
developing country governments. Western countries often tolerated the poor
governance of developing countries, providing the developing country
governments supported the geopolitical goals of the western countries. See, e.g.,
GEORGES NZONGOLA-NTALAJA, THE CONGO: FROM LEOPOLD TO KABILA (2002).
181. HENRY, BLOOD BANKERS, supra note 9, at 66. Similarly, Argentina's heavy
borrowings during the twentieth century was caused by "[1]eading international
banks" not bad policies in Argentina. The banks "not only provided a huge
amount of finance for misguided government spending" but also "private tutorials
to Argentina's elite on how to move vast amounts of their 'rich' country's wealth to
New York, Miami, and Switzerland." Id. at 226-227. Yet Henry concedes that
"[a]nyone could see that the junta's economic policies, on top of the repression,
were approaching a dead end." Id. at 242. The alternative was for Argentines
simply to accept devaluation losses.
182. Henry, supra note 4, at 5-6.
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linked."183
The Control First framework recognizes the problem of weak
domestic institutions within the "exploited" jurisdictions. For
example, Henry notes that Venezuela's banking supervisor in the
1970s and 1980s had only six professional auditors for its banking
sector and "limited enforcement powers," while the banks were
"protected from oversight by heavyweight political connections." 84
Moreover, the Tax Justice Network complains that, "many key
'source' countries don't even have domestic income tax regimes in
place, let alone the power to enforce such taxes across borders."185
The solutions offered by Control First framework proponents to
these problems are not to strengthen the weak institutions (although
they presumably would not object to doing so), but to prevent the
transfer of wealth from developing countries to financial institutions
outside them and change laws to allow later governments to recover
what they allege is previously looted wealth. 86
183. HENRY, BLOOD BANKERS, supra note 9, at 6. Similarly, Henry complains of
the role of international institutions in the promotion of coffee growing in Vietnam,
which turned out to be a lower cost producer than many Central American
countries. Id. at 214. Despite support for the policy from Vietnam's authoritarian
government, Henry finds the problem was in the World Bank and other
international lenders' pressure on Vietnam to liberalize its economy. Id. at 212-13.
Indeed, almost nothing cannot be excused by Henry in his search for oppressive
behavior by international financial institutions: even Saddam Hussein's invasion of
Kuwait was the act of "a bungler, driven into a corner by his country's economic
crisis and isolation," Kuwaiti "insults," and Henry's view of that Kuwait was an
illegitimate British construction rather than a nation. Id. at 307, 355, 358, 362.
184. Id. at 112. Henry appears to see no contradiction between such points and
his acceptance of the later Chavez government's assertion that the Venezuelan state
oil company, PDVSA, had had too much autonomy which required the government
to take control of its finances. Id. at 120. On the problems with the Chavez-run
PDVSA, see Peter Wilson, Venezuela's PDVSA Oil Company Is Bloated, 'Falling Apart,
USA TODAY (May 28, 2012), available at http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/money
/world/story/2012-05-28/venezuela-oil/55248628/1; Jason Simpkins, Hugo Chavez
is Dead, But His Legacy of Inefficiency Will Live On, OIL & ENERGY DAILY (Mar. 7,
2013), http://www.oilandenergydaily.com/2013/03/07/hugo-chavez-pdvsa/. He
also ignored the widespread consensus that the pre-Chavez PDVSA was a model of
efficiency and transparency. For example, William Ascher noted that PDVSA had
"escaped the rampant inefficiency and corruption that are so prevalent in state oil
companies in other many countries" and achieved "relative competence, cost
consciousness, professionalism, and efficiency" precisely because the pre-Chavez
governments had not "used the firm as a serious off-budget laundering
mechanism." WILLIAM ASCHER, WHY GOVERNMENTS WASTE NATURAL RESOURCES:
POLICY FAILURES IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 221 (1999).
185. Henry, supra note 4, at 42.
186. Id. at 42, 43 ("For developing countries, then, the true so-called
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As with the crime control measures described above, the
Control First prescription for corruption is a set of standards
dictated by a small group of countries and NGOs to be imposed by
fiat on other jurisdictions. Much of the costs will be borne by
jurisdictions and institutions with little or no say in the development
of the standards. This focus is a step backward from the needed
examination of the drivers of corruption in particular circumstances.
As Mushtaq Khan argues, the "critical question" is identifying the
type of corruption problem a society faces.187
3. Deterring Tax Avoidance and Tax Evasion
Many Control First proponents appear to believe that there is a
"correct" (or perhaps "fair") amount of tax owed on any particular
amount of income, that any effort to reduce that amount is
illegitimate, and that such efforts are, or ought to be, illegal. Thus,
they rarely distinguish between tax evasion (breaking the law) and
legitimate tax planning (structuring one's affairs to reduce the tax
owed while complying with the law). For example, Prof. Phyllis Lai
Lan Mo argues that "[t]here is little doubt that all cases of tax
avoidance are at odds with national interest"s and she sees "the
distinction between avoidance and evasion" as "tenuous at best in
practice." 8 9 Similarly, the Tax Justice Network "feel[s]" that it has
"effectively demolished pretty much every" argument in favor of
offshore financial centers playing a positive role.190
For Control First proponents, taxes are central to most
international financial transactions. For example, Picciotto asserts
that "the main spur for the creative exploitation of disjunctures in
the international state system has been the avoidance of taxation."191
Tax avoidance, or at least that degree of it which is contrary to the
'development finance' problem is precisely that all this unrecorded wealth is now
offshore, in the hands of private bankers and their own rapacious elites. That
means their 'debt' problem has really become a tax justice problem-one that the
developed countries have a responsibility as well as the capacity to help them
solve.").
187. Mushtaq H. Khan, Determinants of corruption in developing countries: the limits
of conventional economic analysis, in INTERNATIONAL HANDBOOK ON THE ECONOMICS OF
CORRUPTION 216, 242 (Susan Rose-Ackerman ed., 2006).
188. PHYLLIS LAI LAN Mo, TAx AVOIDANCE AND ANTI-AVOIDANCE MEASURES IN
MAJOR DEVELOPING ECONOMIES 1 (2003).
189. Id. at 3.
190. Henry, supra note 4, at 25.
191. Picciotto, supra note 7, at 48.
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intent of the government that proposed the tax law, is seen as the
moral equivalent of breaking the law and potentially illegal in its
own right. Thus, when the band U2 moved its music publishing
company from Ireland to the Netherlands, saving substantial sums
in taxes because of the Netherlands' favorable treatment of royalty
income relative to Ireland's, the band was engaged in tax avoidance:
legal behavior to minimize its taxes.192 One might criticize this
strategy on the grounds that the band had some kind of moral
obligation to pay more taxes than the letter of the law required, but
there was nothing illegal about its behavior.193 Similarly, complaints
in the United Kingdom over Starbucks' and Amazon's tax strategies,
which reduced their U.K. tax bills, brought complaints from U.K.
Prime Minister David Cameron and others that they were
"immorally" minimizing their taxes; Cameron told MPs that he
would make "damn sure" that such companies paid their fair share
of U.K. taxes.194 Prime Minister Cameron rejected the notion that
being "within the law" was sufficient; "really aggressive tax
avoidance" might be legal but would not be "playing fair."195 As a
result, Starbucks has begun making substantial payments in excess
of its legal obligations to the U.K. government.196 Both Democratic
192. Robert Mackey, U2 Responds to Critics of Their Deal with the Taxman, N.Y.
TIMES: (Feb. 27, 2009) http://thelede.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/02/27/u2-respond-
to-critics-of-their-deal-with-the-taxman/.
193. The controversy over the move is summarized in Mackey, Id., that notes
that the charge that U2 was hypocritical for advocating for greater aid to
developing countries while avoiding Irish taxes depending on U2's charitable
work. Had U2 simply spent all its money on itself, there would be no hypocrisy in
making the tax move. Id. U2 responded to the charge of hypocrisy by arguing that
Ireland had itself lured business to its economy through low tax rates. Therefore,
Bono contended that
What's actually hypocritical is the idea that then you couldn't use a
financial services center in Holland. The real question people need to ask
about Ireland's tax policy is: 'Was the nation a net gain benefactor?' and of
course it was - hugely so. So there was no hypocrisy for me - we're just
part of a system that has benefited the nation greatly and that's a system
that will be closed down in time. Ireland will have to find other ways of
being competitive and attractive.
Id.
194. Christopher Hope, David Cameron: Tax avoiding foreign firms like Starbucks
and Amazon lack 'moral scruples', THE TELEGRAPH, (Jan. 4, 2013), http://www.telegra
ph.co.uk/news/politics/ david-cameron/9779983/David-Cameron-Tax-
avoidingforeign-firms-like-Starbucks-and-Amazon-lack-moral-scruples.html.
195. Id.
196. Terry Macalister, Starbucks pays corporation tax in UKforfirst time in five years,
GUARDIAN, (June 23, 2013), http://www.theguardian.com/business/2013/ju
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and Republican members of the U.S. Senate have leveled similar
complaints at Apple when they noted that Apple has used Irish
subsidiaries to reduce the amount of income tax owed the U.S.
Treasury.197 While Apple was simply applying the law as enacted by
the U.S. Congress, there seemed to be a view that the company
should, in effect, voluntarily increase the amount of tax it paid.198
Thus, Control First proponents contend that there is a "fair"
allocation of tax independent of what tax laws actually say. Tax
laws are thus seen as something other than the messy process of
complex bargaining among interest groups within governments,
often pursuing multiple and even contradictory objectives.199 Rather
they are "the main link between state and citizen, and are
experienced as the most direct intervention by the state in economic
activity." 200 Moreover, by not taking into account the entire tax
codes they compare, anti-tax competition activists mistake
n/23/starbucks-pays-corporation-tax (quoting Starbucks that decided to forgo
certain deductions which would make us liable to pay 00m in corporation tax this
year and a further E10m in 2014. We have now paid £5m and will pay the
remaining E5m later this year.").
197. Biting Criticism, ECONOMIST, (May 21, 2013), http://www.economist.c
om/blogs/schumpeter/2013/05/apples-tax-arrangements (discussing criticism of
Apple over its international arrangements).
198. Dominic Rushe, Senators accuse Apple of 'highly questionable' billion-dollar tax
avoidance scheme, GUARDIAN, (May 20, 2013), http://www.theguardian.com
/technology/2013/may/20/apple-accused-tax-avoidance-billions-scheme (noting
that U.S. Senator John McCain said his constituents were "mad as hell" to learn that
Apple was paying tax rates that were sometimes lower than 1%. "I've never seen
anything like this." While Apple argued that "Apple complies fully with both the
laws and spirit of the laws. And Apple pays all its required taxes, both in this
country and abroad.").
199. STOPFORD, STRANGE & HENLEY, supra note 11, at 135.
A state has objectives that are multiple, often conflicting, always
shifting. It cannot in reality be a rational actor in the game-theory
sense of having a fixed order of priorities in its policy goals. It always
wants incompatible, conflicting values. It wants to be efficient and
competitive and to preserve social peace and the cohesion of the state
with society. It wants autonomy and the freedom to choose its own
path to economic development and access to advanced technology and
overseas markets. It is playing a trade-off game in which the variables
are never constant.
Id.
200. Picciotto, supra note 7, at 48. This is nonsense on stilts. Philosophers may
wish to transform tax laws into a "link" between the state and citizen, but in
practice tax laws are one part of the rules by which individuals and entities operate.
Respect for the rule of law requires both the tax authority and taxed individual or
entity to respect the rules as written, not as imagined.
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competition on one margin for the entire contest. For example,
while the United States has relatively high nominal marginal rates
for its corporate income tax compared to the OECD average, it also
has quite generous depreciation allowances such that the effective
marginal tax rate for new equipment financed by equity in a 2007
U.S. Treasury study was found to be just 24 percent rather than the
nominal rate of 39 percent.201 We have little doubt that this biased
equipment purchases toward the U.S. entity at the expense of
entities in other OECD jurisdictions within multinational businesses.
If rate competition is "unfair," should not depreciation allowance
competition be as well?
The first goal of the financial regulatory network must therefore
be to enable collection of the "fair" amount of taxes by various
governments. To accomplish this, the Control First solution is built
on that deployed earlier in pursuit of the proceeds of drug deals and
corruption: identifying and tracing beneficial owners and
transactions. However, these are more difficult to accomplish in the
context of taxes, in part because of the much larger set of
transactions that must be monitored. Rather than focusing on
individuals suspected of drug crimes and those whose behavior fits
a profile of an individual involved in such crimes (e.g., depositing
large amounts of cash regularly), a tax-focus expands the pool of
suspicious behavior to everyone involved in a cross-border
transaction.
A significant part of the history of income taxation across
jurisdictions is related to efforts to minimize tax evasion by making
it difficult to fail to report income. To attempt to ensure that
taxpayers declare all of their income, jurisdictions typically require
parties that make payments that may constitute income to the
taxpayer to inform the tax authorities of such payments and,
occasionally, to withhold estimated tax on those payments as
well.2 02 In fact, modern income taxes fundamentally depend on
systems of third party reporting and withholding to ensure
201. BANK, supra note 76, at 250-51.
202. Gordon, Losing the War, supra note 166, at 556-557, and sources cited. The
withholding of estimated tax enhances administration and reduces costs to the
government by allowing a pay as you earn system. Konraad van der Heeden, The
Pay-As-You-Earn-Tax on Wages, in TAx LAW DESIGN AND DRAFTING 564, 564-567
(Victor Thuronyi ed. 2001). The basics of U.S. international tax rules can be found
in RICHARD L. DOENBERG, INTERNATIONAL TAXATION IN A NUTSHELL (9th ed. 2013).
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compliance.203 Thus both Britain and the United States adopted
withholding at the source for wage income as part of their
imposition of broad-based income taxes.204 More recently, the
United States has extended reporting requirements for nonwage
payments to individuals to ensure that such income does not go
unreported.205 For many years, Britain used a complex system of tax
withholding on dividend and retained corporate income to ensure
that individual taxpayers paid the appropriate personal income
tax.206 As tax revenues as a share of GDP have largely risen
throughout the world between 1965 and 2000, and were up
"sharply" in most OECD countries in that period,207 demand for tax
strategies to reduce tax bills has increased.208
However, such requirements to report and perhaps to withhold
normally applied only to payors who were resident of the
jurisdiction imposing the tax.209 After all, the laws of Country A do
not normally apply to the residents of Country B, so Country A
could not require payors who are under the jurisdiction of Country
B to send Country A's tax authority information. Residents of
Country A who were keen on evading taxes could take advantage of
this situation by accumulating income in Country B and not
declaring it to Country A's tax authority. Successful evasion would
work only if Country B did not tax the income either or taxed it at a
203. Gordon, On the Use and Abuse, supra note 168, at 516-17, 519-21.
204. I.R.C. § 3402; Income Tax Act, 2007, pt. 15, c. 1.
205. I.R.C. § 6041-6050W.
206. J.A. KAY & MERVYN A. KING, THE BRITISH TAx SYSTEM (5th ed. 1990)
(describing the imputation system used to tax corporate dividends in the UK from
1973). Although alien to Americans' current conception of corporate taxation, this
is in accord with at least some tax theory. See Boadway, supra note 73, at 94 ("One
role of the corporations tax is to act as a backstop or withholding device for the
individual tax"; to the extent it serves this function "such withholding should be
recognized by providing a credit against individual taxes when these taxes are
eventually paid on corporate source income."); Id. at 107 (describing how corporate
tax functions as a withholding tax); Albi, supra note 7, at 131 ("The withholding
function of [corporate income taxes], acting as a backstop to personal taxation,
makes sense in the case of resident and non-resident shareholders, particularly if
the latter are non-resident in name only."). See also Boadway, supra note 73, at 45
(discussing design of a corporate tax for this purpose).
207. Tanzi, supra note 154, at 12-14. The OECD total rose from 24.2% of GDP in
1965 (with a low of 10.6 in Turkey) to 36.1% in 2000 (with a low of 18.5% in Mexico).
Id. at 13. (From 2000 to 2007, tax revenue as a percentage of GDP fell in 24 of 30
OECD countries.) Id. at 14-15.
208. Freyer & Morriss, supra note 8, at 21-24.
209. Id. at 520-21.
54 [Vol. 37:1
Moving Money
lower rate. Because the income tax is generally a residence-based
system, Country B might not tax the income if the taxpayer declares
herself or himself not to be a resident of Country B. Also, and more
simply, evasion would work if Country B did not have an income
tax at all.2 10 The recent "scandal" involving J~r6me Cahuzac, who
resigned as the Socialist Party's Budget Minister in France, involved
just this type of issue: M. Cahuzac had undeclared bank accounts in
Switzerland and Singapore, which he may have used to evade
French taxes on income paid directly to that account. 21' Of course, if
the financial institutions in Country B discovered which of its
customers were actually residents of Country A, and then reported
to the tax authorities of Country A all financial information on those
customers, then Country A could ensure that its residents did not
commit tax evasion by failing to declare that income.
This is exactly what the G-7, the OECD, the United States, and
the European Union have been advocating for some time, 212 and the
framework, which has recently been adopted as policy by the Group
of 20.213 Previously larger, mostly onshore jurisdictions that depend
on the income tax had pressed low or no income tax jurisdictions
only to provide information on particular accounts when the taxing
jurisdiction believed that one of its residents was committing tax
evasion by receiving undeclared income in the low or no tax
jurisdiction.214 Although no offshore center or other jurisdictions
with low or no income tax would ever need to request such
information from high tax jurisdictions, nearly all have signed tax
210. In part to prevent such evasion, the international tax system had long
included a provision that payments that typically represented income paid by
residents to nonresidents include a gross withholding tax. So, if the taxpayer in the
above example opened an account at a bank in Country B, any payments to that
account from Country A that typically represent income would be subject to a gross
tax of 30%. However, many countries, including the United States, have over time
exempted many types of transnational payments including, for example, bank
interest and portfolio bond interest, from withholding taxes as a way of reducing
interest costs to US borrowers. In other cases, bilateral income tax conventions
reduced or eliminated gross withholding taxes on other types of payments.
211. Gerard Davet, Fabrice Lhomme & Simon Piel, La justice enquite sur la banque
Reyl & Cie [Justice investigation into the bank Reyl & Cie], LE MONDE, May 14, 2013,
http:/ /abonnes.lemonde.fr/politique/article/2013/06/14/fraude-fiscale-lajustice-
en quete-sur-la-banque-reyl-cie_3430212_823448.html.
212. Morriss & Moberg, supra note 26, at 44-47.
213. Tax Annex to the Saint Petersburg G20 Leaders' Declaration (Sept. 6, 2013),
available at http://www.g20.org/news/20130906/782776427.html.
214. Gordon, On the Use and Abuse, supra note 168, at 515-19.
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information exchange agreements with onshore jurisdictions. 215
Given the disparity in benefits, such agreements have been signed
under pressure from onshore jurisdictions, organized in part
through the OECD's two initiatives, the Harmful Tax Practices
initiative and the Global Forum on Taxation, later renamed the
Global Forum on Transparency and Exchange of Information,216 and
the European Union's Code of Conduct Group on Harmful Tax
Practices.217
However, realizing that this did not uncover tax evasion but
only facilitated prosecution of otherwise identified instances of tax
evasion, these high tax jurisdictions are now seeking to require that
financial institutions in other jurisdictions routinely report to the
high tax jurisdictions details of the financial transactions of the
residents of high tax countries when these transactions occur
outside the high tax countries. In other words, the high tax
countries wish to treat the financial institutions of low or no tax
countries as if they are under the jurisdiction of the high tax
countries. For example, starting in January 2014, the European
Union's Council Directive on Administrative Cooperation in the
Field of Taxation will do this for members with respect to wages,
director's fees, and income from life insurance products, pensions,
and immovable property.218
215. Exchange Of Tax Information Agreements, OECD (Oct. 28, 2013)
http://www.oecd.org/tax/transparency/exchangeoftaxinformationagreements.ht
m; OECD, Convention on Mutual Administrative Assistance on Tax Matters,
htp://www .oecd.org/tax/exchange-of-
taxinformation/conventiononmutualadministrativeassista nceintaxmatters.htm.
216. Gordon, On the Use and Abuse, supra note 168, at 523-40.
217. Harmful Tax Competition, EUROPEAN COMMISSION (Oct. 28, 2013) http://ec.
europa.eu /taxation-customs/taxation/companytax/harmfultax-practices/.
218. In addition, they must also provide information when one E.U. country has
reason to suppose that there may be a loss of tax in the other E.U. country; a person
liable to tax obtains a reduction in, or an exemption from, tax in one E.U. country
which would give rise to an increase in tax or to liability to tax in the other E.U.
country; business dealings between two persons liable to tax in different E.U.
countries are conducted through one or more countries in such a way that a saving
in tax may result in either or both of the E.U. countries; the competent authority of
one E.U. country has grounds for supposing that a saving of tax may result from
artificial transfers of profits within groups of enterprises; information forwarded to
one E.U. country by another E.U. country's competent authority has enabled
information to be obtained which may be relevant in assessing liability to tax in the
latter E.U. country. Administrative Cooperation in the Field of Taxation, Council
Directive 2011/16/EU (15 Feb. 2011), available at
http://europa.eu/legislation-summaries/taxation/fiOOO 6_en.htm.
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Perhaps the most extensive (and intrusive) expansion of
transnational reporting is the U.S. Foreign Account Tax Compliance
Act (FATCA). FATCA requires foreign financial institutions to
identify to the United States their U.S. account holders and to
disclose their names and addresses, and the accounts' balances,
receipts, and withdrawals. 219 Failure to do so would result in the
United States applying a gross withholding tax of 30 percent on all
payments of gross income to those financial institutions.22 0 And, to
uncover exactly who is a resident of the high tax country, foreign
financial institutions will need to determine if U.S. residents are
actually beneficial owners of arrangements with accounts in those
countries. 221 In spite of such burdensome and expensive
requirements, many low or no tax offshore centers have reached
agreements or are expected to reach agreements with the United
States to avoid the sanctions, including the Cayman Islands,
Guernsey, Jersey, The Isle of Man, Singapore, and Switzerland. 222
European nations are creating their own "son-of-FATCA" laws to
require similar efforts.223
In other words, high tax countries are forcing all jurisdictions,
including those who do not have significant income taxation as a
matter of policy, to serve as unpaid income tax law enforcement
officers of the high tax countries, and even if the country does not
report on the financial transactions of its own residents, typically
219. 26 U.S.C. §§ 1471-1474.
220. 26 U.S.C. §§ 1441.
221. For this reason, FATCA requires foreign financial institutions to determine
if a client has a "substantial U.S. owner." This means, in the case of any corporation,
any specified U.S. person that owns, directly or indirectly, more than 10% of the
corporation's stock (by vote or value). For any partnership, it means any specified
U.S. person that owns, directly or indirectly, more than 10% of the profits interests
or capital interests in the partnership. For a trust, it means a specified U.S. person
treated as an owner of any portion of the trust under the grantor trust rules and any
specified U.S. person that holds, directly or indirectly, more than 10% of the
beneficial interests of the trust. Id.
222. Resource Center, Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act, UNITED STATES
TREASURY, available at http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/tax-
policy/treaties/ Pages/FATCA.aspx (last visited on Oct. 29, 2013).
223. Salman Shaheen, UK to impose son of FATCA on Crown Dependencies, despite
government's denials, INT'L TAX REV., (Nov. 23, 2012), available at http://
www.internationaltaxreview.com/Article/3121964/EXCLUSIVE-UK-to-impose-
son-of-FATCA-on-Crown-Dependencies-despite-governments-
denials.htnl?LS=EM S751719; Sanford Miller, Son of FATCA-Swiss/U.K. Agree on
Information Exchange, JDSuPRA LAW NEWS, (Mar. 25, 2013), available at
http://www.jdsupra.com /legalnews/son-of-fatca-swissuk-agree-on-infor-96287/.
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because it has no income tax to enforce. An alternative, of course,
would be for the high tax countries to provide their own tax
authorities more resources, but this, of course, would cost them
money. The high tax jurisdictions, not surprisingly, believe that it is
better to require foreigners to provide them free tax administration
services. This, even though the vast majority of tax cheating in high
tax countries like the United States is done strictly domestically. 224
Nevertheless, nearly all offshore and other low or no tax jurisdictions are
complying. They have little choice, since their economies are
dependent on access to the larger onshore economies.
A further issue involves tax avoidance through transfer pricing.
The international system of allocating the profits of transnational
companies among different jurisdictions for purposes of income
taxation evolved during the 1920s, primarily under the auspices of
the League of Nations (and since the end of the Second World War,
the OECD).225 In essence, the system began with the assumption
that each country should be permitted to tax the income of
companies that arose within that country -in effect, to become
"silent partners" with a share equal to the income tax rate.226 The
problem with such a system was that many companies were
transnational, with either branches of the same company or separate
companies operating as subsidiaries of a parent company located in
different countries. Creating vertically integrated firms is one way
that firms cope with the risks of international operations.227
Due to the fact that these groups of branches and subsidiaries
operated as a single, integrated whole, they did not need to keep
track of goods, services, and capital assets as they moved among
branches or from one company to another. How, then, to allocate
224. See Richard Cebula & Edgar L. Feige, America's Underground Economy:
Measuring the Size, Growth and Determinants of Income Tax Evasion in the U.S.
(University of Wisconsin, forthcoming 2011), available at http://www.ssc.wisc.edu/
econ/archive/wp2011-1.pdf and sources cited.
225. Michael Graetz & Michael O'Hear, The "Original Intent" of U.S. International
Taxation, 51 DUKE L.J. 1021 (1997).
226. It has long been argued that levying an income tax on companies separately
from their human owners makes little economic sense, other than as a withholding
tax on income to be distributed later to those human owners. See generally Graeme
S. Cooper & Richard Gordon, Taxation of Enterprises and Their Owners in TAX LAW
DESIGN AND DRAFTING (Victor Thuronyi ed. 2001), and sources cited.
227. STOPFORD, STRANGE & HENLEY, supra note 11, at 71. Similarly, various
intangibles such as "investments in technology, marketing and skills of
organization" play important roles in NFP structures. Id. at 75.
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taxable income among different jurisdictions? The solution was, in
effect, to pretend that the economic activity by the single, integrated
group of branches and companies was divided into independent
companies, one for each jurisdiction in which the integrated whole
operated. Each "separate" company would then be required to keep
separate books of account, calculate its "separate" earnings, and
report these to each jurisdiction. The only way to accomplish this,
however, was for the integrated whole to invent prices for the
goods, services, and capital assets that were transferred between
each "separate" entity.
However, to calculate an accurate allocation of income among
each "separate" entity, it would be necessary to compute these
'transfer prices' based on the prices that would have applied had the
parties not been related, i.e., market-determined or "arm's length"
prices.228 As there was no business reason for the integrated group
to keep records of intra-group transfers, the group was compelled
by taxation authorities to create them. In those cases where goods,
services, or assets were transferred to persons outside the group this
was easy. But in other cases, often the majority of instances (at least
with respect to value) there were no such arm's length prices
available, requiring companies to find "comparable" transactions
between companies that are not subject to the same control, and to
make adjustments to those comparable transactions. As Michael
Durst, one of the world's foremost authorities on the issue, has put
it, "[t]he basic tenet of arm's-length transfer pricing -the availability
of 'uncontrolled comparables' for transactions between commonly
controlled parties-is based on a fundamental misunderstanding of
practical economics." 229 Professor Stephen Shay, formerly Deputy
Assistant Secretary for International Tax Affairs at the U.S. Treasury
Department and another of the world's foremost experts on transfer
pricing, recently noted with respect to a particularly important
transfer pricing rules, the so-called "cost-sharing rule," that
the application of theory and models in the messiness of the real
228. "[A]n antiquated tax enforcement device called the 'arms-length' or
'separate accounting' method . . . ." Jonathan Rowe, Unitary Method Curbs Tax
Shenanigans: An Alternative To Arm's Length, MULTINATIONAL MONITOR (1980),
available at
http://www.multinationalmonitor.org/hyper/issues/1980/09/rowe.html.
229. Michael Durst, The Two Worlds of Transfer Pricing Policymaking, TAX NOTES
443 (an. 4, 2011).
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world can lead to unintended or unanticipated results. As
demonstrated by the repeated efforts to strengthen the cost
sharing regulations and the continued evidence of income shifting
to lower tax countries, the application of cost sharing in the
context of the international taxation has proven to be highly
problematic. This is in part because assumptions necessary for
the theory of cost sharing to be valid, including that all
contributions are fully accounted for, are nearly impossible to
control in a real world setting230
Creating such prices for the taxation authorities became an onerous
and expensive process, one that has become even more onerous and
expensive as the value of sui generis intellectual property231 has
increased over time.232
To make matters more complicated, such groups of companies
often operate in countries with varying rates of income tax or no
income tax at all. In such cases, international groups have a clear
incentive to allocate as much of the group's total income in member
companies located in low or no tax countries. 233 The way to do so
would be to err on the side of overstating deductible costs in
companies located in high tax countries, with a correlative
overstatement of income in companies located in low or no tax
jurisdictions, when inventing transfer prices. Such incentives would
obviously work more effectively on the taxpayer's behalf if one or
more constituents of the group were located in a low or no tax
230. Testimony of Stephen E. Shay Before the U.S. Senate Permanent
Subcommittee on Investigations Of the Committee on Homeland Security and
Governmental Affairs Hearing on Offshore Profit Shifting and the Internal Revenue
Code, (May 21, 2013), at 6, available at www.finance.senate.gov/imo/media/doc
/062608sstest.pdf.
231. Id at 7 ("The difficulties with administering transfer pricing rules in relation to
a sophisticated multinational group are compounded where comparable third-
party transactions are unavailable or inexact, as is the case with respect to most
high-value intangible property, and by the flexibility afforded a multinational
corporate group in planning and executing its global legal and pricing structure to
minimize tax.").
232. OECD, DEALING EFFECTIVELY WITH THE CHALLENGES OF TRANSFER PRICING 10
(2012), available at http://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/taxation/dealing-effect ively-
with-the-challenges-of-transfer-pricing_9789264169463-en ("[T]he resolution of
transfer pricing disputes tends to be resource intensive for both [multi-national
enterprises] and tax administrations.").
233. JANE G. GRAVELLE, Cong. Research Serv., R40623, TAx HAVENS:
INTERNATIONAL TAx AVOIDANCE AND EVASION 9-10 (2013), available at
http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R40623.pdf; OECD, Addressing Base Erosion and
Profit Shifting 33-37 (2013), available at http://www.oecd.org/ctp/beps.htm.
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jurisdiction. On the other hand, taxation authorities from high tax
countries have exactly the opposite incentive: to understate
deductible costs in companies located in their countries when
auditing taxpayers transfer prices.2 34
Moreover, while, at least in theory, economic rates of return are
equalized in the long run across firms, the transfer pricing rules use
accounting rates of return rather than economic rates of return, and
these "would not be equalized even in competitive markets, poised
in long-run equilibrium, much less in the imperfectly competitive
markets in various states of disequilibrium that are the norm."23 5
Reliance on accounting data has important consequences for
evaluations of transfer prices:
1. "Tax authorities in different jurisdictions are likely to allocate
individual multinational firms' consolidated income across
countries in different ways."
2. "Individual multinational corporations cannot accurately
anticipate their country-specific tax liability in the absence of an
Advanced Pricing Agreement [with tax authorities]."
3. "The current transfer pricing regime produces inequitable
results."
4. "Multinational and domestic firms are not treated uniformly
for tax purposes." 236
In short, "a tested party's tax liability under the [U.S. or OECD
methods] is entirely dependent on the particular profit level
indicator chosen and the specific unaffiliated companies included in
one's firm sample."237
If there ever was a Control First reporting requirement with
high cost and little chance of success, it would be the world's
transfer pricing regime. The OECD has provided, and continues to
234. Id.
235. ELIZABETH KING, TRANSFER PRICING AND CORPORATE TAXATION 7 (2010). As
King notes, "there is no reasonable basis for assuming that one firm will earn the
same accounting rate of return as a similarly situated competitor." Id. To take just
one example of why this is so, note that the book value of assets - a key component
of the accounting rate of return -will be based on the accounting conventions
followed by each company and so even identical assets may be recorded
differently. Moreover, the accounting rates of return will be heavily influenced by
the price paid for each asset (which will vary over time) and the extent to which the
asset has been written off. Id. at 16.
236. Id. at 8-9.
237. Id. at 17. These problems exist for other methods as well. See id. at 17-41.
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provide, hundreds of pages of guidance on how to estimate arm's
length prices, 2 38 while individual higher tax jurisdictions have
created their own libraries of regulations.239 But ultimately, it is
essentially impossible for private sector actors to invent accurate
arm's length prices where there has been no arm's length
bargaining. The same is true for tax authorities. While this truth
has been obvious to both practitioners and scholars for at least 30
years, the OECD and higher tax countries have continued to
reaffirm the arm's length standard. 240 Once again, the Control First
impulse has turned private sector actors into unpaid adjuncts of
governments, in this case by requiring them to invent arm's length
prices where no market for those transactions actually exists. As
with other Control First impulses, these controls add significantly to
costs of doing business. In addition, Control First critics attack the
private sector for not voluntarily guessing at transfer prices that
result in transferring more profits to governments rather than less.
Indeed, the OECD continues to argue in favor of more, and earlier,
mandatory transparency and disclosure by taxpayers, without
discussing the additional costs such disclosure might entail.241
238. OECD, TRANSFER PRICING GUIDELINES FOR MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES AND
TAX ADMINISTRATIONS (2010), available at http://www.oecd.org/ctp/transfer-
pricing/transfer-pricing-guidelines.htm.
239. See, e.g., Treas. Reg. § 1.482-1 to 1.482-9.
240. In 1980, Jonathan Rowe described an "antiquated tax enforcement device
called the 'arms-length' or 'separate accounting' method." Jonathan Rowe, Unitary
Method Cubs Tax Shenanigans: An Alternative To Arms-Length, MULTINATIONAL
MONITOR (1980), available at http://www.multinationalmonitor.org /hyper/issues
/1980/09/rowe.html. Since then scholars have continued to attack attempts to
implement arm's length pricing as a fool's errand. See, e.g. Stanley I. Langbein, The
Unitary Method and the Myth of Arm's Length, 30 TAx NOTES 625 (Feb. 17, 1986), at
625; Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, The Rise and Fall of Arm's-Length: A Study in the Evolution
of U.S. International Taxation, 15 VA. TAx REV. 89 (1995); and Durst and Robert E.
Culbertson, Clearing Away the Sand: Retrospective Methods and Prospective
Documentation in Transfer Pricing Today, 57 TAX L. REV. 37 (2003). In 2007, Reuven
Avi-Yonah, one of the very best international tax academics, concluded simply that
the current arm's length standard is "incompatible with today's global economy."
Reuven Avi-Yonah & Kimberly Clausing, Reforming Corporate Taxation in a Global
Economy: A Proposal to Adopt Formulary Apportionment, The Brookings Institution
(2007), available at http://www.brookings.edu/-/media
/research/files/papers/2007
/6/corporatetaxes%20clausing/200706clausing-aviyonah.
241. OECD, TACKLING AGGRESSIVE TAX PLANNING THROUGH IMPROVED
TRANSPARENCY AND DISCLOSURE: REPORT ON DISCLOSURE INITIATIVES (2011), available
at http://www.oecd.org/ctp/exchange-of-tax-information/48322860.pdf.; OECD,
MINISTERIAL DECLARATION ON BASE EROSION AND PROFIT SHIFTING (May 29, 2013)
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Given the impracticability of creating a system of accurately
allocating income among related members of a group though arm's
length-transfer pricing, different alternatives that are far simpler to
apply have been proposed. However, these systems either are
fundamentally inaccurate (e.g., factor apportionment, where income
is allocated based on relatively arbitrary formulas based on the
location of factors such as sales, work force, and real property)242 or
deviate substantially from an income tax (e.g., the "destination"
system proposed by members of the Oxford University Center for
Business Taxation),243 and none is likely to be implemented any time
soon.244
In other words, the world's wealthiest and most powerful
governments have created and persevered with a system to allocate
transnational income that cannot work, but that they nevertheless
fruitlessly try to implement by adding more and more costs to both
private and public sectors. However, a fundamentally more radical
"solution" has been proposed by governments of high tax countries
that would at least eliminate the incentive for taxpayers to err on the
side of higher prices paid by constituent members of the group
located in their high tax jurisdictions, though it would not make it
any easier for taxpayers or tax administrations to invent transfer
prices. Conveniently, it would also eliminate the general incentive
for businesses to locate in lower tax jurisdictions. The solution is to
force all low or no income tax jurisdictions to adopt relatively high
corporate income taxes. While so far largely ineffective, the efforts
of the E.U., and many of the constituent member countries, to fight
what they see as unfair tax competition by forcing low tax countries
to raise their effective rates continues. The clamor over the recent
bailout of Ireland (in which many EU members demanded that
Ireland raise its corporate rates in exchange for credit support) and
over the use of Irish subsidiaries by Apple and other companies
suggest that these efforts are far from over.245 A victory would
available at http://www.oecd.org/mcm/C-MIN%282013%2922-FINAL-ENG.pdf.
242. GRAVELLE, supra note 233 at 26.
243. Michael Devereux, How we can make global companies pay their fair share of tax,
FIN. TIMEs 11, (May 23, 2013). At least internationally, U.S. states use a factor
apportionment system. Avi-Yonah & Clausing, Reforming Corporate Taxation, supra
note 240, at 13.
244. GRAVELLE, supra note 233, at 24-26.
245. John Murray Brown, Ireland defends low corporate tax rate, FIN. TIMES, Apr. 15,
2011, http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/e90525f2-66al-lleO-ac4d-00144feab49a.html
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represent the epitome of the Control First view: controlling not only
the collection and reporting of financial information, but tax
systems -and tax rates - themselves. 246
Is this wise or fair? Many offshore centers chose not to have
income taxes, perhaps because they made little sense from an
administrative or economic perspective.247  For example, a
consumption tax (such as sales tax or a value-added tax (VAT)) does
not depend on tax reporting by those earning income but rather by
those selling covered goods and services. The expansion of VATs is
"[tihe most important tax development of the last half-century." 248
Collection of consumption taxes poses a different set of challenges to
tax authorities, e.g., cash purchases may be made without being
recorded for tax purposes, and so made without collecting the tax. 249
#axzz2VN6EdhZO.
246. Another tax evasion issue involves the use of offshore companies to
generate fictitious losses. Because these are instances where the taxpayer must
reveal the existence of the offshore company, the tax authorities can require the
taxpayer to provide further proof of the losses. More traditional exchange of
information agreements can be used to help confirm or deny the reality of such
losses.
247. Gordon, On the Use and Abuse, supra note 168, at 521; See, e.g., Boadway,
supra note 73, at 119 ("Taken together, these arguments [summarized by the author]
based on administrative ease, efficiency, and equity conspire against
comprehensive income as an ideal form of taxation."). Consumption taxes are also
superior to income taxes because they tax "present and future consumption at the
same rate, while income and scheduler (dual) taxation tax future consumption at a
higher rate than present consumption." See, e.g., id. at 118. They also avoid "many
of the problems of income taxation" by avoiding calculating capital income and
indexing capital gains. Id. at 120. See also Levin & Ritter, supra note 77, at 235
("Developing countries, with less complex tax systems in place, may therefore
perhaps be bolder. There is no need for developing countries to fall into the same
traps of tax system design" and so they may be able to adopt consumption-based
systems.).
248. Jorge Martinez-Vasquez & Richard M. Bird, Value-Added Tax: Onward and
Upward?, in ELGAR GUIDE, supra note 7, at 218, 218.
249. See generally, Martinez-Vasquez & Bird, Id. at 255-58 (discussing problems
of evasion of VATs); Michael Keen & Stephen Smith, VAT Fraud and Evasion: What
Do We Know, and What Can be Done?, 59 NAT. TAX J. 861, 866-67 (Dec 2006) (sales off
the books is only one form of avoidance on VATs; under-reporting sales, failing to
register at compulsory levels of turnover, misclassifying commodities for different
rates, and engineering bankruptcy before payment are other forms); Nikolaos T.
Artavanis et al., Tax Evasion Across Industries: Soft Credit Evidence from Greece (Univ.
of Chi. Booth Sch. of Bus., Fama-Miller Ctr. for Research in Fin., Paper No. 12-25,
2012), available at SSRN: http://ssm.com/abstract=2109500; G. Agapetos, VAT
Evasion: Overview of the Greek Experience, 17 J. MODERN GREEK STUD. 151 (1999);
Simon Wilson, How carousel fraud is putting the VAT system in a spin, MONEYWEEK
(Aug. 31, 2006), http://moneyweek.com/how-carousel-fraud-is-putting-the-vat-
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Applying consumption taxes to transactions across borders also
pose problems in deciding which jurisdiction is entitled to tax the
transaction. Internet transactions posed such a problem in the
United States, with internet retailers without a physical presence in
a particular state not collecting sales tax on shipments to that state's
residents. 250 Efforts to persuade consumers to report and pay taxes
on out-of-state purchases generally failed. 251 In some instances,
specific types of consumption and excise taxes are avoided by
shifting transactions to different jurisdictions, as with tobacco sales
on Native American reservations relative to sales in stores in states
where tobacco taxes apply and bootlegging.252 Similarly, locating
transactions in low tax jurisdictions can defeat efforts to apply taxes
based on physical presence.
All systems of taxation thus present challenges to tax
authorities in ensuring that all relevant transactions or income are
taxed. Each type of tax presents different challenges, however. For
example, efforts to tax at progressive rates based on total income
require a consolidated tax return that reports the entire income of
the taxpayer. Hong Kong uses a schedule-based income tax system
that precludes progressive rates because taxpayers report different
forms of income on different schedules to different tax authorities. 253
Without a total income, it becomes impossible to tax on a
system-in-a-spin/.
250. Donald Bruce, William Fox & Matthew Murray, To Tax or Not to Tax? The
Case of Electronic Commerce, 21 CONTEMP. ECON. POL. 25, 25-26 (Jan. 2003), available at
http://web.utk.edu/-dbruce/cep03.pdf (use tax collection generally relies on
voluntary compliance); Priyanka Meharia, e-Commerce and Taxation: Past, Present and
Future, 11 IUP J. ACCOUNTING RES. & AUDIT PRAC. 25 (2012) (discussing efforts to tax
ecommerce).
251. STEVEN MAGUIRE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R41853, STATE TAXATION OF
INTERNET TRANSACTIONS 1 (May 2013), available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs
/misc/R41853.pdf (consumers are required to remit use taxes to their taxing
jurisdiction for the use of the product purchased. Compliance with this
requirement, however, is quite low).
252. See Philip DeCicca, Donald Kenkel & Feng Liu, Reservation Prices: An
Economic Analysis of Cigarette Purchases on Indian Reservations 1 (May 2010) (as of
2010, New York did not collect taxes on cigarettes sold on Indian reservations. The
sales on these cigarettes appear substantial-a consumption rate 20 times higher
than the average New York resident, if consumed only by tax immune citizens.
This allows an inference of sale to non-Native Americans.). Kusum Singh, Cross-
Border Shopping: Implications for Sate Fiscal Competition in Multiple Tax Instruments
(Univ. of Ky., 2011), available at http://uknowledge.uky.edu/gradschool-diss/155.
253. Littlewood, supra note 111, at 385-86.
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progressive rate schedule.254 Is this a feature (as the Anglo and
Chinese business communities thought when the system was
adopted after World War II) or a bug?
There are policy arguments for and against particular forms of
taxation. Moreover, "tax policies have been increasingly used to
promote non-revenue objectives." 255 To a considerable extent, the
debate over the appropriate form and level of taxation can be
resolved only by resort to political preferences; without an
agreement on the purpose of the tax system (for example,
redistribution or non-distortionary funding of public goods) there
can be no agreement on the "best" system. With respect to the
debate about the impact of Jurisdiction A's tax system on
Jurisdiction B's tax system, arguments that Jurisdiction A is engaged
in "unfair" tax competition assume the outcome by failing to
recognize that different jurisdictions simply make different policy
choices. 256  Moreover, efforts to skew the debate by labeling
jurisdictions that rely primarily or entirely on indirect taxation as
"zero tax" or "low tax" jurisdictions are misleading. Obviously,
even a jurisdiction relying entirely on indirect taxes is not a "zero
tax" jurisdiction, just a zero income tax jurisdiction 257
4. Redistribution
Many Control First framework proponents want to make use of
control over money flows to redistribute income and wealth. For
example, Henry, author of TJN's The Price of Offshore Revisited, argued
in his 2003 book The Blood Bankers: Tales from the Underground Global
Economy that "[rlising inequality is an important anomaly for
254. Id. at 386.
255. Tanzi, supra note 154, at 11; Levin & Ritter, supra note 77, at 198 ("Numerous
special regimes and deductions apply to financial investments, as encouraging
these investments is often regarded as an important policy objective to encourage
risk capital or to stimulate pension savings, for example.").
256. The structure of an economy affects the design of the tax system. See Bird,
supra note 24, at 417 ("tax design is ... strongly influenced by economic structure.").
Moreover, as Winer et al., note, "there is no reason to limit international
competition to that over taxation, since there are other types of policy instruments
that can often serve as good substitutes." Stanley L. Winer, Lawrence W. Kenny, &
Walter Hettich, Political Regimes, Institutions, and the Nature of Tax Systems, in ELGAR
GUIDE, supra note 7, at 376, 402.
257. Jorge Martinez-Vasquez & Bird , Direct versus indirect taxation: trends, theory,
and economic significance, in ELGAR GUIDE, supra note 7, at 37, 54 (noting that smaller
population countries tend to rely more on indirect taxes because they have a more
mobile tax base).
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conventional economics to explain, because it predicts that
competitive markets and free trade should lead to the convergence of
global income and wealth levels over time" 258 Similarly, in The Price
of Offshore Revisited, he concludes the report with an emphasis on
inequality: "all of our conventional measures of inequality sharply
understate the levels of income and wealth at both the country and
global level." 259 Offshore wealth has an "astonishing" impact on
inequality: "We have estimated, for example, that less than 100,000
people, .001% of the world's population, now control over 30
percent of the world's financial wealth." 260 As a result, he concludes
that active measures, including redistributive taxation, are necessary
to address inequality.261 Similarly, Control First proponents see
collecting corporate taxes as a tool of redistribution, ignoring the
need to justify such taxation "on grounds other than those of simple
consistency with taxation of wage income" because of the implicit
258. HENRY, BLOOD BANKERS, supra note 9, at xxi. This is nonsensical -economic
theory makes no such prediction. In particular, Henry's example of post-Soviet
Russia (where he asserts "living standards have fallen farthest" while "inequality
has increased the most") illustrate the problems with such superficial claims. Id.
Exploitation theorists like Henry focus on cherry-picked and misleading statistics.
For example, Henry's claims that inequality has risen "the most" in post-Soviet
Russia certainly fails to take into account the inequality that existed in Soviet Russia
in which the elites enjoyed access to goods, privileges, and services unavailable to
ordinary Soviet citizens. See, e.g., MILTON AND ROSE FRIEDMAN, FREE TO CHOOSE 146-
47 ("Russia [the Soviet Union] is a country of two nations: a small privileged upper
class of bureaucrats, party officials, technicians; and a great mass of people living
little better than their great-grandparents did. The upper class has access to special
shops, schools and luxuries of all kinds; the masses are condemned to enjoy little
more than the basic necessities."). See also Abram Bergson, Income Inequality under
Soviet Socialism, 22 J. EcON Lrr. 1051 (1984). However, even addressing only the
post-Soviet experience of Russia, Henry's analysis falls short by failing to account
for the problematic nature of post-Soviet Russian governmental institutions. There
is no basis for claiming that economic theory would predict an evolution toward
equality between countries with and without developed legal institutions, for
example.
259. Henry, supra note 4, at 40.
260. Id.
261. Id. at 42 (suggesting a "modest OECD-wide withholding tax on 'anonymous
assets under management' in the top 50 banks, with the proceeds devoted to aid
and climate change."). Absent from TJN's discussion of inequality is any
appreciation for the complexity of the issues. For example, there is evidence that
the burden of corporate taxation is borne by labor rather than capital (by reducing
new savings and investment, leading to lower wages) and shareholders (due to
"tax-induced managerial underperformance" and the inability to shift the tax on
'old' capital). Albi, supra note 7, at 131. This suggests corporate tax burdens may
ultimately increase inequality.
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double taxation inherent in corporate taxes. 262
The ability of individuals and firms to move assets around the
world constrains the ability of a government to redistribute income
and wealth. Canadian millionaire Harry Oakes famously moved to
the Bahamas in the 1930s, fleeing high levels of redistributive
taxation.263 In the United States, retirees leaving the Midwest for
Florida found not only sunshine and warmer winters, but also
avoided the higher estate taxes imposed in the states where they
worked.264 Control First proponents see such efforts as illegitimate
and reject constraints imposed by markets on governments' ability
to redistribute wealth.265 Such constraints may be behind the trend
away from comprehensive, progressive income taxes in recent
years.266 More generally, some argue that the evidence suggests not
only that globalization has the effect that "all countries are
becoming small open economies" but that they are also "forced to
lower their reliance on direct taxes vis-A-vis indirect taxes."267
However, this may not always be the case, especially in countries
that have effective and efficient income tax administrations. For
example, while the U.K. is one of the most open economies in the
world, the share of total income tax paid by those who earn over
262. Honohan, supra note 42, at 9.
263. GEOFFREY BOCCA, THE LIFE AND DEATH OF SIR HARRY OAKES 82-83 (1959).
264. See generally Jeffrey A. Cooper, Interstate Competition and State Death Taxes: A
Modern Crisis in Historical Perspective, 33 PEPP. L. REv. 835 (2006) (Florida's estate tax
scheme created a national concern as early as 1925, leading to a national estate tax
with state tax credits available.).
265. For example, TJN promotes "progressive and equitable taxation" as the
ideal. See, Tax Havens Cause Poverty, TAx JUSTICE NETWORK (Oct. 28, 2013)
http://www.taxjustice.net/cms/front-content.php?idcatart=2&ang=1. The
current trend is towards dual income taxes with lower rates on capital income, in
part as a response to international capital mobility. Albi, supra note 7, at 150. One
reason for this is that high marginal rates "clearly induce a variety of changes in the
behavior of taxpayers, with resulting economic costs. Tax-induced changes may
include changes in hours worked and in labor force participation, the substitution
of non-taxable for taxable consumption, changes in the timing of income
realization, changes in the form of compensation (including incorporation), use of
deferred compensation and other tax shelters, and increased evasion." Bird, supra
note 24, at 426. Rather than recognizing that tax competition imposes limits on
their preferred policies, TJN rages against the idea of competition.
266. Tanzi, supra note 154, at 25 (noting "gradual movement toward the
scheduler income taxes that had been common in continental Europe in the early
part of the last century. This movement has been in part forced by globalization
and by tax competition.").
267. Jorge Martinez-Vasquez & Bird, supra note 257, at 57.
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E150,000 has increased from 22.2 to 27.7 percent in the period from
2000 to 2013.268 Not surprisingly, Richard Bird has concluded that
"[a]n obvious reason why most developing countries reap little from
either income or property taxes is their continued inability to
administer such taxes effectively." 269
Again, the question is whether any government or a particular
government has a "right" to tax those subject to its jurisdiction that
requires other governments to act to insulate it from the forces of
intergovernmental competition and the consequences of the laws
and regulations adopted to enforce its tax policy choices. The ability
to raise tax rates, as happened in OECD countries through at least
2000,270 incentivizes tax avoidance measures by taxpayers.
However, despite this, there is evidence that cutting corporate rates
has not reduced tax revenue. 271 And, of course, there are constraints
on tax design that require trading off competing goals that may
affect revenue.272 There are innumerable issues requiring tradeoffs
involved in designing an actual tax system that go beyond the
simplistic, one dimensional focus on a single aspect of tax equity
used by Control First proponents. All tax policy makers face
competing demands based on "the desire for increased revenue
constrained by public resistance to taxes, the demand for more fair
taxes, and the need for economic growth."273 Indeed, one scholar
has concluded that "[t]he administrative problems of implementing
a comprehensive income tax are nigh insuperable." 274 Moreover,
even among countries with broadly similar tax systems, the
268. Matt Chorley, Squeezing the Rich, MAIL ONLINE http://www.daily mail.
co.uk/news/article-2451686/Top-1-earners-pay-THIRD-income-tax-year.html (last
visited on Oct. 28, 2013).
269. Bird, supra note 24, at 418.
270. Tanzi, supra note 154, at 12. Direct taxes account for an increasing share of
total taxes in OECD countries. Martinez-Vasquez et al., supra note 257, at 40. This
has a similar impact.
271. Tanzi, supra note 154, at 27; ALBI, supra note 7, at 137-38 (noting rising
revenues while rates on corporate taxes fell from late 1980s to 2008 in Europe and
the OECD generally).
272. See, e.g., Boadway, supra note 73, at 103 (describing constraints imposed by
differences in elasticity of the supplies of capital and wage income and by the
possibility of tax evasion and restraints on possible penalties); STEINMO, supra note
23, at 3 ("Any tax system embraces a complex mix of competing goals, ambitions,
and considerations.").
273. Id. at 21.
274. See, e.g., Boadway, supra note 73, at 117.
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incidence and structure of particular taxes may vary considerably
across countries.275 If one government makes particular choices,
there is no generally recognized principle of international law that
requires other governments to accommodate those choices in
forming their tax policy (or any other policy). 276
Further, tax scholar Vito Tanzi noted that "[tihere is no theory
that can tell us what should be the optimal level of taxation for a
country. That level would depend on (1) how well governments use
the tax revenue; (2) how good are the tax laws used to collect the
revenue; (3) how good is the tax administration; and (4) how
citizens react to the inevitable disincentive effects that high tax rates
generate." 27 Moreover, tax structures depend on details of political
arrangements.278 These considerations are absent from the Control
First literature. As we noted above, the current Control First
initiatives also raise the question of who is to pay for these costs, as
275. STEINMO, supra note 23, at 14.
276. As Steinmo notes, tax policy is no longer distinct from policy generally, as
tax laws are "seen as powerful instruments of social policy" and not merely
revenue measures. Id. at 59.
277. Tanzi, supra note 154, at 14-16. Bird puts it similarly:
The best tax system for any country is presumably one that reflects its
economic structure, its capacity to administer taxes, its public service
needs, and its access to such other sources of revenue as aid or oil. In
addition, it must also take into account such nebulous but important
factors as 'tax morale', 'tax culture', and, perhaps above all, the level of
'trust' existing between people and their government. Tax policy
decisions are not made in a vacuum. Nor are tax systems
implemented in one. The taxes that are adopted in a country and how
they are administered are always and everywhere both path-
dependent and context-specific. They reflect the outcomes of complex
social and political interactions between different groups in society in
an institutional context established by history and state administrative
capacity.
Bird, supra note 24, at 423. Similarly, Honohan defines a tax system that is "good
for the financial system" as one that meets three criteria: "It minimizes the
distortions it imposes, for a given amount of revenue collected, especially by
causing the formal financial sector to be bypassed through disintermediation to
untaxed or differently taxed competitors. It is corrective of known distortions, such
as those that result from imperfect and asymmetric information. Finally, it does not
push tax collection from the sector beyond the point where marginal distorting
costs exceed those elsewhere in the economy." Honohan, supra note 42, at 3.
278. Winer, Kenny, & Hettich, supra note 256, at 378-79 (noting roles of
"differences in political transactions costs and the role and importance of veto
players in a particular political setting."); id. at 393 (discussing degree to which
differences between the United States and Canada in tax may be related to political
structure).
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many of these initiatives externalize the compliance costs on to
governments, firms, and individuals without an interest in other
governments' enforcement of particular tax policy choices.
5. Summary
The Control First framework is nearly a photographic negative
of the Efficient Enterprises framework. Rather than focusing on
gains from the movement of money, the primary issue is controlling
the negative side effects of financial flows. These include any
competitive pressure on states that constrain their political
choices. 279 This includes political choices by even nondemocratic
governments, for Control First proponents sometimes deny the need
for protection of citizens against autocratic regimes or fail to
distinguish between obligations owed to autocratic governments
and those owed to democratic governments. 280 In addition, it is
individuals and corporations with money who pose the threat rather
than governments: they must be restrained to permit freer state
action.
This implicitly assumes that all financial market constraints on
governments are problematic. However, developed economies in
which the standard of living of a large proportion of the public
depends on the market economy "have powerful internal feedback
mechanisms that prevent or limit demands that pose sustained
threats to the viability of the productive sector." These are absent in
many developing economies.281
The assumption that financial constraints are illegitimate
accords governments, even those without democratic systems, a
presumption of legitimacy. It is unclear whether even governments
like Iraq under Saddam Hussein or Zimbabwe under Robert
Mugabe lose this presumption.282 Moreover, Control Firsters appear
to reject the argument that even democratic governments may be
279. These pressures go beyond tax competition. There is evidence that
investors place lower values on firms from corrupt countries. See Lambsdorff, supra
note 29, at 36.
280. See, e.g., Henry, supra note 4, at 25 ("it is very hard to defend 'tax
enforcement at any price' when the tax collector is the Burmese junta, Gaddafi's
Libya, or perhaps even the City of Chicago." However, TJN concludes that "most
countries operate very, very far from this hypothetical 'tax compliance vs. freedom-
and-prosperity margin.").
281. Khan, supra note 187, at 228.
282. Henry, supra note 4, at 25 (dismissing such concerns).
2014] 71
Hastings Int'l & Comp. L. Rev.
constrained in beneficial ways by market pressures.283
However, Control First proponents selectively apply this
presumption of legitimacy, according it only to the constrained
jurisdictions' governments and rejecting it with respect to the
jurisdictions whose policies create the constraints. Since even
reasonable policies endorsed by democratic majorities of one
jurisdiction may not be considered as such in another jurisdiction, this
is problematic. More particularly, while the government of one
jurisdiction may conclude that it is worth imposing significant
financial transaction costs on its own residents to achieve some
anticrime or tax evasion objective no matter how marginal, there is no
reason to suppose that the governments of all other jurisdictions
share the same conclusions. 284 While this is far more likely to be the
case when the benefits of such additional transaction costs accrue to
the residents of on-shore than offshore places, it may also be that
different governments have reached different conclusions as to
283. See, e.g., STOPFORD, STRANGE & HENLEY, supra note 11, at 101 ("Regulation
can vary from laissez-faire to the oppressive and capricious."). Further, consent in
a democratic regime may make income taxes more administratively feasible. See
Winer, Kenny, & Hettich, supra note 256, at 383-85 (noting that democratic regimes
rely more heavily on income taxation than authoritarian ones, and suggesting that
consent makes a difference). The lack of consent in authoritarian regimes may
account for some of the "looting" that occurs there.
Control First proponents have a ready answer to these points-it is the
existence of a network of "secrecy jurisdictions" which facilitates the looting by
corrupt government officials. In short, make it harder to hide the fruits of
corruption and there will be less corruption. This argument has some appeal: if
corruption is more costly, surely there will be less of it. However, the Control First
arguments rarely engage in any cost-benefit analysis of the measures they seek to
use to reduce corruption and put little weight on the need for the country where the
looting is occurring to stop the initial theft, preferring to concentrate on the
proceeds. International competition may constrain sovereignty in helpful ways.
For example, political decision makers may want to be able to use domestic
monetary and fiscal policies to promote full employment but be constrained by
international pressures on their currencies. Whether that is a good thing or not
depends on whether the analyst believes that governments make responsible
choices in engaging in simulative monetary and fiscal policies. The long-standing
consensus among economists that central bank independence is a key to restraining
excessively inflationary policies suggests that this issue is at least open to question.
Nonetheless, the key point is that in the Control First framework, finding evidence
to support these claims is not a precondition to efforts to enhance control over
international financial flows.
284. ALEXANDER ET Al. define legitimacy as "those subject to international
regulatory standards have participated in some meaningful way in their
development" and also suggest that regulatory measures require a measure of
effectiveness and accountability as well. ALEXANDER ET AL., supra note 2, at 15.
72 [Vol. 37:1
Moving Money
whether to adhere more closely to the Efficient Enterprises view than
the Control First view or vice versa. A more reasonable
understanding of national sovereignty suggests that onshore
jurisdictions should neither be able to order offshore jurisdictions to
run up costs to the benefit of onshore places nor impose their views of
appropriate trade-offs in economic policy.
Control First advocates have sometimes conceded that onshore
jurisdictions have helped to create the legal framework in which
offshore jurisdictions are able to provide opportunities for tax
avoidance, but argue that the onshore jurisdictions "helped create a
monster they could not properly control." 285 Thus the dominant
conceptualization of international finance is as a corrosive force in
which "capital" or "capital markets" erode state sovereignty by
imposing costs on the adoption of policies that impose costs on the
owners of capital. Considerable resources exist in this zone outside
of governmental control.286 We now turn to the ways in which
money "moves," examining how the reality of finance fits with these
two frameworks.
II. The World's Financial Plumbing
Today's global economy involves a great deal of money
"moving" from jurisdiction to jurisdiction, with the result that
"[p]ayments systems are an integral part of an efficient modern
economy." 287 Not only do firms and people in one jurisdiction
frequently buy things or services from firms and people in another,
but "the growth of Eurocurrency markets, international syndication
of loans, government loans and foreign direct investment" together
with "[tlhe dismantling of restrictions on financial flows across
borders, the deregulation of financial institutions (sic) and
285. Picciotto, Legal Fiction, supra note 7, at 8. There is little doubt that capital
markets constrain government autonomy. See STOPFORD, STRANGE & HENLEY, Supra
note 11, at 6 (noting that it "is the world financial] system in which the firms are but
one set of players and are increasingly recognized as such" that "have constrained"
governments' autonomy). The debate is over whether these constraints are either
desirable or able to be removed.
286. For example, Ronen Palan argues that "[t]he growth of offshore finance is
being driven to a significant extent by private banking" and that 20 % of the
world's private wealth is managed by private banks. Palan, supra note 7, at 23. The
Tax Justice Network estimates that private offshore financial assets range from
$12.1 trillion to $20 trillion, depending upon whether they use a 3.0 or 4.9 liquidity
ratio. Henry, supra note 4, at 36.
287. MILLER & CAFAGGI, supra note 35, at 120.
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international financial innovations" has "significantly" increased the
movement of capital. 288 This globalized financial environment both
offers opportunities to firms and individuals and introduces new
risks with which each must cope.289 In this section, we describe how
the world's financial plumbing operates and the implications for
both policy frameworks.
A. How Money 'Moves'
The use of metaphors to explain unfamiliar or complex systems
can both enlighten and confuse, and such is the case with the use of
the metaphor "moving money." In reality, the modern bank-based
payment system does not "move money," but rather transfers
claims. When the Control Firsters describe "moving trillions of
dollars through offshore centers," images of cash flowing through
oil pipeline-like conduits through small islands on its way to a final
destination do suggest unnecessary detours. Who would ever move
anything that way, unless for some corrupt or nefarious purpose?
But that is not what actually occurs. What does happen is that
payors, in effect, chose to hire the legal regimes and management
skills found in particular jurisdictions (often offshore centers) to
ensure that their funds are safely and efficiently managed as the
funds make their way to ultimately buying goods and services.
How does this work? Before the development of the bank-
based payment system, to engage in commerce beyond barter
governments, firms and individuals physically transferred specie
from buyer to seller, or from investor to entrepreneur. Such
transfers could be expensive and quite risky, with both cost and risk
increasing with the distance the specie had to travel. The modern
payment system developed to reduce expense and risk, thereby
cutting transactions costs and allowing goods, services, and
investment to flow more abundantly.290 This was a significant step
in the creation of the modern economy.291 As a result, however,
288. BEENHAKKER, supra note 30, at 1.
289. Id. at 2.
290. James McAndrew & William Roberds, Payment Intermediation and the Origins
of Banking, FEDERAL RESERvE BANK OF NEW YORK STAFF REPORTS 1-7, 12-13, 17-20
(1999), available at http://app.ny.frb.org/research/staff-reports/sr85.pdf
291. Id. at 17-20. ALEXANDER ET AL., describe this development as follows:
The objective of reducing risk in complex financial markets has led banks
to use innovative financial instruments to diversify earnings among several
countries so that, in any given year, an inadequate investment outcome in
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since the creation of modem banking, nearly all of what we
commonly refer to as "money" has no physical form and is really
nothing more than a claim against a bank in the form of a deposit.
The modern payment system, both nationally and internationally, is
actually a system of adjusting claims by persons against their banks
and among banks themselves rather than a system of "moving"
money.292 This is a critically important component to a modern
economy.293
Assume, for example, that Janet wishes to buy a house from
Bill, paying the entire purchase price without recourse to a loan.
She could give Bill physical money in exchange for title to the house,
but Bill would then face the problem of safeguarding a large amount
of currency and/or transporting it to his bank. If Janet instead
makes a payment to Bill via a check, debit card, or an online transfer
through her account with Bank A, Bill no longer faces those
problems. Janet's "account" with Bank A, whether checking or
savings, is actually a claim she has against the bank for the amount
in her account. In other words, Janet is a creditor of Bank A to the
amount of the account. By using a check, debit card, or an online
transfer, Janet is instructing Bank A to transfer part of her claim to
Bill. If she used a check, Bill could simply stop in at Bank A, present
the check, and exchange it for cash. But if Bill is also part of the
payment system, that would mean that he, too, would have an
account at a bank, say, Bank B. Instead of cashing the check, he can
receive the transfer of Janet's claim against Bank A by adding to his
claim against Bank B. As a practical matter, that means that (1) Bank
A will adjust Janet's claim against it downward by debiting her
account by the amount of the transfer; (2) Bank A will credit Bank
one country may be offset by a positive investment outcome in another
country. This need to reduce risk by expanding cross-border financial
services has also resulted in the establishment of complex organizations,
known as financial conglomerates.
ALEXANDER ET AL., supra note 2, at 25-26.
292. Bank for International Settlements, Committee on Payment and Settlement
Systems, THE ROLE OF CENTRAL BANK MONEY IN PAYMENT SYSTEMS 9-12 (2003),
available at http://www.bis.org/publ/cpss55.pdf.
293. Ranald Michie, The stock market and the corporate economy: a historical overview,
in HANDBOOK OF RESEARCH ON STOCK MARKET GLOBALIZATION 28, 29 (Geoffrey
Poitras ed., 2012) ("The more complex and sophisticated the economy, the greater
the need there is for a financial system that continually responds to the ebb and
flow of credit and capital over both time and space and between individuals,
institutions and businesses.").
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B's claim against it by the same amount, and (3) Bank B will credit
Bill's claim against it by the same amount. 294 If Janet had wished
only to transfer money from her account at Bank A to her account at
Bank B without buying anything, the same process would be
followed, except the claim transfer would be to her claim against
Bank B.
The process of changing claims is typically implemented
through a clearinghouse, often operated through a jurisdiction's
central bank.2 95 In fact, a national currency - the units transferred via
changing claims and claimants -is itself a claim against the central
bank that issued the currency. In effect, much of both Bank A and
Bank B's assets are ultimately claims against the central bank that
created the currency in the first place. It is this system of
transferring claims among different banks, including central banks,
which allows governments, firms, and individuals to engage in
economic activity without the expense and risk of physically
moving specie or currency. The development of the electronic
payments system, by which claim transfer can be done electronically
rather than moving paper checks around, has further reduced cost
and risk.
The vast majority of contemporary international money
movements do not involve the transfer of specie for the same reason
that domestic movements do not: expense and risk of loss. They
follow essentially the same patterns as domestic movements, only
they involve banks located in different jurisdictions -i.e., transfers
of claims from banks in one jurisdiction to banks in another. The
international payment system allows governments, firms, and
persons to conduct trade and investment across international
borders (almost) as easily and inexpensively as does the domestic
system. Moreover, when money "moves" by being reflected in
accounts, it may move through a wide variety of channels. Different
channels offer governments different degrees of control. Most
jurisdictions impose restrictions on the physical movement of
currency, for example. Thus when entering a jurisdiction, travelers
are generally are asked to declare "monetary instruments" in excess
of the set amount (and FinCEN has proposed regulations to include
294. This all happens quickly, but if timing matters, the order of the transactions
is the reverse from how we have presented it.
295. Id. at 20-22.
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prepaid cards in that definition).296 As noted above, banks may
clear transactions through a central clearing house. 297 But banks
may also clear transactions internally, as they sometimes do to avoid
paying clearinghouse fees. For example, when a merchant and a
consumer who both bank with Citibank engage in a credit card
transaction, Citibank may clear the transaction in-house rather than
through MasterCard or Visa.29 8 (Similarly, in-house transaction
clearing may occur with "on-us" checks and wires). In addition,
nonbank financial networks may clear transactions through
exchanges of emails or other means. For example, the hawala
remittance system used in South Asia and cell phone payments
systems in Africa need not involve any entries in an account for the
participants but instead often relies on offsetting transactions
between entities in various jurisdictions.299 While such transactions
may be a relatively small portion of international movements of
money, they may also include a disproportionate share of illegal
transactions precisely because of the lack of account records.
Even in transactions that do involve account entries (as the vast
majority among businesses by volume certainly do, because a record
of transactions is essential to most business accounting efforts), the
identification of the owner of accounts is not straightforward. In
our simple example above, the money comes from an account
owned by Janet and is deposited into an account owned by Bill. But
perhaps Janet is acting on behalf of Tom (who may not want Bill to
know who is buying his house because he believes Bill would
charge a higher price if he knew that Tom was buying the property,
or who may have acquired the funds through illegal activity and so
296. See, e.g., 31 U.S.C. § 5316; FinCEN Form 105 Report of International
Transportation of Currency or Monetary Instruments, available at http://www.
fincen.gov/forms/files/finl05_cmir.pdf (requiring, with some exceptions, those
entering or leaving the United States to declare amounts in excess of $10,000);
http://www.frbatlanta.org/documents/rprf/rprf-pubs/130117_wp.pdf.
297. ROLE OF CENTRAL BANK MONEY, supra note 292, at 10-11.
298. Andrew P. Morriss & Jason Korosec, Private Dispute Resolution in the Card
Context: Structure, Reputation and Incentives, 1 J.L. EcON. & POL'Y 393-472 (2005)
(describing credit card payment system).
299. Patrick M. Jost & Harjit Singh Sandhu, The Hawala Alternative Remittance
System and its Role In Money Laundering, FINCEN (n.d.), at 5-8, available at
http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/terrorist-illicit-
finance/ Documents/ FinCEN-Hawala-rpt.pdf (describing system); Vanessa Clark,
The Sleeping Giants of African Mobile Payments, TECHCRUNCH (Oct. 28, 2012)
http://techcrunch.com/2012 /10/28/the-sleeping-giants-of-african-mobile-
payments/ (describing system).
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be attempting to protect the ownership of the property from
confiscation by law enforcement officials by using Janet as a straw
purchaser). Or perhaps Sarah is the actual owner of the property
but has listed it in Bill's name to avoid having her name on the
public record, for either legitimate or nefarious reasons. Janet's and
Bill's banks can therefore not simply rely on the information given
them by Janet and Bill if they are to make a determination about the
true beneficial owner of the account, but must also seek information
on the source of the funds Janet is using (e.g., by asking to see
financial records) and the source of the ownership of Bill's house
(e.g., by asking to see records documenting how he acquired it and
the source of any funds used to do so).
Moreover, it is obvious where physical persons and physical
objects are; it is less obvious where legal persons like companies and
trusts are located. Legal persons exist only in law, and are granted
attributes, including rights and powers, only by the operation of
law. Legal persons have many of the rights to do things that
physical persons possess, such as own property and enter into
contracts, and to sue and be sued for breach of someone else's
legally protected interest. Banks are organized as legal persons, and
may have physical "brick and mortar" locations for management,
computers, employees, and even vaults to hold physical currency.
In general, the bank's "location" is where it received its banking
charter and where it is subject to primary regulation and
supervision. If, for example, Bank A is headquartered in London,
then the U.K. regulatory authority will exercise primary jurisdiction
over it.300 However, as a general matter, jurisdictions prefer that
banks that wish to operate within their borders -which means that
they offer banking services directly to the jurisdiction's residents
first secure a local charter and be subject to local regulation and
supervision.301 This means that the multinational branches of Bank
A that are located in other jurisdictions, will have separate banking
licenses in each place and are subject to supervision in each place,
even if those branches are completely owned and controlled by
Bank A. From the perspective of the person transferring money
300. Raj Bhala, Cross Border Electronic Banking: Perspectives on Systematic Risk and
Sovereignty, in 5 CURRENT ISSUES AFFECTING CENTRAL BANKS 107, 114-120 (1998).
301. Id. Over time, mechanisms have been put in place to ensure effective
supervision in difference jurisdictions, and to coordinate supervision among
jurisdictions when a bank has a presence in more than one. Gordon, On the Use and
Abuse, supra note 168, at 541-63.
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internationally -meaning the person transferring a claim from, say,
Bank A to Bank B, its branch in Japan-what matters is that Bank B
respects and enforces that transfer. Similarly, in a nonbank
transaction (e.g., via a hawala network), what matters for the person
transferring the money is that the other participants in the network
are trustworthy. In large part for banking networks, this means that
the person transferring the claim can trust the supervisory
authorities and the courts in Japan. But from the point of view of
identifying the beneficial owners of the resources being transferred,
quite different information will also be needed. Crucially, this
information has little or nothing to do with the functioning of the
system of transfers. Collecting and disseminating that information
increases the cost of conducting transactions.
In the course of millions and billions of both national and
international transactions each day, much netting goes on among
deposit-taking banks and central banks, and of course, most of this is
done via electronic instruction implemented by various
interconnected record-keeping systems. 302 But when one refers to the
"international movement of money," one is really referring to the
shifting claims among people and banks that are subject to the
regulation and supervision of different jurisdictions. Once that
money is used to purchase a good, a service, or an asset, the person
now owns either a fleeting benefit or a more lasting one. Getting
these transfers "right" is quite important to the participants: both a
U.S. company paying its Chinese supplier and the supplier want to be
sure the payment goes to the correct entity in China. Not
surprisingly, international financial institutions have invested in
ensuring they can accomplish these transactions as the participants
desire. Their investment in control infrastructure to accomplish
governmental aims is quite different, since it does not advance the
financial institutions' businesses.
Moreover, the development of "non-equity and contractual
forms of association, the so-called New Forms of Investment (NFI)
that have been growing rapidly" since the 1980s, complicates things
still further.303 These include "licensing agreements, franchising,
302. Bhala, supra note 300, at 108-110.
303. STOPFORD, STRANGE & HENLEY, supra note 11, at 16. See also ALBI, Challenges,
supra note 7, at 131 (incentive to shift to unincorporated entities created by
corporate taxation); Boadway & Keen, supra note 75, at 54 ("the world has become
more complex ... [as] even the distinction between debt and equity has become less
clear-cut with the development of such instruments as the monthly income
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subcontracting, management contracts and joint ventures,"30 4 and
"are an important new feature of the global financial structure."
Multiple layers of agreements exist in such cases and the
complexities will quickly overwhelm any effort at standardized
reporting. For example, Stopford et al., describe the evolution of
Firestone's Kenya investment in the 1970s from a majority stake in a
firm with local owners holding a minority interest, with a royalty
arrangement negotiated directly with the country's president to a
minority stake in a firm majority owned by Kenyans, with a
management fee on net sale that was twice earlier fees, higher prices
and lower interest rates allowed because of the local majority
ownership, and a monopoly on imports of types of tires not made
locally.305 They conclude "Firestone increased its profit flow from
Kenya with reduced asset exposure and risk."306 None of these
features would fit easily into even the most rigorous reporting
framework being discussed today. These forms of investment are
"invisible investments," just as earnings of foreign exchange by sale
of banking, insurance, and other services to foreigners are described
as "invisible exports." "Essentially, what the firm is doing is to reap
an additional return on the capital already invested at home in
developing the product by transferring its knowhow across
frontiers."307  Such investments may not even appear in any
financial institution's accounts. How would the "beneficial owner"
of a contractual right be identified?
It is this system of transferring claims from banks in different
jurisdictions that permits governments, firms, and individuals to
engage in economic activity that is not bound by national borders.
It is, in short, what permits a modern global economy to function
preferred shares (treated in the United States as debt for tax purposes, but equity
for accounting purposes).").
304. STOPFORD, STRANGE & HENLEY, supra note 11, at 48 (quoting UNCTC).
305. Id. at 148-49.
306. Id. at 149.
307. Id. at 48. For example, Stopford et al., cite an example of General Motors
sending "at its own expense" a "regiment of engineers" to Brazil from Detroit for
"months" in the 1980s to assist Brazilian suppliers in meeting GM's requirements so
that GM could comply with local content laws. These engineers, paid in the United
States, were a transfer of services to the Brazilian companies but almost certainly
did not appear as income on the Brazilian firms' tax returns as income, although
they would have been expensed by GM in the United States. This boosted GM's
operations in Brazil, effectively shifting income from the United States to Brazil. Id.
at 4849.
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with considerably less value lost to transaction costs. Efficient
Enterprisers applaud this system; it minimizes transaction costs and
thereby allows a more efficient system of creating wealth. In doing
so, it also fosters jurisdictional competition by rewarding those
countries where keeping and transferring claims are most efficient
and the least risky. However, Control Firsters find this system
troubling, arguing that it represents some kind of nefarious, secret
international "movement" of wealth, when it is essentially an
expanded version of the system used domestically. What is
different with respect to the use of offshore centers as intermediaries
is that the person "moving" the funds from an onshore center has
chosen to use the legal and managerial benefits of an offshore center
rather than to continue to use those of his own jurisdiction. We
have already noted the possible efficiency benefits of investors
choosing superior legal systems, and that offshore centers may have
a comparative advantage in this area. We have also shown that
offshore centers have superior records with respect to implementing
anti-money laundering standards, and that they have been
cooperative at implementing the ever more onerous and expensive
reporting and transparency rules demanded by onshore tax
authorities. Given that offshore centers have a recent history of
solid banking supervision,308 there can be no reason to infer
nefarious activity when money is "moved" through an offshore
center. In fact, in view of the recent history of banking problems in
onshore jurisdictions in the United States and Europe, the use of
offshore center banks makes a good deal of sense.
An added wrinkle arises in dealing with intra-firm transfers.
Intra-firm trade is an important part of international trade.309 Not
only do firms trade with each other, different divisions within firms
trade across borders.310 These trades require that the firm make
bookkeeping entries both internally and in accounts in financial
institutions. In the regular course of business, such transfers of claims
shift revenues between jurisdictions and can fall afoul of tax
regulations without any ill intent. For example, Mo describes a U.S.-
China transaction in which a Sino-U.S. joint venture marketed
308. Gordon, On the Use and Abuse, supra note 168, at 562-63.
309. Mo, supra note 188, at 7 (noting that "a significant proportion of foreign
trade [in China, Brazil, and Mexico] consists of transactions between related entities
of ... multinationals.").
310. BEENHAKKER, supra note 30, at 31.
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detergent in China by attaching a free box of stain remover to each
box "Because the small boxes of stain remover were treated as free
gifts, the joint venture transferred the stain remover at cost, thus
reporting no profits in China. Since the stain remover cannot be sold
in the market separately, there was no market price readily available.
Although all information including the costs had been disclosed, the
transfer of stain remover at full cost was considered 'unacceptable'
avoidance and against the spirit of the law, which normally expects
a return from a joint venture investment."3 11 The complexity
necessary to cope with modern business arrangements makes
transfer pricing regulation costly to design and implement.
Of course, it is certainly true that one goal in shifting revenues
is to minimize taxes net of avoidance costs. However, tax avoidance
is merely one goal among many. For example, any tax minimization
strategy must also take into account factors such as impacts on
divisional operating results, 312 import duties,313 harmony among
divisional managers,314 currency fluctuations,315 overall and local
competitive positions,316 the role of foreign partners in
subsidiaries, 317 and labor relations.318 The decisions on allocating
costs are made by managers who are not always focused on
minimizing net tax payments as their goal. Taking all these factors
into account, Shulman concluded that corporate management needs
for measurement, evaluation, and motivation were significant
determinants of multinationals' "control systems" and a
"willingness to tinker incessantly with transfer prices" was
"dysfunctional." 319 Moreover, what revenue authorities perceive as
overly aggressive tax minimization strategies can also attract
regulators' attention and companies may value minimizing tax
investigations over tax savings.320
311. Mo, supra note 188, at 3.
312. James S. Shulman, TRANSFER PRICING IN THE MULTINATIONAL FIRM (1968
[2011 reprint edition]), at 5.
313. Id. at 5.
314. Id. at 7.
315. Id. (firms strive to move funds out of countries with inflation).
316. Id. at 11-12.
317. Id. at 13.
318. Id. at 14 (noting that Mexican requirement of profit sharing with employees
meant local profits must be "reasonable" to avoid labor strife).
319. Id. at 19-20.
320. Id. at 6 ("Another company neglects the impact of taxes on pricing entirely,
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These are not simple problems to manage. For example,
Shulman reported that a multinational operating in Brazil in the
1960s, when inflation there was high, preferred to ship goods to its
Brazilian subsidiary at a low price "to assist it in profitable
operation" and because the Brazilian government required
importers to post of a cash deposit equal to six months imports, and
the deposit lost value due to inflation. However, another
multinational operating in Brazil at the same time preferred to
charge its local subsidiary a high price, to get its money earned out
of the high inflation environment, despite having to lose money on
the cash deposit and pay higher taxes on the reported profits in the
United States. 321 Which set of transfer prices were "correct"?
Even where transfer-pricing efforts are aimed at shifting
resources between jurisdictions, they may not be motivated
primarily by tax considerations. For example, where local laws
prohibit remission of royalties abroad, increasing the transfer prices
of goods can substitute for royalty payments.322  Is this an
illegitimate evasion of local law or a reaction to a legal system
banning one transaction but permitting another?323 Which "intent"
matters - the intent to ban royalty payments or the intent to permit
sales? Similarly, is use of higher transfer prices to shift resources out
of a country where the resource owner fears expropriation a
legitimate reaction to uncertainty over political risk or illegitimate
evasion of "legal" confiscation of foreign-owned assets?324 Shulman
describes how one company used this to avoid losses from
expropriation during and after the Cuban Revolution.325
arguing that simple and consistent pricing practices tend to minimize tax
investigation problems.").
321. Id. at 8.
322. Id. at 9.
323. Consider that Delaware treats each section of its corporate law as having
"independent legal significance." Orzeck v. Englehart, 195 A.2d 375, 365 (Del. 1963)
(" [A]ction taken in accordance with different sections of that law are acts of
independent legal significance even though the end result may be the same under
different sections.") It is a "bedrock" of Delaware jurisprudence. Warner Commc'ns
Inc. v. Chris-Craft Indus., Inc., 583 A.2d 962, 970 (Del. Ch.) affd 567 A.2d 419 (Del.
1989). The doctrine "has played a role in many of Delaware's landmark decisions."
Robert K. Clagg, Jr., Note, An 'Easily Side-Stepped' and 'Largely Hortatory' Gesture?:
Examining the 2005 Amendment to Section 271 of the DGCL, 58 EMORY L. J. 1305, 1319
(2009). This doctrine is as "formalistic" as any about which the Control First
advocates complain.
324.Shulman, supra note 312, at 10-11.
325. Id. at 11. Bacardi diversified out of Cuba in part out of fear of expropriation,
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B. Why Money "Moves"
Claims are transferred internationally because of individual
transactions. Some of these transactions reflect transfer of funds to
accomplish a business purpose: a U.S. retailer importing goods from
a Chinese supplier must pay the supplier by transferring money
from an account the U.S. retailer controls to one the Chinese
supplier controls.
Claims are also transferred because the demand for investment
opportunities and the supply of those opportunities differ across
jurisdictions. In general, "capital flows out of countries where there
is a surplus of saving over domestic investment opportunities into
countries where there is a deficit (savings less investment)." 326 The
Tax Justice Network argues that developing countries exporting
capital is a sign of bad behavior by investors in those countries.327
However, countries with persistently large savings surpluses are
those where the public is "seeking to accumulate wealth (measured
net of government debt) at a faster pace (in absolute terms) than the
initially by the Batista regime. TOM BACARDI, BACARDI AND THE LONG FIGHT FOR
CUBA: THE BIOGRAPHY OF A CAUSE 198-99 (2009). By contrast, the maker of Havana
Club rum, Jose Arechabala, S.A., did not diversify its rum business out of Cuba and
lost its property in the Cuban Revolution. This led to a long-running dispute over
the intellectual property in the "Havana Club" trademark. See Emily Taylor, The
Havana Club Saga: Threatening More than Just "Cuba Coke", 24 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus.
513 (2004). Id. at 11. Bacardi diversified out of Cuba in part out of fear of
expropriation, initially by the Batista regime. TOM BACARDI, BACARDI AND THE LONG
FIGHT FOR CUBA: THE BIOGRAPHY OF A CAUSE 198-99 (2009). By contrast, the maker of
Havana Club rum, Jose Arechabala, S.A., did not diversify its rum business out of
Cuba and lost its property in the Cuban Revolution. This led to a long-running
dispute over the intellectual property in the "Havana Club" trademark. See Emily
Taylor, The Havana Club Saga: Threatening More than Just "Cuba Coke", 24 Nw. J. INT'L
L. & Bus. 513 (2004).
326. BRENDAN BROWN, WHAT DRIvEs CAPITAL FLOWS? MYTH, SPECULATION AND
CURRENCY DIPLOMACY 2 (2006).
327. See, e.g., Henry, supra note 4, at 23 ("since net outflows from developing
countries have continued over sustained periods of time, and since little offshore
wealth or the earnings that it produces have been repatriated, the most important
factors driving it are not those that drive 'hot money,' but long-term
decapitalization."). Interestingly, The Price of Offshore Revisited does not discuss the
temporary, targeted control of capital flows during periods of great financial
instability. Such temporary controls can be used to stabilize large and temporary
swings in exchange rates or to prevent large and temporary currency runs that can
lead to defaults. IMF, The Liberalization and Management of Capital Flows, An
Institutional View (Nov. 13, 2012), available at
http://www.imf.org/extemal/np/pp/eng/20 12/111412.pdf. We do not address
such temporary capital controls in this paper.
84 [Vol. 37:1
Moving Money
expansion of the domestic capital stock."328 Where money can move
freely, there is no reason to expect savings and investment to
balance within a jurisdiction. Chinese citizens have a high savings
rate;329 U.S. citizens a much lower one.330 If opportunities to invest
internationally exist for Chinese investors, this will cause a
movement of capital from China to the United States. (For political
reasons and because of the restrictions on the convertibility of the
Chinese currency, the Chinese government undertakes a major
portion of Chinese investment into the United States).331 A
substantial amount of money moves for this reason, as "[t]he main
ultimate sources of net capital outflows are the advanced economies
in East/South East Asia (Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong,
and Singapore), with an estimated $230 billion, Middle East oil
exporters, $220 billion, Western Europe excluding the United
Kingdom (euro-area, Switzerland, Norway, and Sweden), $120
billion, and Asian-developing countries (China, India, and others),
$130 billion."332
Claims are also transferred because of firms' and individuals'
investment preferences. There may be more investment opportunities
of a desirable type in one jurisdiction rather than another, which will
draw funds in. The desirability of the investment may be due to the
presence of natural resources, relative labor costs, or other advantages
related to factors of production. But it may also be related to the
desirability of the legal and regulatory framework provided by a
jurisdiction. Particularly for international investors, the agency
problems involved in portfolio investment are significant. Moreover,
investment across borders may occur because firms and individuals
desire asset diversification.333 Asset diversification will do more than
328. BROWN, supra note 326, at 7.
329. Guonan Ma & Wang Yi, China's High Savings Rate: Myth and Reality, Bank
for International Settlements (Working Paper No. 312, June 2010), available at
http://www.bis.org/publ/work312.pdf (Chinese savings rate exceeded 50%
during 2000s).
330. Id. at Table 1 (noting U.S. savings rate was under 20% during 2000s).
331. See Philippe Gugler and Bertram Boie, The Emergence of Chinese FDI:
Determinants and Strategies of Chinese MNE 4-5 (Oct. 9-10, 2008), available at
http://gdex.dk/ofdi/20%20Gugler%20Philippe.pdf (until 2003, outward Chinese
investment was principally only allowed by state-owned enterprises. Since then,
the Central government has maintained the lion's share of outward FDI (73.5% in
2003, 82.3% in 2004, and 83.2% in 2005).
332. BROWN, supra note 326, at 19.
333. Id. at 8 ("A considerable amount of two-way capital flows can be explained
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lead to reciprocal swaps between jurisdictions: investors from
jurisdictions which are less stable, which have poorer economic
performance, or which provide less robust property rights protections
will need to diversify out of their jurisdictions more than will those in
stable, better performing economies with strong property rights
protections. Claims are transferred under many labels in business
deals. Firms evaluating investment projects care about all of the cash
flows generated. These include "dividends, plus royalties,
management fees, trademark fees and the effects on profitability of
operations in other countries."334
In addition, capital flows towards deep, well-functioning
capital markets where it can then find its way on to appropriate
investments.335 There is an important role for capital markets as
aggregators and repackagers of funds that will travel on to other
destinations. Indeed without introducing some real world facts
such as "currency risk, political risk, and other heterogeneous
factors, we would have a hard job explaining a salient feature of
global capital flows-the turntable."33 6  A "turntable" is "the
phenomenon of a country (or group of countries forming a currency
area) importing capital on a net basis from another region of the
world and exporting it (net) to another. Typically the turntable
would import capital from the savings surplus countries and re-
export (capital) to the savings deficit countries. Turntables can also
by the simple arithmetic of diversification. If there were no home biases
(preference to hold domestic rather than foreign assets) investors in any country
would tend to hold the same portfolio of assets drawn from all over the world.
That would mean large inflows and outflows of capital being the norm for each
country as part of the process of wealth accumulation. Relative to national income
these would be greater for small countries (whose assets formed only a small part
of the world portfolio) than for large.").
334. STOPFORD, STRANGE & HENLEY, supra note 11, at 150.
335. London has long played this role. Catherine Schenk describes it in the 1960s
as
London was a genuine entrep~t where financial institutions intermediated
between customers abroad and between domestic and foreign customers.
This reflected the sophistication of financial services that had been
developed over the past century; through the Gold Standard, the
subsequent pre-eminence of sterling, and the role of Britain as the world's
major trading nation.
Catherine R. Schenk, International Financial Centres, 1958-1971: Competitiveness and
Complementarity, in EUROPEAN BANKS AND THE AMERICAN CHALLENGE: COMPETITION
AND COOPERATION IN INTERNATIONAL BANKING UNDER BRETION WooDs 74, 78
(Stefano Battilossi & Youssef Cassis eds., 2002).
336. BROwN, supra note 326, at 8.
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have relationships with each other.337
Often assets are repackaged in capital markets, changing their
legal characteristics. Thus a dollar moved from New York to
London becomes a "Eurodollar" rather than a "dollar," and is
capable of being held at a lower cost by a financial institution in
London than it would be in New York.33 8 This is because a London
bank holding a dollar is not required by either the Bank of England
or the Federal Reserve to set aside the same level of reserves for
lending based on that dollar as the Bank would require for a British
bank holding an equivalent amount in sterling or the Federal
Reserve would for a U.S. bank holding the dollar in the United
States.339 The loan can thus be made at a lower cost than it would
otherwise be and the deposit can be paid a higher rate than it would
otherwise receive. o There is nothing illegitimate about this-it
merely reflects the lower transactions costs of packaging a particular
set of claims in large sizes and outside of the reserve requirements
imposed on more retail banking operations. Moreover, the
Eurodollar market expanded in part in response to corporate
treasurers' efforts to maximize the value of their short-term cash
337. Id. at 8-9. There are well-documented examples of turntable effects. For
example, Brown describes how in 2003-04, savings surpluses in Asia (particularly
from Japan and the more advanced economies in east and south Asia) were filling
the U.S. savings deficit. Because Asian investors wanted not just U.S. assets but
also euro-area assets, and euro-area residents sought to borrow low interest yen to
finance euro-area activity, Asian funds flowed into the euro-area, while euro-area
funds flowed out of the euro-area. Id. Similarly, in 1999-2000, European investors
were buying U.S. equities and companies, while a global demand for euro-area
assets was appearing in reaction to the new European currency and development of
deeper capital and money markets in Europe that resulted. Id.
338. ROBERT Z. ALIBER, THE INTERNATIONAL MONEY GAME 176-80 (5th ed. 1987)
(describing operation of Eurocurrency markets). For the role of Eurocurrency
markets in the development of the Cayman Islands as an offshore financial center,
see Freyer & Morriss, supra note 8, at 18-21.
339. ALIBER, supra note 338, at 179-80. In a further example of how regulatory
policies create new financial markets, American banks moved into Europe in the
1960s in part as a response to the Kennedy Administration's creation of the Interest
Equalization Tax in the United States, which was intended to increase the cost of
foreigners and U.S. companies with foreign operations raising capital in the United
States. Stefano Battilossi, Introduction: International Banking and the American
Challenge in Historical Perspective, in EUROPEAN BANKS AND THE AMERICAN
CHALLENGE, supra note 335, at 1, 14. Thus the system that Control Firsters object to
grew in response to an effort to restrict legal capital export from the United States,
precisely the sort of policy they endorse today.
340. ALIBER, supra note 338, at 176-77.
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holdings, not tax-based motives. 341 It grew further as banks
switched from asset management to liability management as their
strategy for matching assets to liabilities on their books.342 In
addition, routing money through sophisticated financial institutions
offers the opportunity to build in regulatory measures to protect
lenders. 343
Of course, some claims are transferred as part of a criminal
enterprise. For example, Colombian cocaine exporters need to be
able to spend money in Colombia that was generated by the sale of
their cocaine in the United States. Similarly, claims may be
transferred across jurisdictional boundaries to another to pay for
terrorist activity. Claims may also be transferred because they
represent stolen assets (either by private actors or by political actors)
in one jurisdiction and an attempt is being made to hide the assets in
another.
A key difference between the two frameworks described above
concerns the legitimacy of the constraints imposed by flows of
claims. (We discuss the Tax Justice Network's effort to estimate the
size of illegitimate flows in the next section.). If individual decisions
by firms and individuals to move money from one jurisdiction to
another reflect decisions about how best to allocate their resources,
broad trends in money movements provide information on how
jurisdictions are perceived by economic actors and reflect economic
activity. A jurisdiction whose government found itself constrained
by such pressures because its policies made it an inhospitable place
for investment would have to choose between continuing the
341. Stefano Battilossi, Banking with Multinationals: British Clearing Banks and the
Euromarkets' Challenge, 1958-1976, in EUROPEAN BANKS AND THE AMERICAN
CHALLENGE, supra note 335, at 103, 104.
342. Id. at 107 ("Both CDs and Eurodollars represented key factors that allowed
banks to strengthen the liability side of their balance sheet, by compensating
shrinking deposits with funds borrowed at market rates. By doing so, they
promoted a radically different way of banking, based on what was known as
'liability management', under which commercial banks increasingly tended to
accommodate liabilities to loan demand by borrowing funds in the money
markets.").
343. MILLER & CAFAGGI, supra note 35, at 21 ("Credit agreements, in short, can
operate as a reasonably comprehensive regulatory systems, entered into by private
contract and not compelled by any government action."). As Miller and Cafaggi
note, lenders monitor performance and verify the borrower is in compliance with
the terms, a valuable service. Id. at 22. In general, they note that "[b]y far the
greatest share of standard-setting and enforcement is conducted by private actors"
through various private bodies and agreements. Id. at 26.
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policies and suffering the consequences or changing the policies.
For example, Papaioannou concludes "the evidence implies that
improving inefficient bureaucracies, tackling corruption, and
enhancing legal system competence are crucial for attracting foreign
bank capital" and that "political liberalizations, privatization and
other structural policies (which are followed by a decline in political
risk), can enhance domestic liquidity by attracting substantially
more foreign capital."344 Thus Venezuela's economy is experiencing
significant inflation (bordering on hyperinflation) largely as a result
of the Venezuelan government's policy choices. 45  Efficient
Enterprises proponents see this is a market reaction to the
institutional environment presented by the government's choices.4 6
Control First proponents see this as a barrier to governments' ability
to adopt policies.347 In addition, they argue that illegitimate motives
drive a substantial number of decisions to move money across
borders. Because they view tax avoidance as illegitimate, they reject
jurisdictions' ability to compete for wealth creation through creation
of a favorable investment climate.
Capital markets discipline governments to some extent,
although the degree varies with the degree of openness to the world
economy. Governments seek to avoid such discipline; as a former
344. Elias Papaioannou, What Drives International Bank Flows? Politics, Institutions
& Other Determinants 29 (Nov. 2004), available at http://www.ecb.de
/events/pdf/ conferences/ ecbimf/paper.paioannou.pdf.
345. See Ezequiel Minaya, Venezuelan Inflation Surges, WALL ST. J. (July 9, 2013),
http:/ /online.wsj.com/article/SB0001424127887324507404578596153737072578.ht
ml; Benedict Mander, Venezuela hit by fears of hyperinflation and recession, FIN. TIMES
(June 9, 2013) http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/b4lfbcb4-dfl-11e2-be7b-
00144feab7 de.html#axzz2cGeeJiQS (attributing inflation to "a tangled web of price
and currency controls which, together with problems in the oil industry that
supplies 96 per cent of export revenues, have generated a shortage of foreign
currency, on which the import-dependent economy relies.").
346. Markets react to government policies. See Jeffry A. Frieden, The Politics of
Exchange Rates, in MEXICO 1994: ANATOMY OF AN EMERGING MARKET CRASH 81
(Sebastian Edwards & Moises Naim eds., 1998). See also Arminio Fraga, Capital
Flows to Latin America, in INTERNATIONAL CAPITAL FLOws 50 (Martin Feldstein ed.
1999) (describing how capital controls gave central bank in Brazil "a false sense of
security and probably allowed Brazil to avoid or postpone a number of important
macroeconomic policy changes and structural reforms.").
347. See, e.g., Henry, supra note 4, at 25-26 ("that when the public sector has been
starved for capital (perhaps having had to rely on high-cost loans or inflationary
finance rather than tax revenue), the rate of return on public investments is often
higher than on private investment. Tax, by producing better roads and educated
populations and so on, can 'crowd in' private investment, rather than crowd it out
as many people believe.").
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Brazilian central bank economist noted, "[g]overnments, for
whatever reason, usually for political reasons, often try to defend
situations that are clearly unsustainable."4 8 Similarly, economists
Reuven Glick and Michael Hutchinson concluded an empirical
study of efforts to prevent financial crises through capital controls
by noting that "[e]xtensive capital controls and other restrictions on
exchange payments may contribute to greater vulnerability of
countries to currency crises by leading to inconsistent policies, poor
policy design, and, at worst, substantial corruption in the financial
and international sector that eventually erodes confidence in the
exchange rate system."349 A government that chooses to isolate itself
can survive without such links, at considerable cost. For example,
both Iran and North Korea have managed to maintain regimes
despite considerable outside financial pressures.350 However, the
Mitterrand government in France in the 1980s "was forced by the
external deficits and the exhaustion of foreign credit into a major U-
turn in policy away from state-owned enterprises and organized
labour and toward productivity in export industries." 351 Were the
constraints imposed on the Mitterrand government analogous to
those imposed by the laws of physics (e.g., a feature of the natural
world to which politicians must adjust) or the result of
undemocratic behavior by outside speculators? Efficient
Enterprisers tend to see such pressures as the former, Control
Firsters as the latter.
In more connected economies, the pressures from capital
markets can be even more significant. For example, capital market
348. Fraga, supra note 346, at 50.
349. Reuven Glick & Michael Hutchinson, Stopping 'Hot Money' or Signaling Bad
Policy? Capital Controls and the Onset of Currency Crises 27 (2000), available at
http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.202.3623&rep=repl&t
ype=pdf.
350. See KENNETH KATZMAN, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RS20871 IRAN SANCrIONS,
(2000), available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/mideast/RS20871.pdf (detailing
some of the methods Iran has implemented as a work-around to trade embargos
and noting that "Government-linked entities are creating front companies and
making increased use of barter trade. Iranian traders are using informal banking
exchange mechanisms and, benefitting from the fall in the value of Iran's currency,
increasing non-oil exports such as agricultural goods, minerals, and industrial
goods. Affluent Iranians are investing in hard assets such as real estate."); Robert
Carbaugh, Are Economic Sanctions Useful in Discouraging the Proliferation of Weapons
of Mass Destruction, 9 World Econ. 181, 191-192 (Oct. 2008) (arguing that only about
a quarter of U.N. countries actively participate in sanctions against North Korea).
351. STOPFORD, STRANGE & HENLEY, supra note 11, at 206.
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discipline has made policies aimed at overvaluing currencies
unsustainable, with the benefit of discouraging inefficient
importation of capital-intensive producer goods and luxury
consumer goods.352 Even in this constrained world, governments
"retain considerable negative power to disrupt, manage or distort
trade by controlling entry to the territory in which the national
market functions. They cannot so easily control production which is
aimed at a world market and which does not necessarily take place
within their frontiers."353 This discipline helps restrain governments
from adopting policies in which politics, rather than markets,
allocates scarce resources.354
Capital markets exert discipline by offering capital alternatives
to local investments when governments adopt policies that reduce
rates of return. For example, Russia experienced considerable
capital flight during 2008 ($74 billion of foreign capital left Russia
between August and October 2008).355 Wealthy Russians also lost
money during this time: Russian oligarchs were estimated to have
lost $230 billion in this same period. 356 Presumably additional
capital left Russia by both recorded and unrecorded means. Why
did this happen? One possible explanation is Russian citizens were
illegitimately evading the controls on their wealth and behavior that
their government sought to impose so it could collect taxes to fund
public goods. Another possible explanation is that Russia was an
economy where the
most powerful companies control natural resources-so wealth
stems not from human capital but from the willingness of a select
group of financially skilled oligarchs to support the policies of the
existing power structure in exchange for control of those natural
resources. Russia uses its court system to harass executives who
speak in opposition to government policies. And its financial
markets lack the transparency and depth to support IPOs. . . .
[T]hrough its willingness to oust executives representing Western
interests . . . Russia sent a strong signal to foreign capital
352. Id. at 107.
353. Id. at 14.
354. Id. at 170 ("Where the state becomes both the engine of development and
the arbiter of social relations, benefits are distributed by 'concessionary' bargaining
with local and foreign groups. Over time, state-controlled dispensation of 'favours'
becomes important for maintaining the regime.").
355. COHEN & RANGAN, supra note 18, at 33.
356. Id.
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providers that it would be happy to take outside capital but that it
would not allow that capital to earn a return on it. Rather, Russia
provided a stark example to those foreign capital providers that it
would use its court system to drive out the representatives of its
Western partners and take full control of the venture once it had
the foreign capital it needed to launch it.3s7
Were anti-oligarch efforts legitimate or illegitimate? Partly
both? How does one tell? Similarly, Malaysia, a prominent
"victim" of capital flight, had a policy of discrimination in
employment, education, and investment against its ethnic Chinese
and Indian citizens, which created "both an exodus of talent from
the country and capital flight."358 Were the anti-Chinese and anti-
Indian policies legitimate policies to which its citizens of Chinese
and Indian origin were morally obligated to submit or illegitimate
acts they could legitimately resist by shifting assets out of the
country by any means available? Moreover, then-Prime Minister
Mahathir's public attacks on hedge funds not only made Malaysian
businesses fearful about additional losses in value but also signaled
weakness to currency markets and attracted more speculative
attacks.359  Should Malaysia have been insulated from the
consequences of Mahathir's statements?
Control First proponents focus almost exclusively on instances in
which governments are robbed by corrupt politicians and
bureaucrats in collusion with private sector actors, as in the Angola-
Russia example discussed earlier.360 They are thus able to ignore
arguments based on questionable behavior by governments. The Tax
Justice Network dismisses the idea that tax competition has beneficial
effects on governments by blithely stating that despite it being "very
hard to defend 'tax enforcement at any price' when the tax collector is
the Burmese junta, Gaddafi's Libya, or perhaps even the City of
Chicago," "[o]ur sense . . . is that most countries operate very, very
357. Id. at 34.
358. STOPFORD, STRANGE & HENLEY, supra note 11, at 124. See alSO DE BROUWER,
supra 36, at 100 (noting that capital flight from Malaysia in November-December
1997 of approximately $30 billion was "largely in response to the domestic banking
crisis and persecution of ethnic Chinese.").
359. Id. at 110. In addition, "[tihe ferocity, emotionalism and anti-Semitism of
Mahathir's comments was an affront to many speculators and widened the
motivation of their activity from simply making money to include an element of
retribution. In the words of some market participants, Malaysia became an 'ego
play.'"
360. See notes 128 to 129 supra.
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far from this hypothetical 'tax compliance vs. freedom-and-prosperity
margin,' along which increased tax competition and reduced
compliance automatically leads to increased liberty,
entrepreneurship, and growth."361 As this quote illustrates, rather
than providing discipline that pushes governments to adopt policies
that promote economic growth, Control First proponents argue that
international financial institutions promote policies that facilitate
looting public treasuries. They argue that what is needed is enhanced
control over financial flows to prevent money from leaving the
jurisdictions where it is being looted. At a minimum, this requires
powerful assumptions about the mix of legitimate and illegitimate
actions by governments. We now turn to analyzing the Tax Justice
Network's attempt to estimate illegitimate movement of money.
C. How Much Illegitimate Movement of Money Occurs?
As we have discussed above, there are policy questions that
need to be resolved in making choices about how to treat the
movement of money. In addition, there are factual ones: there are
disagreements over what types of transactions are occurring, why
transfers occur, and where claims are ultimately being recorded. As
noted earlier, one of the main arguments Control First proponents
make is that illicit flows are large. In this section, we examine the
estimate made by the Tax Justice Network in its report The Price of
Offshore Revisited. To the extent that we are interested in
understanding the costs and benefits of particular policies-to
weigh the costs and benefits of particular measures aimed at either
enhancing the free flow of money or restricting it in pursuit of
increasing tax collections or decreasing the funds available to
criminals-the calculation will be affected by the magnitudes of
legitimate and illegitimate flows involved.
Unfortunately, data on transactions, which are, by definition,
unreported is unsurprisingly hard to come by. As a result, Control
First interest groups seek to establish large estimates to set the
baseline for the debate on turf favorable to their efforts to exert
controls over financial flows. In this section, we examine the most
recent effort to establish the benchmark by the Tax Justice Network.
We use The Price. of Offshore Revisited for this because it is the most
recent effort, it claims to be the most comprehensive estimate, 362 and
361. Henry, supra note 4, at 25.
362. Id. at 40.
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it is widely cited as authoritative in public debates over financial
control measures.363  Analyzing the best case scenario for the
Control First approach is useful both to understand how the policy
debate is being conducted, and because the weaknesses in the effort
reveal how dependent the Control First argument is on strong
assumptions about the nature of financial activity. It is worth
noting, however, that TJN's estimate is an outlier even among other
estimates by ideologically sympathetic sources. As TJN itself notes,
its estimate in The Price of Offshore Revisited is substantially larger
than either its own 2005 estimate or the estimates made by others
who agree with TJN on policy preferences.3 4 That itself is a reason
to be cautious in putting too much weight on the largest estimate.
There are other reasons to be cautious. The Price of Offshore
Revisited purports to use "a more open, transparent, collaborative
model for doing such research so that the data sources, estimation
methods, and core assumptions are all exposed to the sunlight of
peer review, and ultimately to public scrutiny."365 To date, no such
materials have appeared on its website beyond a PowerPoint
presentation lacking crucial details. When we asked a research
assistant to contact the author and the Tax Justice Network in 2012
and 2013 to obtain the details of the model and the data that was not
reported in the report, he received no reply despite multiple emails
and other messages. For an organization promoting an "open,
transparent" approach, the Tax Justice Network proved remarkably
opaque and closed about its methodology. In addition, TJN, and
Henry, are fond of quotations of anonymous "officials" who say
witty things such as: "The problem is not that these countries do not
363. See, e.g., Yenni Kwok, Global Super-Rich Hide $21 Trillion in Tax Havens,
CNN.coM (July 25, 2012) http://edition.cnn.com/2012/07/23/business/super-
rich-hidden-wealth-offshore; Lyneka Little, Super-Rich Hide $21 Trillion in Secret Tax
Havens, Says Tax justice Network, ABC NEWS (July 23, 2012) http://abcnews.go.
com/blogs/business/2012/07/super-rich-hide-21-trillion-in-secret-tax-havens-
says-tax justice-network/; Mary Carroll, Brazil's Wealthiest Hide US$520B: Daily, THE
RIo TIMEs (July 23, 2012), http://riotimesonline.com/brazil-news/rio-
business/brazils-wealthiest-hide-us520b-in-offshore-accounts/ #; Tax havens: Super-
rich 'hiding' at least $21tn, BBC NEws (July 22, 2012)
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-18944097. Remarkably, these stories accept
the claims made in the report uncritically and do not present alternative views.
364. Henry, supra note 4, at 34-35. The earlier report is a 2 page "briefing
paper." TAX JUSTICE NETWORK, The Price of Offshore (2005), available at http://www
.taxjustice.net/cms/upload/pdf/BriefingPaper-ThePrice-ofOffshore_14_MAR
2005.pdf.
365. Henry, supra note 4, at 5.
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have any assets. The problem is, they're all in Miami." 366 Sprinkling
the report with such quips improves its readability but adds nothing
to its legitimacy. TJN also relies heavily on unsupported factual
assertions. For example, it claims that, "we also know for a fact that
wealthy investors from these ["key" Latin American] source
countries [such as Venezuela and Mexico] account for a significant
share of US bank deposits owned by non-residents." 367 How does
TJN know this? They do not say. This is not information made
publicly available by banks or regulators and factual claims about it
require support if they are to be taken seriously. What is a
"significant" share? Who knows? The report is opaque on the
crucial details about how its estimate was constructed, which is
ironic in light of TJN's focus on demanding that others to be
transparent. Since it is impossible to reverse engineer the estimates
based on the information provided in the report, we examine what
TJN reveals about its methodology and probe the assumptions
underlying it. We then focus on the "corrections" and
"adjustments" TJN makes to its model's estimates.
1. Methodology & Assumptions
TJN's methodology and its implicit assumptions are
problematic as a basis for public policy for five main reasons. To
begin with, The Price of Offshore Revisited focuses on "measuring
long-term un- recorded cross-border private financial capital flows and
stocks."368 It begins by attempting to estimate "underreported
capital flows," which it concedes might be due to both legitimate
and illegitimate motives.369  Capital flows can be short-term
(typically up to a year) or long-term (more than a year).370 (Simply
noting an increase in claims recorded in one country and reduced in
another tells us nothing about what type of claim is involved.).
Income from portfolio investment-"the ownership of financial
securities, broadly defined to include sales and purchases of
securities and amounts of outstanding claims and liabilities reported
by banks and nonbanking concerns" - and direct foreign investment
366. Id. at 6.
367. Id. at 31.
368. Id. at 23 (emphasis in original).
369. Id.
370. BEENHAKKER, supra note 28, at 47.
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are reported in countries' current accounts; "exchanges in financial
assets" are reported in the capital account.371 Inexplicably, The Price
of Offshore Revisited fails to discuss or cite any of the rapidly growing
literature on financial flows. 372 This may not be surprising since this
literature raises issues that undermine TJN's focus on tax avoidance
and instead demonstrate the impact of the quality of the legal
environment in determining investment.373  If investors have
rational reasons for avoiding investing in particular countries, this
undermines TJN's assumption that such investments would increase
in the absence of OFCs. Instead, TJN assumes that "the most
important factors driving" these flows are "long-term
decapitalization" based on the observation that "net outflows from
developing countries have continued over sustained periods of
time."374 This is a powerful assumption and not justified by the
observation that firms and individuals have consistently shifted
assets out of some jurisdictions and into others. It is at least
plausible that such shifts might involve desires to move assets to
jurisdictions with better quality legal institutions, more stable
political environments, less corruption, and greater investment
opportunities. TJN offers no evidence to support its rejection of
more conventional explanations like these.
The method of examining residuals from official statistics might
produce useful information. In theory, global current account
balances should add up to zero, since money entering one country
comes from another.3 75 However,
[i]n practice there are large errors in measurement which mean
that equality is not observed in the actual data. . . . If
measurement techniques were perfect, and all the relevant
economic transactions were traceable by the official statisticians,
there would be no errors. It is important to realize, however, that
these saving and current account surpluses, even perfectly
371. Id. at 48.
372. In addition to works cited in this paper, see, e.g., IMF data and statistics on
capital flows, http://www.imf.org/extemal/data.htm; Masahiro Kawai & Shinji
Takagi, A Survey of the Literature on Managing Capital Flows, in MANAGING CAPITAL
FLows: THE SEARCH FOR A FRAMEWORK (Masahiro Kawai & Mario B. Lamberte eds.,
2012) and sources cited.
373. See, e.g., Papaioannou, supra note 302, at 7 (finding "a strong causal effect of
legal system effectiveness indicators on the volume of cross-border lending
activities.").
374. Henry, supra note 4, at 23.
375. BROWN, supra note 326, at 3.
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measured, would be quite different for much of the time from the
equilibrium concepts in which economists are interested.37 6
For example, the world current account balance has swung from
negative $14 billion in 1975 to a positive $125 billion in 1990, then
back down to $50 billion in 1995, then up to $174 billion in 2000, and
back down to $150 billion in 2005.377 Within that time, the United
States' current account balance swung between $18 billion in 1995 to
negative $810 billion in 2005.378 These dramatic movements in the
total world current account balance as well as the U.S. current
account balance suggest that there is some degree of noise in the
system. More importantly, these differences suggest that there are
substantial problems with measurement even in highly developed
economies. Further, understanding these flows is made more
complex because of the rapid pace of financial innovation, which
complicates the valuation of securities and other financial
instruments held by investors. Since the movement of money is
merely the shifting of claims, as we explained above, not taking into
account other forms of claims presents only a portion of the total
picture.
Setting aside these complications, TJN estimates hidden funds
by comparing the sum of sources of foreign capital ("foreign loans,
net direct investment, and net portfolio investments") with
"recorded uses" ("financing current account deficits and increasing
official reserves").379 The difference for each country is (by
definition) "unrecorded net capital outflows." 380 As TJN notes,
every item on its list is measured with error. TJN assumes,
however, that "over time and across dozens of countries, the errors
should more or less cancel out."3 81  This is another powerful
assumption and would be true only if the errors were randomly
distributed around a zero mean. If measurement errors have a
systematic bias to them, this would be an invalid assumption.382
376. Id.
377. Id. at 4-5, Table 1.1.
378. Id.
379. Henry, supra note 4, at 28.
380. Id.
381. Id.
382. TJN claims to have "grudgingly" adjusted for fluctuations in exchange
rates, although no details are provided. Since it also states that the adjustments
made little difference, however, we can ignore the absence of information on what
adjustments it made. Id. at 29 (it turns out not to make all that much difference to
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There is no evidence that such a restrictive assumption on error
distributions is correct- measurement errors in capital flows are not
merely the result of random transcription errors in recording
transactions, although such errors surely occur. They are also the
result of systematic errors in recording due to accounting
conventions, the wide range of decisions about how to value and
report assets, and other features of international business,
government, and accounting. Imposing a highly restrictive
assumption about the distribution of errors on a model is an
extremely powerful assumption that requires more than an assertion
to justify it.383 Without this assumption, however, TJN's estimates are
worthless.
Next, TJN makes inappropriate assumptions about particular
types of transactions. For example, TJN argues that round-
tripping -where a country imports capital in one form and exports
it in another form to and from the same other country -is a sign of
bad behavior.384 This is simply wrong. Round-tripping is "a
pervasive feature of the global flow of funds."385 There are a variety
of reasons for such flows. First, equity markets are more developed
in some countries. For example, the United Kingdom and
Switzerland have deep, well-developed equity markets. "Global
investors buy shares in U.K. or Swiss companies which themselves
make large direct investments in the world outside. In effect the
U.K. or Switzerland become equity intermediation centers-some
direct investment outside the U.K. or Switzerland that first passes
through a British or Swiss multinational has ultimate equity owners
also outside." 386 The appearance of "global investment banks made
the estimates" but "for the sake of academic purity" adjustments made).
383. See BENOIT MANDELBROT & RICHARD L. HUDSON, THE MISBEHAVIOR OF
MARKETS: A FRACTAL VIEW OF FINANCIAL TURBULENCE (2007) (describing impact of
mistakenly relying on a normal distribution of error terms).
384. The Tax Justice Network includes this among its dubious motives for
unrecorded capital flows. While the paper suggests not to prejudge motives,
round-tripping is described as "taking money offshore, dressing up in secrecy
structures then pretending to be 'foreign' investors in order to take advantage of tax
breaks only available to 'foreigners.'" Henry, supra note 4, at 23.
385. BROWN, supra note 326, at 11.
386. Id. at 11. Round-tripping also occurs because managers in multinationals
from some countries have a comparative advantage. For example, U.K. corporate
managers have a comparative advantage "in undertaking and administering
business in the English-speaking world (especially the US)." Id. at 12. Investors
outside Britain and the United States may thus invest in British or American
companies, which then buy assets in the investors' home countries as a means of
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it easy for the buying and selling of stocks to be directed to the best
market, wherever that was."387
Similarly, even countries with a population that has a strong
investor home bias produce round-tripping. For example, Japanese
investors have a particularly strong home bias for Japanese equity
investments, while foreign companies are reluctant to acquire
Japanese equity investments because of market barriers and other
factors such as the lack of a market for corporate control. On the
other hand, Japanese firms are willing to acquire foreign assets. As
a result, the in-flow of funds into Japan is matched over time by
Japanese firms' outward investment, producing a round-trip for
profits sent back to Japan.388
Third, some round-tripping is a result of discriminatory policies
that oppress ethnic minorities, as with the circular flow of Malaysian
Chinese or Indian citizens' funds out and back into Malaysia,389
which cleanses their money of the ethnic quality that disadvantaged
it under Malaysian law.
Finally, round-tripping may occur because firms and
individuals anticipate changes in currency valuations. For example,
considerable funds flow in and out of China as a result of
anticipated appreciation of the renminbi (RMB), which leads
Chinese firms to seek to borrow in foreign currency, interest by the
Chinese diaspora in investment into China, and Chinese
government purchases of dollar, euro, and other foreign currency-
denominated assets.390  Given all of these reasons for round-
tripping, there is no basis to conclude that the existence of parallel
flows of accounting claims between jurisdictions could only be
evidence of illegal or even undesirable behavior.
Similarly, TJN claims that, "under-taxed corporate profits and
royalties" are the source of funds "that have been parked offshore
by way of rigged transfer pricing schemes." 391 Although it concedes
that estimates of "transfer pricing abuses are more problematic" and
so does not include them in its headline estimates, the report
taking advantage of this management expertise.
387. Michie, supra note 293, at 59.
388. Id. at 13.
389. STOPFORD, STRANGE & HENLEY, supra note 11, at 124.
390. BROWN, supra note 326, at 13-14.
391. Henry, supra note 4, at 24.
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concludes "they are likely to be significant" 39 2 and so suggests their
exclusion renders TJN's estimates a floor. TJN is selective in its
consideration of transfer pricing issues, focusing on only examples
that reinforce its position. As we described above, transfer pricing is
an extraordinarily complex issue in which different firms operating
in the same environment may have incentives to shift prices in
opposite directions. In addition, TJN ignores the complications in
relying on export figures introduced by Value Added Tax fraud,
which can involve phony claims of exports. 393 The distinction is
important since in a typical VAT fraud scheme the money would
not actually move out of the jurisdiction but instead the party
committing the fraud would claim a refund from the tax
authority. 394 VAT frauds in developing countries would thus inflate
recorded outflows (and so TJN's estimates) without any actual shift
of resources out of a jurisdiction as the result of fraud within the
country. Since this does not fit TJN's narrative, it is not mentioned.
Third, TJN makes a strong and implausible assumption about
the destinations of the illicit funds. According to TJN, this money
comes from the "myriad of illicit activities in the global
underground economy -corruption, fraud, insider trading, drug
trafficking, 'blood diamonds,' and innumerable other for-profit
crimes" that provide "illicit loot" which needs concealment.395
However, TJN assumes that the money from all of these activities
ends up "idle in relatively-low-yield offshore investments," which
leaves the "public sector . . . starved for capital (perhaps having to
rely on high-cost loans or inflationary finance rather than tax
revenue.)" 396 Offshore investments thus earn "a modest 6-month CD
rate," which has been "'grossed down' to reflect the costs of offshore
392. Id.
393. Michael Keen & Stephen Smith, VAT Fraud and Evasion: What Do We Know,
and What Can Be Done? IMF Working Paper 10 (Feb. 2007), http://www
.imf.org/extemal/pubs/ft/wp/2007/wp0731.pdf ("The universal zero-rating of
exports means that fraudulent claims to have exported commodities are an intrinsic
difficulty for the VAT.").
394. Id. at 9-10.
395. Henry, supra note 4, at 24. This is only a partial list-TJN asserts that
"[t]here is a long laundry list of economic bads enabled by haven jurisdictions: not
only tax evasion but also fraud, bribery, illegal gambling, money laundering, and
traffic in contraband: drugs, sweatshops, human and sex trafficking, arms, toxic
waste, conflict diamonds, endangered species, bootlegged software ... the list is
virtually endless." Id.
396. Id. at 25-26.
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management." 397 This is an implausible assumption in several
respects. It assumes that people engaged in high risk criminal
activities choose "low yield" investments for their money once they
have spirited it out of the jurisdiction where their crimes are
committed. Why criminals would choose to invest like cautious
senior citizens is not explained and is unlikely considering the
evidence of their appetite for risk from their choice of occupation. It
is also counter to the usual assumptions about money laundering,
which focus on the need to get the money into vehicles that permit
using it.398 Moreover, this ignores considerable evidence that the
domestic cost of maintaining a corrupt regime is quite high.399
397. Id. at 30. (It is unclear how much "grossing down" has been done, since no
figures are provided.). We have attempted to find out where we can get a well-
paying job managing wealthy people's money by putting them in 6 month CDs
from major banks but these jobs seem in short supply -in part because wealthy
people seem to actually want their money managers to earn them money. The Price
of Offshore Revisited refers to "our interviews with private bankers and other
offshore industry experts" to determine that "the median private banking
customer" is "much less interested in maximizing short-term returns than in
securing an offshore nest egg - typically he or she is often taking quite enough risk,
thank you, back home." Id. This assumption is contradicted by one of The Price of
Offshore Revisited's key sources, the Merrill Lynch / Capgemini report, World Wealth
Report. Merrill Lynch & Capgemini, World Wealth Report 2011 (2012), available at
http://www.ml .com/media/114235.pdf. That report found that "Many HNWIs
took on more risk in 2010 as markets continued to rebound from crisis-related
losses. As a result, aggregate portfolio holdings shifted further toward equities and
away from cash deposits and predictable fixed-income instruments." Id. at 16.
Among the many peculiarities of these assumptions is that a considerable amount
of OFC business is on behalf of businesses and banks, which are looking for
returns. For example, many banks offer overnight investment sweep accounts, in
which excess funds are moved automatically to short term investment vehicles in
offshore markets. See, e.g., BNY MELLON, Investment Sweep,
http://www.bnymellon.com/trea suryservices/ investments weep.html; Sovereign
Bank, Automated Eurodollar Sweep,
http://www.sovereignbank.com/institutional/invest ments/ automated-
eurodollar-sweep-institutional.asp. Moreover, a serious critique of international
finance over the past few decades is that it has been overly focused on achieving
high returns, taking on too much risk at times. See, e.g., PHILIP AUGAR, CHASING
ALPHA: How RECKLESS GROWTH AND UNCHECKED AMBITION RUINED THE CITY'S
GOLDEN DECADE (2009) (describing flaws in UK's financial services sector). TJN
appears to be arguing that at just the time when everyone else in finance was busy
chasing high returns on everything from overnight deposits to longer term
investments in hedge funds, the tax evading class of criminals, money launders,
and other undesirables was just looking for a nice quiet certificate of deposit with a
low return.
398. P. Allen Schott, COMPREHENSIVE GUIDE TO AML/CFT 1-9 (2d ed. 2008).
399. See TONY HODGES, ANGOLA: THE ANATOMY OF AN OIL STATE 61 (2003) ("The
bestowal of favors has been the favoured strategy for taming the civilian opposition
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In addition, even if TJN's assumption of criminals buying low
yield CDs from offshore banks is correct, this does not support
TJN's conclusion that the money is idle. Once the money is
transformed from the suitcase of cash into an accounting entry at the
bank, the bank will invest the money itself (via loans, asset
purchases, etc.) and so transform the money into productive capital.
If the criminals are accepting low yields, the profits are accruing to
the banks' shareholders and so are taxed as the banks' profits
and/or through the shareholders when realized as dividends or
capital gains.
Next, TJN bases its estimates on a claim about money in private
banking institutions, where "First World private bankers employed
by the top 50 or so institutions have orchestrated the systematic
erosion of income and wealth bases in high- and low-income
countries alike."400 As "senior pilots in 'Capital Flight Air"' these
bankers have allegedly helped clients "move a significant share-
more than half, in the case of Latin America and some Asian
countries-of their liquid capital to offshore accounts under the
cover of shell companies and trusts, beyond the reach of domestic
tax authorities." 401 It is hard to know how TJN can know the
numerator (the fraction of Latin American and "some Asian"
investors' assets), since the entire point of the OFC structures in
TJN's framework is to conceal ownership of the assets, or the
denominator (the total wealth of these investors). While there are
some people hiding some assets somewhere, the estimate of "more
than half" seems to be pulled from thin air.
TJN estimates that the top 50 global private banks (which are
not listed in the report) held $12.06 trillion in "private cross-border
financial wealth" in December 2010.402 This estimate is based on
and limiting the 'risks' of democracy.... Oil wealth provides the presidency with
enormous resources to buy off opponents and build alliances, while the lack or
non-enforcement of transparent rules and procedures for the allocation of resources
(whether diamond concessions, state contracts, privatization of state assets, land
titles or business licenses) gives the head of state an array of mechanisms with
which to dispense favours.").
400. Henry, supra note 4, at 31. Somewhat mysteriously, TJN asserts that these
bankers have "assiduously recruited the world's wealthiest people as their clients,
including tens of thousands of developing countries." Id. at 31-32. We're sure TJN
meant "people from" rather than" of "but given The Price of Offshore Revisited's
snide tone, we can't resist a jab."
401. Id. at 32.
402. Id. at 33.
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unspecified and unreported calculations from "company annual
reports and 1OKs, investment analysts, interviews with private
banking industry experts, industry watchers like Wealth Briefing
News and Money Laundering Alert, and a survey of recent market
research studies for the private banking industry."403 Setting aside
the complete lack of transparency in these "calculations," the
estimates are implausible when compared to larger economic
trends. Counterintuitively, TJN's estimate is that the amount of this
wealth grew from $5.4 trillion in 2005 to $12.06 trillion in 2010- a
remarkable performance during an unprecedented global financial
crisis.404 By comparison, consider that the advocacy group Better
Markets (which we might expect to be aligned with TJN in general
on policy questions) estimated that the financial crisis cost the U.S.
economy at least $12.8 trillion.405 Mark Adelson, former chief credit
officer at Standard and Poor's (who we might not expect to be
particularly ideologically sympathetic to TJN), estimated the cost of
the financial crisis to the global economy at $15 trillion.406 The IMF
estimated the cost of the crisis in 2009 at $11.9 trillion.407 For global
private wealth invested in financial institutions to have more than
doubled while those same institutions were undergoing an
unprecedented crisis of liquidity and stability is truly remarkable
performance -particularly if all that money was just in low yield
CDs, as TJN hypothesizes.408
403. Id. at 32.
404. Id. at 33.
405. See Dennis Kelleher et al., The Cost of the Crisis BETTER MARKETS 2 (2012),
available at
http://www.bettermarkets.com/sites/default/files/Cost%200f %20The%20
Crisis_2.pdf.
406. Al Yoon, Total Global Losses From Financial Crisis: $15 Trillion, REAL TIME
EcoNoMICs (Oct. 1, 2012, 5:52 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/economics
/2012/10/01/total-global-losses-from-financial-crisis-15-trillion (quoting Mark
Adels- on).
407. Edmond Conway, IMF Puts Total Cost of Crisis at E7.1 Trillion, THE
TELEGRAPH (Aug. 8, 2009), available at http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance
/newsbysector/banksandfinance/5995810/IMF-puts-total-cost-of-crisis-at-
7.1trillion .html.
408. The puzzle is presumably solved by the various government bailouts of
large financial institutions. TJN does point to these bailouts as saving a number of
"too big to fail" financial institutions, although it wonders why "Treasury
Departments around the world" failed to realize "that these very same banks are
leading the world in enabling tax dodging-indeed, to some extent, precisely
because offshore investors know that they have been under-written by their
Treasury Departments." Henry, supra note 4, at 33, 34.
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As a result of these powerful assumptions, largely unsupported
by anything other than vague references to secret sources, TJN's
estimates are unreliable. Because the case for Control First measures
depends heavily on having a large estimate of the amount of
potential revenue, not having a reliable estimate makes it more
difficult to justify increasing financial transaction costs.
2. Corrections and Adjustments
A second category of problems with TJN's estimates is that the
already problematic estimates are increased by additional
corrections and adjustments. For example, TJN considers
adjustments to principal and interest in arrears to be "fictional
finance" rather than "actual cash flow;" since including it in the
calculations produced "nonsensical results" (an undefined term but
which appears to mean results that did not accord with TJN's
desired outcome), it is excluded.409 However, TJN counts debt
forgiveness as a "use" of funds. 410 Thus if a debt grows because of
missed interest payments, TJN does not count this increased liability
but if a debt shrinks because of forgiveness, this is counted. TJN
does not discuss how this factors into its claim that there is an
accumulating stock of assets in OFCs. For example, if any of the
assets TJN claims exist outside the recorded economy are invested
in bonds issued by a developing country and held in an offshore
account, those investments will lose value when a portion of the
debt is cancelled.411 Since TJN simply sums its estimates of flows
out each year, failing to adjust for this leaves an overstatement of
the stock it estimates exists offshore.
Similarly, TJN finds that following its methodology for China
would yield an "implausible" estimate of Chinese foreign
investment (13 percent).412 TJN suggests "much of [China's]
unrecorded capital transactions with Hong Kong are probably
409. Id. at 28.
410. Id. at 29.
411. This seems likely. For example, hedge funds hold considerable Argentine
public debt and have been engaged in extended legal battles with the Argentine
government over the terms of repayment. See Roben Farzad, Argentina's 11-Year
War with Hedge Funds, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK (Nov. 29, 2012) http://www .bus
inessweek.com/articles/2012-11-29/argentinas-11-year-war-with-hedge-funds.
Since these are the sorts of funds TJN finds objectionable, they are likely to have
investors TJN objects to as well.
412. Henry, supra note 4, at 31.
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double-counted. A significant amount of China's apparent capital
flight is actually just 'round-tripping' by way of intermediary
companies based in Hong Kong and a few other key havens, notably
the British Virgin Islands." 413 TJN also argues there is considerable
trade mis-invoicing through Hong Kong.414 Without providing
evidence that these claims are true, TJN has adjusted the results of
their calculations to get ones more to their liking instead of
abandoning a method of estimation that yielded "implausible"
results.415
It is worth unpacking this example because it is revealing of the
flaws in TJN's methodology. There is not a single source cited in the
discussion of "China's Story," although numerous factual claims are
made. According to TJN, Hong Kong is a major center facilitating
both trade mis-invoicing and flight capital from China.416 Yet Hong
Kong is part of the People's Republic of China and the national
Chinese government has both de jure and de facto authority over it.
(Indeed, if there is concern within Hong Kong over the territory's
relationship with China, it is that China exerts too much control, not
too little.) If Hong Kong was undermining the Chinese tax system
and denying the Chinese national government access to tax revenue
it needed to provide public services on the scale TJN alleges
(US$125.9 billion from Hong Kong according to TJN's estimates),
surely the Chinese government would have noticed this and taken
steps to halt the practice. After all, Hong Kong has only limited
autonomy under its Basic Law and the Chinese Constitution- the
"one country, two systems" framework-and certainly does not
have the level of legal autonomy that even British Overseas
Territories or Crown Dependencies possess with respect to the
United Kingdom.417 In short, there may be "two systems," but China
is certainly "one country" with respect to enforcement of Chinese
413. Id.
414. Id. Henry suggests that many of China's unrecorded capital outflows with
respect to Hong Kong are double counted.
415. Id. (Hong Kong capital outflows estimate "permits us to adjust China's
accumulated wealth estimates accordingly.").
416. Id. at 38.
417. See Ray Yep, Understanding the Autonomy of Hong Kong From Historical and
Comparative Perspectives, 24 CHINA INFO. 235, 236 (2010) ("While the Basic Law
prescribes the parameters for engagement between the central people's government
and the HKSAR government and the jurisdictional boundary of the latter, the
flexibility of these limits is subject to decision by the former through its power to
make, unmake, and interpret the Basic Law.").
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law. This leaves TJN in a difficult position: either Hong Kong is not
an illegitimate tax haven or the Chinese government is somehow
allowing massive wealth to escape through Hong Kong. For TJN to
complete this argument, it must argue that the Chinese government
is both corrupt (and so interested in allowing the looting to occur)
and incapable of moving money out of China without a costly and
elaborate charade involving Hong Kong's financial system. No
doubt there is corruption in China, as there is virtually everywhere.
But the idea that Hong Kong is needed to facilitate corruption on the
mainland is ludicrous. By making an ad hoc "adjustment" to the
inconvenient results of their model in the case of China, TJN reveals
the problematic nature of their calculations.
Hong Kong intermediates a great deal of China's external trade
and serves as a key vehicle for international investment into
China.418 This provides a better explanation for the flows of claims
through Hong Kong. What TJN ignores is that Hong Kong is a
multinational financial services center and entrep6t, which provides
sophisticated business and financial services to companies as well as
a legal system recognized as sophisticated on business issues.419 The
Hong Kong Stock Exchange is a deep and sophisticated capital
market using a convertible currency (the Hong Kong dollar) that
allows access to Chinese investments for investors who cannot
invest through mainland stock exchanges because of China's
restrictions on RMB convertibility. Major Chinese businesses,
including ones with substantial state ownership stakes, have listed
on both the Hong Kong and Shanghai stock exchanges.420 There is
little doubt that some Chinese investors seek to obtain the benefits
of Hong Kong's legal and business environment as well as tax and
418. Yue-Chim Richard Wong, The Role of Hong Kong in China's Economic
Development (Univ. of H.K., Int'l Ctr. for the Study of E. Asian Dev., Kitakyushu,
Working Paper Series Vol. 2002-06, Nov. 2002), available at http://file.icsead
.or.jp/user03/927_186.pdf .
419. See, e.g., Report on the First Five Years, supra note 40, at 33 ("The rule of law is
one of Hong Kong's greatest strengths. It is the cornerstone of Hong Kong's
success as a leading international commercial and financial center, providing a
secure environment for individuals and organizations and a level playing field for
business.").
420. See Clark Liu & Mark S. Seasholes, Dual-Listed Shares and Trading (Working
Paper, Dec. 2011), available at http://www.cfainstitute.org/learning/prod
ucts/publica tions/contributed/equityinvestments/Documents/rfdual-listed-
shares-and-trading.pdf (examining dual listed companies and finding price impacts
of differences in share rights).
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other advantages China offers to "foreign" investment by routing
investment funds through OFCs like the BVI.4 2 1 Indeed, since such
activity is openly discussed in financial circles, it is certainly well
known to Chinese authorities. 422 China might tolerate such
investments to gain the benefit of "genuine" foreign investment or
because it believes offering its own investors the benefits of Hong
Kong's legal and financial systems are worth the cost in foregone tax
revenues. By operating in a factual vacuum and ignoring the role
that financial centers like Hong Kong play in the world economy,
TJN grossly oversimplifies the functioning of world economy, which
undercuts the credibility of its estimates.
Having created estimates of money flows, TJN augments its
numbers using estimates of "how much these accumulated flows
might be worth over time." 4 23 This is a particularly vigorous
shifting of the cards in the three card monte game, since TJN simply
"assumes that a significant portion-50 to 75 percent, on average-
of these tax-free earnings are not repatriated to source countries but
are reinvested abroad in relatively 'safe', low-yielding investments,
denominated in traditional reserve currencies like US dollars." 424 TJN
supports this assumption with the "fact" that "most haven
investments are made for longer-term motives like asset protection,
money laundering, and diversification, not just short-term
speculation, with low turnover and high reinvestment rates." 4 2 5 Not
421. The success of the BVI in providing companies to intermediate Hong
Kong/China investment stems from the pre-Hong Kong handover period, when
many Hong Kong residents were concerned that the Chinese Communist
government might expropriate their property. In 1989, representatives of the BVI
Government travelled to Hong Kong to advertise the ease of setting up BVI
companies and the security of ownership under BVI/British law in Hong Kong
prior to the turnover. As a result, many Hong Kong residents transferred property
ownership to BVI companies. IMF, I ASSESSMENT OF THE SUPERVISION AND
REGULATION OF THE FINANCIAL SECTOR, THE BRITISH VIRGIN ISLANDS 16 (2003), available
at http://www .imf.org/extemal/pubs/ft /scr/2004/cr0492.pdf.
422. See Geng Xiao, People's Republic of China's Round-Tripping FDI: Scale, Causes
and Implications (Latin America/Caribbean and Asia/Pacific Econ. & Bus. Ass'n,
Working Paper 24, Dec. 2004), available at http://www5.iadb.org/laeba
/downloads/WP_- 24_2004.pdf (estimating average round-tripping FDI is between
20%-30% of Chinese capital flight, and suggesting that profit-motive and risk
diversification for developing countries determine the level of round-tripping FDI).
423. Henry, supra note 4, at 29.
424. Id. at 29-30.
425. Id. at 30. This adjustment is peculiar in that "diversification" and "money
laundering" are dramatically different activities, which cannot be categorized as
similar.
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only are criminals bad investors, but they are also world-class savers!
This is staggeringly implausible.
Finally, TJN uses what it labels as "The Offshore Investor
Portfolio Model" based on Bank of International Settlements (BIS)
data on cross-border deposits, wealth management industry
analysts' assumptions about portfolios, and "interviews with actual
private banks." 426 TJN begins with multiplying the amount of
offshore deposit liabilities by non-banks (using figures from the BIS)
by three, which TJN says is a "super-conservative" choice to account
for high net worth individuals' portfolios' allocation of assets into
offshore "'security blankets' for more risk-averse investors."427
Multiplying things by three certainly makes numbers bigger, which
appears to be TJN's goal in such an arbitrary calculation. Finally,
TJN assumes that illiquid investments in hedge funds, art, real
estate, and private equity make up 10-17 percent of these
individuals' portfolios. Thus for every dollar of nonbank deposit
liabilities in an offshore bank, TJN would add to its estimate of
offshore financial wealth two more dollars, turning the $7.01 trillion
into its lower estimate of $21 trillion. TJN also hints that more
should be added to reflect the likelihood that its 3.0 multiplier is too
low and to account for the illiquid assets.428
There are many problems with this "multiply things by a
number we made up" method of "estimation." First, it assumes that
all of the nonbank deposit liabilities in offshore banks are deposited
there by high net worth individuals. This is false. Many deposits in
banks in offshore jurisdictions made as part of Eurocurrency market
lending by institutions and are derived from sweeps of overnight
deposits. 4 29 TJN's first error in this regard is to assume that all OFCs
resemble Switzerland, which has an active private banking business
426. Id. at 34. We would have thought talking to private bankers would have
been more productive than discussing things with the banks.
427. Id. at 35.
428. We're not sure why the illiquid assets are broken out separately since the
liquidity ratio would presumably reflect them already, but TJN does not explain the
role of this adjustment. Id.
429. See Paul S. Pilecki, It Pays to Reduce Free Balances When Interest Rates Are
Rising, CMTY. BANKER 2 (Dec. 2005), available at http://winstonandstrawn.com/s
iteFiles/publications/websiteversion.pdf (describing how "Larger organizations
also use Cayman or Nassau branch deposits or commercial paper issued by a
holding company affiliate as the investment vehicle in a sweep arrangement. If a
bank has an offshore branch, a sweep can be operated without significant
operational difficulties....").
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in which much (but not all) of banks' assets represent deposits from
high net worth individuals. OFCs are a diverse set of jurisdictions,
with many not pursuing individual clients in banking but focusing
on other markets. Evidence that TJN's approach is flawed can be
seen in the drop in high net worth individual's cash/ deposits
holdings between 2010 and 2011 from 17 percent to 14 percent, a
drop that is not reflected in any adjustment in TJN's estimates.430
TJN's second error in constructing this estimate is to assume
that an investor's overall portfolio is mirrored in the offshore
portion of his or her portfolio. Thus even if TJN is correct that a
customer of a Swiss private bank keeps his or her liquid assets in the
Swiss account, there is no evidence to support the assumption that
the less liquid assets are also kept in Switzerland. Moreover, it is
unclear what it means for a Rembrandt painting to be "in"
Switzerland, unless it is physically present in Switzerland, although
its owner is elsewhere. As with other adjustments, TJN claims to
have "checked" its liquidity ratio calculations "with private bankers
and industry sources" for confirmation, but none of these people are
identified and no sources are cited.431
TJN's third error is to lump all high net worth individuals
together. To take just one obvious source of differences, the Merrill
Lynch/Cap Gemini World Wealth Report, on which TJN heavily
relies, finds that individuals from different countries have different
preferences for the percentage of their assets held in liquid form.
For example, wealthy Japanese tend to hold "55% of their aggregate
portfolio in fixed-income and cash/deposit vehicles at the end of
2010, up from 48 percent a year earlier and above the global average
of 43 percent." 432
A fourth problem is that the World Wealth Report suggests that
TJN's assumptions about the looting of developing countries are
incorrect. According to that report, 53 percent of total worldwide
high net worth individuals live in the United States, Japan, and
Germany. Nine of the top 10 nations for numbers of high net worth
430. World Wealth Report, supra note 397, at 16. TJN might respond that since they
are assuming a lower ratio, this does not matter. That is incorrect as what matters
is the change in flow. Thus even if their point estimate is lower than Merrill
Lynch/Capgemini's, if they argue that wealth reports like Merrill's are valid they
need to accept that it can indicate a reduced percentage of cash holdings whatever
their assumptions about the point estimates.
431. Henry, supra note 4, at 36.
432. World Wealth Report, supra note 397, at 16.
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individuals in 2010 are developed economies; the only exception is
China.433 (Brazil and India rank 11th and 12th.). The United States
alone has over 40 percent of all high net worth individuals; China
has 6.4 percent. The developed economies have 89.9%; the three
largest developing economies, just 10.1%. This suggests that TJN
has vastly overstated the number of looters in developing countries
who have managed to hold on to their ill-gotten gains.
The common theme among these adjustments and corrections is
that TJN has manipulated its assumptions to consistently increase
the size of the estimate, while discarding any model predictions that
would be seen as implausible or which detract from its preferred
narrative. Its estimates should therefore be ignored in serious policy
debates.
III. Coping with Uncertainty and Policy Choices
How much money is "moving" around the world in criminal
transactions? How many people and firms are illegally evading
taxes? No one knows. TJN's eye-catching estimate of massive
hidden wealth languishing in low yield CDs in offshore jurisdictions
is largely the product of the assumptions made rather than a
reasonable approximation of a concededly difficult number to
estimate. Unfortunately, because it is a huge number, it has
attracted widespread attention- particularly from governments
weary of austerity measures looking for easy fixes.4 34 In light of the
uncertainty about the relative size of beneficial international and
harmful financial transactions, rational policy discussions are
difficult. How then to have a reasonable discussion of the costs and
benefits of the various policy proposals made by Control First
advocates? We suggest four important issues.
First, policymakers need to be clear about whether they are
approaching financial issues from an Efficient Enterprises or a
Control First framework; is the goal to facilitate creating wealth or
prevent bad behavior? If a Control First approach is going to be
taken, are there any limits to it? Are the constraints that capital
markets impose legitimate or illegitimate? Do all governments and
their policies get presumptions of legitimacy? For example, can a
country confiscate one ethnic group's wealth with impunity, as
433. World Wealth Report, supra note 397, at 7, Figure 3.
434. See supra note 347.
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Zimbabwe did to white farmers, or redistribute wealth more
generally, if less dramatically, from one ethnic group to another, as
Malaysia has done? Can a government involuntarily swap its
citizens' holdings in non-local currencies and for national currency,
as Argentina did, or print as many units of currency as it wishes, as
Venezuela is currently doing without suffering financial
consequences? May a government criminalize reporting economic
information, as Argentina has, 4 3 5 and still be treated as a trustworthy
regulator of financial transactions? What about democracies where
tax policy is set based on a "mass feeding frenzy" that produces a
"swamp of unfairness, complexity, and inefficiency" (Steinmo's
description of the U.S. tax system as it developed after World War
II) or "dramatic see-sawing of tax policy and the fiscal incoherence
these changes have wrought" (his description of post-War British
tax policy)?436
Second, what are the constraints imposed by the need for the
rule of law on Control First measures? Is tax avoidance-that is,
following the rules to reduce one's tax burden -legitimate? If not,
how are tax obligations determined? Are they determined by
individual negotiation with tax authorities?
Third, what criteria will be used to judge the effectiveness of
those Control First measures that are adopted? Are there specific
revenue targets that must be reached? Is there a yardstick by which
to determine if there are measures that are too expensive?
Finally, who pays for the costs of the Control First measures?
Are all governments responsible for the costs within their
jurisdiction? Are private actors responsible for the costs they incur?
Are there limits to these costs? Who decides which measures are
required? Do all jurisdictions have a voice in determining which
measures are adopted?
To conclude, we turn to applying the frameworks to the policy
issues facing governments with respect to the degree to which they
will choose to facilitate or obstruct the movement of money across
borders. We examine three key issues where the differences in
approach between these two frameworks are critical to the policy
435. The Price of Cooking the Books, ECONOMIST (Feb. 25, 2012) http://www
.economist.com/node/21548229 (noting that "The [Argentine] government has
gone to extraordinary lengths, involving fines and threats of prosecution, to try to
stop independent economists from publishing accurate inflation numbers.").
436. STEINMO, supra note 23, at 163, 165, 206.
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choices: international investment, taxation, and financing
governments.
A. International Investing
Investments are not equally easy in all jurisdictions. Investors
must cope with country risks when investing across borders, and
not all countries present the same risk profiles.437 In addition, there
are other asymmetric obstacles to cross-border lending. Developing
markets may present "cultural differences and lack of information"
and "differing accounting and disclosure practices," 438 while well-
developed capital markets such as the United States, E.U., or Japan
offer well-understood practices that are easily accessible even to
outside investors. Where legal systems are not as developed,
investors face additional risks. Such risks include "(a) the
rudimentary protection of intellectual property rights (patents,
trademarks, copyrights), (b) the inadequate regulation of fair
trading and competition, (c) problematic dispute regulation
(unequal access to courts, unenforceable foreign judgments, and the
inability to refer disputes to arbitration) and (d) limited rights to
appeal."439 Many developing countries also seek to encourage
foreign investment by offering incentives including tax incentives.440
Access to well-functioning, liquid capital markets is an
important means of reducing financing costs. Many countries do
not have such markets, as a result of a variety of factors including:
information barriers, particularly with respect to accounting
standards and disclosure; transactions costs, including taxes on
transactions and high fees for transactions; foreign exchange risk;
regulatory barriers, including relatively high levels of capital gains
taxation; lack of liquidity; and political risk, including concerns over
government interventions, lack of capital market laws and
institutions, and poor quality judicial institutions." 1
Where countries have tried to control capital movements, they
437. BEENHAKKER, supra note 30, at 51 (explaining country risk as "the possibility
that unexpected events within a host country will influence a client firm's or a
government's ability to repay a loan.").
438. Id.
439. Id. at 56.
440. Mo, supra note 188, at 133.
441. BEENHAKKER, supra note 30, at 173.
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have often created unintended bad consequences. Brazil's efforts to
control capital flight, which dated from 1962 to 1990, restricted
capital remittances by taxing remittances above 12 percent heavily.
When inflation created a black market for foreign currency, foreign
firms found it worthwhile to repatriate funds above 12 percent at
the official exchange rate, pay the tax, and then reinvest via the
black market rate, more than offsetting the tax liability. 442
The fundamental question is whether cross-border investment
is presumptively beneficial or presumptively harmful. If the former,
then the policy goal should be to minimize the transactions costs of
such investments, imposing burdens only when the cost can be
justified as preventing a harmful activity (e.g., money laundering).
This requires demonstrating that the effort actually accomplishes its
goal.
B. Collecting Taxes
Collecting taxes is not a simple task. Indeed, a recent survey of
tax issues concluded both that "[c] omplexity is the unavoidable rule
of corporate income tax structures"443 and that tax administration "is
typically . . . the most difficult to get right."444 Many developing
countries lack the government infrastructure to administer a
complex tax system (such as the U.S. tax system). It is not even clear
that the United States has the capacity to administer its enormously
complex tax system. Among the problems contributing to tax
administration difficulties are: lack of rule of law and transparency,
including rapid changes and instability in tax laws; lack of a
tradition of voluntary compliance with tax laws; lack of efficiency in
administering tax laws, including lack of capacity to perform audits,
nonexistent third party information, and too few trained personnel;
corruption, which allows poorly paid civil servants and poorly
drafted, overly simplistic tax laws to become the source of bribes;
frequent tax holidays used to attract foreign investment,
encouraging businesses to report losses until a holiday occurs;
competition for investment, which limits aggressive enforcement of
tax laws.445
442. STOPFORD, STRANGE & HENLEY, supra note 11, at 105.
443. Emilio Albi & Jorge Martinez-Vazquez, Introduction, in ELGAR GUIDE, Supra
note 7, at 1, 4.
444. Id. at 7.
445. Mo, supra note 188, at 12-13. Mo describes the impact on tax collections of
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When particular incentives are available, businesses and
individuals structure transactions to take advantage of these
incentives. For example, China offered a lower tax rate for firms
receiving foreign financing at less than LIBOR plus 0.25 percent. At
a time when LIBOR was 10 percent, a firm borrowing RMB10
million from a Japanese lender re-characterized its initial loan rate of
10.4 percent to be 10.2 percent plus a service fee of RMB200,000 and
so qualified for the preferential tax rate." 6 China could have written
its tax laws to require calculation of an effective interest rate
including such fees, but it did not. Was the transaction illegitimate?
One response is to argue that tax authorities should be able to
exercise discretion to disallow tax strategies administratively when
they determine they are inconsistent with the intent of the tax laws.
Alternatively, countries that create tax laws that offer such
incentives could adjust their own tax laws to ensure that only
transactions they seek to incentivize are able to take advantage of
the provisions. We think the latter should be required before a
jurisdiction asks other jurisdictions to alter their laws or restructure
the entire financial system.
Moreover, jurisdictions need to take responsibility for their own
policy choices and implementations. In many instances, poor
quality tax policy can complicate tax administration and contribute
to avoidance and evasion. For example, Mo describes Mexico's tax
evasion problems as the result of the combination of complex tax
laws, "dysfunctional preference schemes," a large informal sector,
inflation, and inefficient tax administration. Several aspects of the
Mexican system sound much like what TJN and other Control First
proponents advocate:
Specifically, tax laws have been structured in which taxpayers are
treated as potential tax dodgers. Therefore they have to comply
with a huge number of formal requirements and different
obligations. The requirements that taxpayers have to fulfill to
the competition among local authorities in China for investment as producing "a
flexible approach toward enforcing the [tax] law whereas statutes and regulations
can be interpreted broadly to suit the need of other public policies. There are
inconsistencies among local, provincial, and national laws and regulations.... For
instance, receipts from enterprise income tax are shared between local and central
government, while individual income tax revenue is destined only for local
governments. Being dependent on revenue, individual local governments have
more incentives to grant tax reductions to promote local businesses and attract
foreign investment, thus creating inconsistencies." Id. at 79-80.
446. Id. at 80-81.
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take certain deductions are overcomplicated and formal.
In the past, legislation has repeatedly been based on exemptions,
which has led to great complexity throughout the tax system. In
many cases, the inspection efforts of tax authorities have been
transferred to the taxpayers, who have to cover the resulting
administrative costs. Every effort has been made to give the tax
authorities every facility to perform official inspections, which
complicates the entire tax system." 7
This approach creates its own corruption and tax leakage problems.
The preferential treatments of taxpayers create significant
loopholes. For example, the simplified tax regime allows small
companies with less than $300,000 annual sales to pay income tax
at a flat rate with a ceiling of 2.5% of income earned, less an
amount equal to three times minimum wages. This system that
taxes the difference between income and outlays on a cash-flow
basis, not only makes inspection difficult, but also treats among
other income tax payers unequally. In addition, large
corporations can take advantage of this loophole by splitting into
a number of small companies that are less scrutinized in
underreporting earnings. Lack of administrative capacity at the
provincial level is also a major impediment for progress." 8
More generally, Mo concluded from her study of four major
developing economies that, "an ineffective tax administration
system is a key factor leading to a high level of noncompliance."" 9
Mo is generally unsympathetic to tax avoidance measures, and we
find her description fits the Control First approach to taxes closely.
Yet, her proposed solution was the opposite of the Control First
approach: simplification of tax structures as an important means for
improving tax compliance.
A simplified tax structure will enable tax authorities to shift their
attention from monitoring of eligibility for exemptions and special
treatment give to firms and individuals, to more productive
activities such as development of a master file of taxpayers,
collections, and audits. In addition, it is easier for taxpayers to
understand, and therefore comply with simplified uniform rules.
With fewer special rules, there are also fewer opportunities to
avoid or evade by mis-classifying income, overstating deductions,
and claiming exemptions or credits. Finally, a simplified tax
447. Id. at 123-24.
448. Id.
449. Id. at 166-67.
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structure would reduce the scope for corruption since
complexities and ambiguities in tax law facilitate many taxpayers
to evade taxes.450
This is consistent with an Efficient Enterprises framework:
simplifying and improving domestic tax law's administration and
content facilitates more transactions, which yields more wealth.
The same point is seen in the discussion of transfer pricing. As
noted earlier, many Control First proponents argue that transfer
pricing is a key method of illegitimate shifting of money from
higher tax jurisdictions to lower taxes. 451 However, this assumption
is not accurate. For example, a survey found that much of the
writing on transfer pricing was about tax issues, while managers
had a much broader set of concerns.452 The allocation of earnings
across a firm's operations is rarely a simple task and the models
used by tax authorities to do so based on methodologies "founded
on basic assumptions about market structure and firm behavior that
are rarely empirically valid." 45 3 As a result of these methodological
problems, "multinational firms are unable to accurately anticipate
their tax liabilities in individual countries."454
The Control First approach to taxation is thus based on an
unrealistic assumption that any tax system a government (or NGO)
can imagine can be implemented. However, there are myriad
constraints on governments imposed by the world. Tax competition
provides one set, but taxes are just one of many criteria used by
firms and individuals in making financial plans.4 55 Moreover, the
450. Id. at 169.
451. For example, Picciotto argues that multinational firms have a competitive
advantage in their ability to "use a network of often fictional subsidiaries to exploit
all the possibilities of the interaction of tax systems, as well as the growing tax
treaty network." Picciotto, supra note 7, at 52-53. He describes this advantage as:
this entails a system of intermediary 'stepping stone' subsidiaries, which
are used to channel the transfer of assets and returns on investment to and
from foreign operating subsidiaries, through conduit companies (formed
in a treaty country) and then on to holding companies in low-tax havens.
Picciotto, supra note 7, at 53.
452. SHULMAN, supra note 312, at 3.
453. KING, supra note 235, at 1.
454. Id.
455. Albi, supra note 7, at 139 (a multinational may decide to establish itself in a
country, in spite of taxes, to serve its consumers better or because of product
transport costs. Other important factors in the location decision of foreign direct
investment (FDI) are relatively low wages or a qualified workforce. Quality of
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requirement of the rule of law that tax (and other) laws be written
down in advance inevitably leaves opportunities for tax avoidance
through structuring. In many instances, avoidance efforts take
advantage not of "loopholes" but tax code provisions put in place
deliberately to serve policy objectives (e.g., to promote investment),
satisfy political preferences (e.g., a preference for indirect taxation),
or special interests (e.g., tax credits for favored industries). To
single out a single piece of a multi-dimensional policy, as the
Control First approach does, is doomed to fail. What most of the
Control First proponents fail to recognize is that governments face a
series of tradeoffs in designing tax and other policies. In particular,
tax policy is not simply a matter of announcing a rate and collecting
the revenue.456 Different methods of taxation are susceptible to
different methods of avoidance and evasion.457
Moreover, an important component of cross-border financial
flows is external financing of government spending. For example,
the large U.S. budget deficits in the 1980s combined with relatively
high U.S. interest rates and the perceived safety of U.S. government
debt led to large capital inflows into the United States.458 Similarly,
the relative safety of U.S. government debt and today's even larger
deficits is drawing capital into U.S. financial markets despite low
infrastructure or the management skills of the country's business community, with
good goods and services providers, are also important for FDI location.").
456. Consider Norway, sometimes touted as a model of relatively progressive
tax rates by "tax justice" advocates. If one goes beyond the rates, one discovers that
Norway "has a petroleum tax system with such generous depreciation allowances
that, when added to interest payment deductibility, normal returns on investment
in this sector are practically tax exempt." Albi, supra note 7, at 134.
457. For example, income taxes can be evaded by illegally failing to report
income to tax authorities. An American citizen who earns income in Britain could
thus evade American income taxes by not informing the Internal Revenue Service
of the British income and not paying the tax owed under the U.S. system of world-
wide income taxation. A British citizen who was not resident in the United States
would not be engaged in tax evasion for failing to report income earned in the
United States, however, because under the British system of territorial taxation,
British taxpayers owe income taxes only on income earned in Great Britain. Income
taxes can be legally avoided by structuring a source of income so that the income is
not taxable by a particular tax authority. Locating an asset in a low tax jurisdiction
or a jurisdiction that does not tax a particular form of income thus reduces the tax
burden. For example, a non-American taxpayer who deposits money in an interest-
bearing account in the United States is not liable to the United States for income tax
on the interest. If his home jurisdiction does not tax foreign source income, he
would avoid tax on the interest income by depositing the funds in a U.S. bank
rather than a home jurisdiction bank.
458. BEENHAKKER, supra note 30, at 50.
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returns, since returns globally are depressed by central banks' easy
money policies.459 Focusing only on the tax portion and ignoring
the borrowing portion is dangerously incomplete.
IV. Conclusion
As we have shown, the global financial network is a complex
system that uses different jurisdictions for different purposes. Some
of these purposes are legitimate, while some are not. The question
facing policy makers around the world is how much reworking the
system can tolerate before the benefits it yields are too eroded.
Unfortunately, that debate turns in part on data that is impossible to
obtain. The most recent effort by the Tax Justice Network falls so far
short of any reasonable analysis that it cannot be considered
seriously.
As a result, the debate is being conducted based on world-
views rather than realistic cost-benefit appraisals. Certainly, as
Richard Bird argues, "tax researchers need to understand the real
constraints and objectives facing [developing country] policy
makers before offering them pre-cut solutions to what researchers
think are their problems." 460 Control First proponents believe that
the most important thing is to stop bad things happening in finance.
By contrast, Efficient Enterprises proponents, like the two of us,
believe that the analysis should begin with the promotion of
economic growth. We think the debate needs to begin with
discussion of those priorities rather than masked by the pretense of
data. In conducting that debate, it is vital that competing policy
proposals consider the benefits as well as the costs of jurisdictional
competition. The rule of law is all too scarce in today's world and
jurisdictions that specialize in providing it to others provide a valuable
service that needs to be recognized.
The overly simplistic, conspiracy-theory view of international
finance promoted by the Tax Justice Network must give way to a
realistic appraisal of the tradeoffs imposed by real world conditions
before the international tax competition debate can find solutions to
the difficult problems created by differences in national tax regimes.
As Richard Bird convincingly argues,
459. See Martin S. Feldstein, The Budget Deficit and the Dollar, 1 NBER
MACROECONOMICs ANNUAL 355, 356-358 (Stanley Fischer ed., 1986) (discussing
causes of capital inflows into the United States in early 1980s).
460. Bird, supra note 24, at 428.
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The level and structure of taxation reflect deep-seated institutional
factors that, in the absence of severe shocks, do not change
quickly. Tax policy decisions are not made by a benevolent
government. Taxation is not just a means of financing
government; it is also a very visible component of the social
contract underlying the state. Citizens are more likely to comply
with tax laws if they accept the state as legitimate and credible
and are thus to some extent both willing to support it and afraid
of what will happen to them if they don't. [A]ny major tax
reform is thus always and everywhere an 'exercise in political
legitimation'. Those who will have to pay more must be
convinced that they will get something worthwhile for their
money. Those who do not want to pay more must not be able to
block reform and, in the end, must be willing to go along without
taking to the hills in revolt or fleeing the country. Those within
the government and in the private sector who have to implement
the reform must support it or at least not actively sabotage it.
And of course politicians have to see sufficient support to warrant
putting reform not only on the agenda but on the ground. 461
This suggests that the solution to tax evasion lies in substantial part
in reforming governments to ensure that they uphold their side of
the social contract.
In addition, there are trade-offs to be made on virtually every
margin in the design of tax systems and ignoring them is a recipe for
dysfunction. Improving international tax systems is more likely to
result from continuing "to eliminate tax preferences," "a better
approximation of tax depreciation to the actual depreciation of
assets," and continuing "the process of base-broadening and rate-
moderating that started in the second half of the 1980s." 462
However, these steps are much less likely to grab headlines than
over-hyped, fanciful claims of trillions of hidden wealth and require
boring discussions of technical details rather than rhetorical
flourishes such as denunciations of "pirate bankers."
As Albi notes, "[g]ood tax administration performance is a
must for all taxes."463 Providing tax officials and policymakers with
the information needed to tackle the messy job of real tax reforms in
developing countries is thus key. 464 Devoting more resources to
461. Bird, supra note 24, at 428.
462. Albi, supra note 7, at 162.
463. Id. at 163.
464. Id. at 169.
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creating honest, competent governments in jurisdictions where
corruption and incompetence is the norm is critical 65- and not
addressed by denunciations of jurisdictions providing rule of law
services to the rest of the world. Moreover, reality may constrain
the choice of tax structures in ways that do not accord with
individuals' or NGOs' preferences. For example, as Martinez-
Vazquez and Bird argue, "even a bad VAT is often likely to be better
than the possible alternatives in even the poorest countries," 466
shifting from income taxes to consumption taxes may be preferable
to TJN's desire for redistribution when other factors are weighed in
with such preferences.467
Finally, there are real issues of respect for sovereignty that must
be addressed, and which the Control First view ignores. Today's
international financial institution regulation "is dominated by a few
rich or large countries."468 If we live in a world where international
relations require respect for the sovereignty of all jurisdictions, the
shifting of costs from large, wealthy jurisdictions to small ones
demanded by the Control First proponents is illegitimate.
465. Bird, supra note 24, at 416-17 ("[Lord] Kaldor ... was thus right in the
important sense that countries that wish to tax more need to ensure their governing
institutions facilitate the achievement of this goal. Doing so by such oft-suggested
means as enhancing the rule of law, reducing corruption and the shadow economy,
and improving tax morale, is neither simple nor easy.").
466. Jorge Martinez-Vasquez & Bird, supra note 248, at 231.
467. Another example is Alexander et al.'s call to allow developing nations to
substitute "macroeconomic controls for the resource intensive firm-level
regulation" required today for financial institutions. ALEXANDER ET AL., supra note
2, at 269. This would be inconsistent with the type of individual transaction
controls proposed by TJN and other Control First groups.
468. Id. at 171.
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